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Iran has had a long history of relations with Czarist
and Soviet Russia, one which has often been characterized by
highly opportunistic attempts by Russian leaders to dominate
Iran. The development and success of the Islamic Revolt
which toppled Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, in
1979 had a profound effect on the Soviet-Iranian relationship.
Unsure of the eventual outcome, Moscow's leaders reacted
cautiously and at the same time opportunistically. The Soviet
aim was to avoid comjnitting its support before the revolu-
tion's outcome was clear; to protect Soviet interests which
could be affected by the instability in Iran; and yet to be
in a position to take advantage of whatever situation developed
as a result of the conflict. Despite its best efforts, how-
ever, the Kremlin has been unable to exploit to any signifi-
cant degree the advantages thought to be inherent in the
overthrow of the Shah and the demise of American influence
in Iran, and finds itself instead confronted with a number of
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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 1979, after a 37-year reign which had sur-
vived great power interference, internal challenges and
assassination attempts, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of
Iran, was overthrown by domestic turbulence and revolution.
This development, with all of its domestic and international
implications for Iran, was characterized by much confusion
and misunderstanding on the part of western leaders, the
press and the general public. It is, moreover, safe to say
that confusion was not confined to foreigners alone, but was
also evidenced to a significant degree in the activities of
the participants themselves, from the demonstrator in the
street, through the opposition leadership, to the person of
the Shah himself.
In the United States, there appeared to be no clear under-
standing of the sources of the crisis or of why events in
Iran had taken such a course. No better illustration of this
confusion exists than misperceptions which prevailed concerning
possible Soviet involvement in the movement against the Shah
and Moscow's response to the events in Iran. To an American
public conditioned to what is, at a minimum, a more active and
forward Soviet foreign policy in a global sense, and in par-
ticular to Moscow's activities since 1975 in that region of
the world - "adventurism in the Horn of Africa," an involvement

in Afghanistan which was eventually to lead to the Soviet
invasion of that country in December 1979, etc., - the coin-
cidence of unrest in Iran in 1978 raised suspicions of further
Soviet instigation and exploitation in what has come to be
termed the "arc of instability."
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Moscow's re-
action to Iran's revolution and the impact of events in Iran
on the future of Soviet-Iranian relations. This study is
divided into three parts.
The first of these, undertaken in Chapters II and III is
an examination of the development of Iran's relationship
with the USSR. Iran has a long history of relations with
Czarist and Soviet Russia, one which was characterized by
highly opportunistic attempts by Russian leaders to dominate
Iran, and Iranian efforts to resist penetration and maintain
its territorial integrity. The history of the relationship
has played an important role in the perceptions of Soviet
and Iranian policy-makers alike, and is relevant to its
future course as well.
The second portion of the thesis will deal with domestic
and external factors which influenced the development of the
anti-Shah movement in Iran. Of particular interest is the
question of U.S. responsibility for the circumstances leading
to the revolution and the response of American policy-makers
to the threat to a "pillar" of U.S. policy in the Persian
Gulf/Indian Ocean region.

Also considered in this part of the study will be
the phases through which the revolution in Iran progressed.
Critical dates and events will be highlighted, with the
objective of demonstrating that there were specific points
at which the regime might have succeeded in defusing the
situation had it undertaken specific measures. This
examination will further establish a frame of reference
for analyzing the Soviet reaction to the "Islamic Revolt"
in Iran.
The primary focus of the thesis, Moscow's actual response
to the crisis and the prospects for the future Soviet-Iranian
relations, is examined in Chapter V. This study contends
that the Iranian revolution was not a totally welcome develop-
ment in Moscow. Indeed, it presented the Kremlin with a
situation in which the advantages of the demise of the Shah
were at least balanced by uncertainties and risks, and
indeed, a dilemma of opportunism for the Soviet leadership.
Through an examination of those publications available in
English, primarily, but not necessarily limited to Foreign
Broadcast Information Service , reasons for the nature and
form of the Soviet reaction will be offered. Specifically,
this involves scrutinization of the Kremlin's treatment of
certain aspects of the revolt; Moscow's official position,
"anti-imperialism" and religion are among these. The dis-
cussion will then be carried forward into an analysis of
10

the issues which are certain to be involved in determining
the future course of Soviet-Iranian relations, and conclu-
sions will be offered.
11

II. SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS FROM THE HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE; THE CZARIST LEGACY
Iran's national history can be traced backwards in time
some 2,500 years to the Persio-Median Empire. In 539 B.C.,
Cyrus the Great asserted his independence from the Medes
and established the first Persian Dynasty - the Achaemenid -
which lasted from 539-330 B.C. A second great Persian
Dynasty, the Sassanid, emerged in 224 A.D. and was finally
overcome by the Moslem conquest in 651 A.D. The demise of
this second Dynasty left Iran divided and nominally subject
to foreign rule, although several lesser Persian dynasties
asserted their independence intermittently during the 9th
through 14th centuries. In the 10th century, for example,
the Samanid Dynasty dominated the eastern portion of Iran,
"arousing and reestablishing Iranian national spirit."
This Iranian national spirit also continued to find expression
in Persian literature, history and art, and a religious inter-
pretation which led to what Wilber has termed an "Islamic
Iran with a character quite different from that of any of
2the other Moslem countries."
By the time the Safavids arose under Shah Ismail circa
1500, the Ottoman Turks were already firmly established in
Southeast Europe and Nearer Asia. During most of the next
three centuries, the Ottoman Empire was the most important
foreign power of concern to Iranian rulers. Thereafter, as
12

will be discussed below, Russian power gradually supplanted
the threat from the Ottomans, as Russian interests in expan-
sion, commerce and security found expression in increased
pressure on both the Turks and Persians.
In 1512, the new Ottoman Sultan, Selim the Grim, turned
east against Ismail, who had proclaimed Shi 'ism as the reli-
gion of Iran. Moreover, Selim suspected that Ismail was
"being used by the crowned heads of Europe, jealous of the
3
new Ottoman power, to make trouble for him..." The first
Ottoman-Safavid encounter ended in an Iranian defeat, and
set off an intermittent struggle between the two dynasties
which continued throughout the following two centuries.
Despite that defeat, however, for the first time since the
reign of the Sassanids, parts of Iran were ruled by native
Iranian dynasties (e.g., the Buwayids, Saffavids, etc.).
Under Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) , Iran successfully blunted
Ottoman expansion and recovered Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Georgia, which had been lost to the Turks by Ismail and Tahmasp
At its height, the Safavid Empire stretched from the Black
and Caspian Seas to the Gulf of Oman and included portions
of present-day Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and the Georgian, Armenian
and Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republics.
It was also during Abbas ' rule that development of rela-
tions with European countries was first actively pursued..
Great Britain was the most important of these, and numerous
4English travelers made their way to Abbas' court. Trade and
13

commerce also flourished, and in 1622 a military alliance-
of-sorts between Iran and the British was forged to expel
5the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf.
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
Among the other places in Europe to which Abbas dispatched
emissaries was the Tsardom of Muscovy. Moscow at this time
could not yet be termed a "state" in the modern sense of the
word, but was more a "personal feifdom" of the Tsar of Moscow.
Nevertheless, as Richard Pipes, for example, has noted, the
growth of Moscow was already the cause of concern in Europe:
In 1600, Muscovy was as large as the rest of
Europe... Having been eminently successful in ac-
quiring power through the accumulation of real
estate, (Moscow's tsars) tended to identify politi-
cal power with the growth of territory, and the
growth of territory with absolute, dominal authority.
The idea of an international state system, with its
corollary, balance of power, formulated in the west
in the seventeenth century, remained foreign to
their way of thinking. So did the idea gf recipro-
cal relations between state and society.
°
By the time Abbas dispatched his representatives to
Moscow in the 17th Century, early Russian interests in the
lands to the east and southeast had already manifested them-
selves. Ever since the early 14th Century, when the Golden
Horde had ruled vast regions of Central Asia and Eastern
Europe, Russian merchants had traded with the Crimea and
northern Iran. Muscovy, because of its geographic location
and the legacy of commercial ties established under Mongol
rule, remained oriented "towards the east even after the
14

Golden Horde had dissolved and Moscow entered into regular
commercial relations with western Europe. The conquest in
the 1550 's of Kazan and Astrakhan, both of them important
entrepots of oriental and Middle Eastern goods, increased
Russian involvement with eastern markets. Until the
eighteenth century, Russia's foreign trade was directed
primarily towards the Middle East, especially Iran; of the
three bazaars in Moscow in the second half of the seven-
7teenth century, one dealt exclusively with Persian merchandise."
Another factor which drew Moscow's attention in the
direction of Persia was settlement. For several centuries,
Russian migration and settlement had been restricted to
regions immediately around Moscow. In the north and west,
powerful European neighbors (e.g., Poland and Sweden) con-
fronted the Russians. To the east and south, powerful Turkic
tribes at first resisted Russian settlement and cultivation
of the fertile "Black Earth Belt", which ran from Kiev to
gthe Urals. As Richard Pipes has noted, however,
A dramatic change in the history of Russian coloni-
zation occurred after the conquest in 1552-1556 of
the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. Russian
settlers immediately began to pour towards the mid-
Volga, ejecting the indigenous Turks from the best
lands; others pushed beyond... the main migratory push
then and subsequently proceeded in the southern and
southeastern direction...^
The elimination of the Turkic opposition was to have impor-
tant implications for subsequent developments in Russian
relations with Iran and her neighbors - it removed a
15

significant buffer between growing Muscovite power and the
Muslim Empires of Persia and the Ottomans. Thereafter, it
was but a matter of time until Russian expansion gradually
filled this void and brought them to the very doorsteps of
these empires.
When he acceeded to the throne in 1642, Shah Abbas II
(1641-166 7) undertook to expand Persian involvement with
Europe. Trade and commerce were the central interests involved,
An examination of this period reveals two important factors
which deepened these relationships. First was the lure of
Eastern trade for European countries. Second was the declin-
ing ability of the Persian rulers to prevent European encroach-
ments. The Persian need for British aid in 1622 to expel
Portuguese traders who refused to pay the customary tribute
to the Shah was but one example of the disadvantages Iran
found herself in vis-a-vis the European powers. The price
the British exacted for their assistance in this case was
a guarantee of a pre-eminent role in Gulf affairs, one which
they held and protected for over three centuries.
It was trade that also brought about the first recorded
instance of Russian aggression against Persia during the
reign of Abbas II. The Grand Duke of Muscovy had dispatched
a delegation of over 800 men to Isfahan, the Safavid capital.
Abbas soon discovered that the Russians were not diplomats,
but merchants seeking to avert payment of Iranian customs
duties. Abbas expelled the delegation and, in retaliation.
16

Cossacks from southern Russian overran the province of
Mazanderan and burned the provincial capital, Farrahabad.
Following Abbas' death, there was a lapse in formal relations
between Persia and Russia for more than four decades.
Throughout the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the
stage was being set for the difficulties in which Persia
would find herself in the 1800 's. Due in part to a lack
of effective leadership, Safavid power was rapidly declining
and, in many parts of the Empire, the Shah's rule was nominal
at best. This process was occurring at the same time that
Russia, which was to become a key actor in Iranian affairs
in the 19th Century, came under the rule of the visionary
Czar, Peter the Great (1682-1725). It was during Peter's
reign that Russian interests in trade, commerce and settlement
were transformed and molded into more definite, related
economic-political-military goals. It was also the period
during which the opportunism which eventually came to char-
acterize Russian behavior towards its neighbors first
developed.
Peter's ultimate goal was to transform Russia into a
European and world power. He recognized that this task could
not be accomplished unless Russia engaged in large-scale
commercial and trade activities in the manner of the British
and others. Furthermore, Russia's land power would be insuffi-
cient to safeguard these activities from foreign encroachments.
Rather, Russia must have access to the open sea and develop
17

the naval power to maintain that access and protect her
commerce. Russian military defeats between 1687 and 1695
against Tatars allied to Turkey and supported in part by
naval re-supply at Azov confirmed Peter's estimation of
the importance of sea power
.
Peter's quest for outlets to the sea and naval power,
although initially concentrated in the Baltic (at Sweden's
expense) , and in the Black Sea (against the Turks) , ultimately
involved Persia. Early in his reign, Peter had planned to
extend Russian influence to the Caspian region. In 1713, "an
interest in India as well as a desire to outflank and defeat
the Turks prompted him to construct a large flotilla at
Astrakhan on the Volga with a view to sending an expedition
to the Caspian Sea, then somewhat weakly held by the Shah of
Persia." Nor did the rationale for such an expedition stop
with Persia and the Caspian. From the Caspian, the way would
be open for an invasion of India. Percy Sykes, in his noted
work on Persia, quotes the alleged "will" of Peter the
Great:
Article IX. . .approach as near as possible. . .Constan-
tinople and India - whoever governs there will be the
true sovereign of the world. . .excite continued wars,
not only in Turkey, but in Persia... in the decadence
of Persia, penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf, (and)
reestablish. .. the ancient commerce with the Levant,
advance as far as India, which is the depot of the
world. Arrived at this point, we shall have no longer
need of England's gold.^-^
In 1716 and 1717, Peter dispatched representatives to
explore commercial possibilities in Persia and to explore
18

and map the Caspian region. The second mission resulted
in a trade agreement with the Shah, Sultan Hussein, and
a report to Peter concerning the situation in Persia and
the Shah's fears of a Russian attack. In 1721, a Persian
attack on Russian merchants provided Peter with an excuse
to launch a combined land and naval attack along the Caspian,
which ultimately resulted in Persia's ceding Baku, Derbent
and territory along the south shore of the Caspian to Russia.
The steady decline of the Safavids climaxed in 1722
with the Afghan conquest of Persia. The new Afghan rulers,
however, had neither the interest nor power to control the
nominal Safavid domains. This afforded Russia and the Otto-
mans the opportunity to partition the western provinces of
13Persia between them. Czarist Russia now occupied the western
and southern shores of the Caspian Sea. Without Peter's firm
hand, however, the Russians were unable and generally unin-
terested in further exploitation of this foothold. Until
Catherine the Great took the Russian throne some 31 years
after Peter's death, the Russians temporarily abandoned further
pressures against the Turks and Persians.
Persia, meanwhile, had come under the rule of an Afshar
tribesman. Nadir Quli, who had served as a military commander
for Shah Tahmasp. Having successfully defeated the Afghans
in 1729, Nadir deposed Tahmasp, declared himself regent for
Tahmasp 's son Abbas III, and upon the death of Abbas in 17 36,
proclaimed himself Nadir Shah. Under the reign of Nadir Shah
19

(1736-1747) , the degeneration of the Persian Empire tem-
porarily abated. Afghanistan and India were overrun, while
the Russians had in the meantime evacuated the Persian
14
side of the Caspian Sea. This resurgence, however, was
not destined to outlive Nadir. The half-century following
Nadir's death was one of anarchy in Persia as rival dynasties
struggled for power.
By the time the fourth great Persian Dynasty - the Qajar
emerged just prior to the turn of the century, Persia was
ill-prepared to meet the challenge of what was to become a
century of European intrigue and political and economic
competition in the Near East. As one observer has noted,
In the final years of the eighteenth century, the
factors which seem to have permitted Iran's survival
were external rather than internal. Rivalry between
the Russians and the Ottomans, domestic tumults on
their own hearths, and fear of other powers in addi-
tion to each other reduced their threats to Iran at
this time. Other than at every opportunity contributing
to the possibility that the Ottomans and Russians
would eventually devour each other, no other foreign
policy was actively pursued by Iran as the eighteenth
century drew towards its end.'^^
B. PERSIAN RELATIONS WITH 19TH CENTURY EUROPE AND RUSSIA
When the 19th Century opened, Iran found itself imperiled
by two gigantic empires, Russian and British. Russian power
was poised at the Ottoman and Persian doorstep. Britain had
clearly established interests in India and its adjacent areas
Iran stood at the crossroads of East and West, astride the
routes upon which the rising industrial strength of these
20

two Empires was dependent for raw materials, markets and
commerce.
As Joseph Upton has observed, the 19th Century was "the
period when the (Persian) rulers discovered that their
military strength was totally inadequate to defend the
national territory from foreign invasion. .
.
(and there emerged)
a national policy of balancing off irresistable foreign
pressures ... in an endeavor to achieve a sense of personal
•^ „16security.
"
This national policy of balancing off foreign pressures
underwent its first test in the early part of the nineteenth
century with Napoleonic France. Napoleon, who even as a
youth had dreamed of invading India, now sought to involve
Persia in his scheme for an overland invasion of India. It
will be remembered that Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. He
soon approached Czar Paul I of Russia with a proposal for a
joint Franco-Russian invasion of India, which would, in
Czar Paul's words, "liberate India from the tyannical and
17barbarous yoke of the English."
With the failure of the Egyptian venture, however. Napoleon
withdrew from the plan and sought instead to neutralize
Russia by enlisting the aid of Fath Ali Shah. Napoleon pro-
posed "to restore to Iran her territories in the Caucasus
in return for: (1) a Turko-Persian alliance to harass Russia
from the rear, and (2) an overland route to the rich sub-
18
continent of India to enable Napoleon to drive out the British."
21

For his own part, Fath Ali was content to obtain French
support and assistance to bolster Iran against Russia and
Britain.
Although quick British diplomatic action forestalled a
Franco-Persian alliance in 1800, Fath Ali again turned to
France when the British failed to assist Persia against
Russian attacks on Ervian and Enzeli. In 180 7, the Treaty
of Finkenstein was signed, in which the Shah agreed to join
France in an attack on Russia and to aid in an invasion of
India.
While the threat of a French invasion of India quickly
passed, Russian interest in the possibility of capturing the
sub-continent persisted. Great Britain had long considered
Russian expansion as a threat to India, and viewed the main
20threat as coming through Iran. As the 19th Century progres-
sed, Persia therefore came to figure prominently both in
Russian designs to at least pressure the British position in
India, as well as in British determination to thwart Russian
moves as far as possible from India. According to Schuster,
The strategical interests of Great Britain in
Persia arise from conditions with which India is
most intimately concerned. .
.
(When) the ambitions
of France were the main source of apprehension, it
was through Persia that a blow at British supremacy was
expected to be struck and that an invasion of India
was planned... It is clear that Persia has assumed a
strategical importance in relation to British India...
which is indisputably great when it is remembered
that closely upon Persia and upon Afghanistan is the
evergrowing momentum of a power whose interests in
Asia are not always in accord with our own... 21
22

Russian interest in India and the aggressive nature of
their activities against Persia in the 19th Century was a
product of an admixture of continuing concerns and objec-
tives. There was, as was previously mentioned, Russian
expansionism, in part a function of the "transient" nature
of the Russian frontier. Until the 19th Century, given the
lack of clearly defined geographical boundaries, "the presence
of Russian settlers and soldiers determined to a large ex-
22tent the borders of the Russian Empire." In the Middle East
and South-Central Asia by the early 1800 's, Russian expansion
was approaching the point at which any further territorial
gains must be at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, Persia,
or the British.
A related concern was security, the "enormous steppes
and plains - vast areas without natural barriers which
allowed the penetration of nomads from the east and south.
The defense of such an area and the establishment of secure
frontiers. .
.
(required) . . .acquiring control over the entire
plain, the main entrances to it and the mountains around
23it."^-^
To these motivations might also be added Russian commer-
cial interests, military strategies, and Russia's "civilizing
mission" as the "most pious Christian Kingdom" in the world,
the "Third Rome". Finally, there was the idea of "Pan-
Slavism", which played its role in the intellectual rationale
for the expansion of the Russian state. The latter two concepts
23

were, of course, inter-related and resulted in a somewhat
idealized vision of Russia as the country destined to solve
24
mankind's problems.
Beginning in 1804, there ensued a ten-year period of
Russo-Persian clashes over Georgia, an area important to
the control of Persia's northern provinces and strategically
located on the flank of the Ottoman Empire. The use of overt
Russian military force against Persia was accompanied by
attempts to, as Peter had "directed" a century earlier,
25
"excite continued wars, not only in Turkey, but in Persia."
As Yodfat and Abir have noted, the Russians "examined
existing local separatist movements, as well as the possi-
bility of encouraging the growth of such movements specifically
supporting Russian policy," including in 1809, an attempt to
convince the Pasha of Baghadad to move toward a "complete
separation from the Porte" and "to act against Persia", with
26
a promise of Russian protection.
In 1813, the Russians started another in the series of
clashes with Persia and defeated the Persian forces at
Aslandoz. This defeat compelled the Shah to sign the Treaty
of Gulistan later that same year, in which Persia ceded to
Russia Georgia, areas in the Caucasus, Daghestan, Shirvan,
Ganjeg, Karabagh and all territory between the Caucasus and
Caspian Seas. Additionally, Persia ceded to Russia the
27
exclusive right to sail ships of war on the Caspian Sea.
In 1814, Great Britain and Persia signed the Treaty
of Tehran, a treaty of defensive alliance which provided for
24

mutual assistance in case of aggression against either party
and stipulated that the as-yet unsettled boundary between
Russia and Persia would be determined by negotiation between
Persia, Russia and Great Britain. Nevertheless, when con-
flict between Russia and Persia again erupted in 1825, Britain
failed to come to Persia's aid. The military defeat of
Persia in this conflict resulted in the Treaty of Turkomanchai,
2 8
which was signed in 182 8. According to the terms imposed
by this Treaty, Persia ceded to Russia portions of Armenia
and was forced to pay a war indemnity. More importantly,
however, was the loss of internal political sovereignty
Persia suffered under other provisions of the Treaty, which
gave the Russians jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases
involving Russian subjects and granted the Russians a special
role in internal affairs as the "protector" of the Qajar
dynasty. By this treaty, the Russians thus "secured the
obedience of a weak and degenerate Iranian monarchy" and
began the economic and political penetration of the country,
29
which was eventually exploited by other powers as well.
C. INTENSIFICATION OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY
With the Treaty of Turkomanchai, the Russo-Persian border
in the Caucasus was generally stabilized. From this time
into the Twentieth Century, Iran was to be torn between the
conflicting interests of Russia and Great Britain. Russian
plans for expansion and the establishment of spheres of
influence, which, in contrast to those of other European
25

powers, generally involved areas adjacent to existing holdings,
30
were now focused on Central Asia. The Russians also
explored the possibilities of securing a warm water port
31
on the Persian Gulf, to challenge the British position there.
In the 18 30 's Russia sought to improve relations with
Persia in order to gain time to consolidate its hold in its
newly-won territories. Due to the internal situation in
Iran, however, such Russian concerns were probably unfounded.
Path Ali Shah died in 1834, setting off a struggle for power
between several factions. It was only with the support of
the Russians and British that Muhammed Shah, the grandson
and rightful heir to the throne, was crowned Shah in 1835.
This condition of internal weakness and chaos typified 19th
Century Iran. As Professor Nikki R. Keddie has observed:
If one accepts Max Weber's acute definition of the
state as 'a human community that (successfully)
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory, ' the Qajars had no
state, since tribes, city factions, local governors,
and even members of the Ulama class had private
armies and engaged in battles without the central
government's being able to intervene. 32
This situation had serious implications for both Iranian
domestic and foreign policy. Internally, it meant that the
monarchy, only one among several powerful groups vying for
power within the country, relied on external powers for its
continued existence and predominance. Such dependence, in
turn, meant that the foreign policy of Iran was more vul-
nerable to the whims of these same powers.
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Such was the case in the Persian attempts to compensate
for its losses in the Caucasus-Caspian region at the expense
of Afghanistan, the all-important buffer between Russian
and British India. The Russians encouraged Persian attacks
on Afghanistan in 1836. These attacks led to a rupture of
diplomatic relations with Great Britain and withdrawal of
33the British military mission to Iran. In 1837, the Russians
further instigated an alliance between Persia and the Barakzai
Amirs of Kabul and Kandahar to attack Herat, then an indepen-
dent Afghan amirite under a prince of the previous Saddozai
Dynasty.
Similar Russian encouragement was provided to Persia
under Nasir al-Din Shah in the 1850 's. Nasir al' Din's reign
was marked by generally friendly relations with Russia and
the entrenchment of Russian influence throughout the country.
The Iranian attack on Afghanistan in 1856, timed to take
advantage of Britain's preoccupation with Russia in the
Crimean War, prompted a British declaration of war against
34Persia following termination of hostilities m the Crimea.
Nasir Shah was forced to seek peace when Russian military
support failed to manifest itself and the British seized
Kharah and Bushire. Great Britain and Persia signed the
Treaty of Paris in 1857, but Russo-Persian relations remained
• 4- ^ 35intact.
Among the reasons for Russian encouragement of Persian
efforts against the Afghan buffer to British India (and the
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ultimate cause of the Crimean War as well) was Russian con-
cern over the Ottoman Empire. During the first half of the
19th Century, Russian policy-makers feared that the Ottoman
Empire might disintegrate and they determined to keep it
36intact. Such a disintegration, they thought, would surely
result in a partition of the Empire by European powers - a
partition from which Russia would be excluded. Such a develop-
ment would bring strong neighbors to Russia's southern fron-
tier and result in the decrease of Russia's influence in the
37
area, and the emergence of a new "balance of power."
By the 1850 's, however, the Russians had come to feel
that they were in a powerful enough position to participate
in such a division of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, they
mistakenly perceived that other European powers would
38
acquiese to a partition. The decisive defeat of Russian
forces in the Crimean War, however, confirmed British
determination to maintain the Ottoman Empire intact and
resulted in the decline of Russian influence in that area.
The implications of the Russian defeat also extended to
Iran, where a "semblance of balance was restored" between
39Russia and Britain. A further result was the intensifica-
tion of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, which was to deepen,
40particularly in the latter part of the century. By 1873,
Russia had conquered territories both to the west and east
of the Caspian and the common frontier between Russia and
Persia was thus established.
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with the arrival of Russian power close to settled
Persian territory west of the Caspian in the 1870 's, Russian
tactics towards Persia changed. Heretofore, the Russians
had relied primarily on military force to gain their objec-
tives. Beginning in the 1870 's, however, the Russians began
to emphasize "penetration by peaceful means" in their dealings
with Iran. Accordingly, Russia sought "to preserve the
integrity and inviolability of the Shah's domains, not seeking
territorial increases .. .and not permitting the dominance of
a third power, (but) gradually to subject Persia to (Russian)
domination without violation. . .of either the external signs
41
of Persia's independence or her internal structure." (Empha-
sis added.)
The outstanding features of the Russian penetration of
Iran between the 1880 's and 1907, when Britain and Russia
formalized what were, in fact, the de facto "spheres of
influence" they had developed, were as follows:
1. Economic penetration, which came to be the central
aspect of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran. The demand for
economic concessions accelerated after Nasir Shah granted
the de Reuter concession in 1872. Despite the subsequent
cancellation of that concession in 1873, Nasir granted a
new concession which resulted in the establishment of the
Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889. The Russians countered by
obtaining the right to found the Russo-Persian Bank in 1890.
Through this institution, controlled after 1897 by the Russian
29

Ministry of Finance itself, the Russians came, by 1900, to
42
control the finances of Persia.
2. Complementing the effort to obtain control of
Persia's financial affairs was the endeavor to obtain com-
mercial advantages for Russian merchants, embodied primarily
in the 1901 Coramerical Treaty and the Russo-Persian Customs
Treaty of 1903. Additionally, the Russians undertook to
secure further concessions for its nationals, and to sabotage




3. A third form of penetration was Russian control over
the Persian military. In 1878, Nasir al-Din Shah requested
and received Russian aid in organizing, equipping and train-
ing a Persian cossack regiment. This regiment, officered
and commanded by Russians, soon became a tool of Russian
diplomacy, unresponsive to the Shah's needs, and Persian
in name only. The Commander of the Russian Brigade, a
Russian named Kasagovsky, was directly responsible to the
Minister of War in St. Petersburg. Financial support for the
44Brigade came from the Russian legation.
The net effect of these, and a variety of other activi-
ties, including control of railway and transportation con-
struction, was that northern Persia was totally under Russian
45
control. The Russians had thus made significant strides




D. IRAN BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS: 1906 - 1917
The extent of Persian discontent with foreign exploita-
tion of the country, as well as exploitation of the people
by the Shah, was demonstrated by two events just prior to
the end of the 19th Century. In 1891, the religious leaders
and people forced the Shah to revoke the Tobacco Concession
which had been granted to Britain. Then, in 1896, Nasir al-
Din Shah, whose policies and personal extravagances had
virtually bankrupted Iran, was assassinated. He was replaced
by Muzaffaru'd-Din, who was neither respected, nor feared,
to any great extent by the populace.
Thus, as the twentieth century opened, Persia was in a
state of near anarchy, with little internal cohesion, and
held together in reality by external forces whose interests
were served by the perpetuation of the facade of a united
Persia. Under these circumstances, given the failure of the
Qajars to furnish Iran with either "a reasonably efficient
administration; a strong and loyal army, " or to isolate the
country from outside influence, Persian discontent was an
46
overdue, if not foreseeable, development.
The Revolution of 1906 in Iran was an outcome of this
situation, as well as other external influences. The single
most important factor was the defeat of Russia in the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905. This defeat "had a profound psycho-
logical effect on the Persians in their relations with Russia,
Russia had been defeated by an Asiatic Power; Russia had been
31

publicly humiliated in the eyes of the world; Russia was
47
no longer all-powerful."
Impetus for the Persian Revolution of 190 6 was also
furnished by Russia's own Revolution in 1905, which nearly
succeeded in toppling the Tsar. Even though the Russian
Revolution of 1905 ultimately failed, the symbolic granting
of a Duma and other constitutional rights in Russia, the
most conservative of the monarchies, had a profound intel-
lectual impact in Persia. The influence of this revolution
"seeped into Iran through the Caucasus; for after the failure
of their attempt in Russia, some of the leaders of the revo-
lution in Transcaucasia migrated to Iran, where they founded
48
newspapers and agitated for liberal revolution."
Following open agitation and anti-government riots and
demonstrations in 1905 and 1906, and a series of broken
promises by the Shah for administrative reform, a new round
of disturbances occurred in June-July 1906. As a result,
Muzaffaru'd Din Shah granted a Constitution and an elected
National Assembly. With his death in 1907, however, the
Crown Prince, Muhammed Ali Mirza came to the throne. Despite
his pledges to respect the rights granted by his father, the
new Shah immediately set out to undermine the Constitution,
which set off a renewed struggle between the Royalists and
49Constitutionalists
.
Meanwhile, external pressures were again beginning to
shape events in Iran. Russia's revolution and her defeat
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against Japan had accelerated a Russian foreign policy re-
evaluation. Prior to 190 5, Russia had generally demonstrated
little interest in a partition of Persia, fearing that such
a division would unnecessarily jeopardize their predominance
in the north, while it would formally limit the potential
50for further advances into southern Persia.
After 19 05, however, the Russians, pressured internally,
and reacting to the alliance of the Central Powers in Europe,
began to reassess their foreign policy, including their
policies in the Near East and their relationship with Great
Britain. Sergei Witte, the Russian Prime Minister after 1905,
recognized that "Russia could only lose by an overambitious
and expansionist policy .. .Foreign adventures and wars were
bound to aggravate (Russia's) internal sores..."
Of particular import to Russia, and to Great Britain as
well, was the menace of Germany's growing influence in the
Ottoman Empire. Negotiations between the two powers,
originally begun in 1905, resumed in 1906 and resulted in
the now famous (or infamous) Anglo-Russian Convention of
521907.^^
The Anglo-Russian rapproachment had far-reaching impli-
cations. First of all, through its partition of Persia and
other provisions concerning Afghanistan and Tibet, it sought
to preserve the status quo, in which Russian dominance in
the north was now shed of its cloak and took more direct forms
Secondly, the Russians explicitly stated that they "did not
33

deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian
53Gulf." An unforeseen result of this stipulation was that
the British found themselves in control of the area in which
oil was to be discovered only a year later, making Iran more
than just an outpost for the defense of India.
For the Iranian people, the Anglo-Russian Convention
was a disillusioning experience. In the continued struggle
between the Constitutionalists and Royalists in Iran, the
balances had decidedly shifted in favor of the Royalists,
who relied on Russian assistance. British accommodation with
Russia, in the eyes of the Constitutionalists, who had looked
54
to Britain for support, amounted to a betrayal.
The impact of the Convention was thus almost immediately
felt in the Constitutional struggle. By early December 1907,
Muhammed Ali-Shah had apparnetly decided to destroy the
Majlis and overthrow the Constitution. The constitutionalists
were fragmented; the merchants were reluctant to supply con-
tinued funding for the Majlis, and the clergy, having failed
to win control of the new government, now took up a position
of opposition to it. An abortive attempt was made to disband
the Majlis with the help of the Cossack Brigade in December,
and an uneasy truce was arranged. Only the intervention of
the Russians and British saved Muhammed Ali from being
deposed.
The following year, Russia forcibly interfered on the
side of the Shah to dissolve the Majlis. This set off a
34

year-long revolt, which was combatted in part by Russian
troops in northern Iran, but which ultimately resulted in
military defeat of the Shah's forces and deposition of the
Shah.^^
Russian intrigues in Persia nevertheless continued
through 1910-1912, as attempts were made to provoke a new
civil war and th^ conspired to return Muhammed Ali Shah to
the throne. Russian troops continued to operate within the
country, interfering with Iranian attempts to restore order.
In 1912, the Russians sabotaged W. Morgan Schuster's finan-
cial mission to that country, which had threatened the
57Czarist economic strangle-hold on the country. Such was
the condition of Iran when World War I broke out. The
government of Iran was powerless, disorganized and bankrupt;
northern Iran was under Russian military occupation; Iran's
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III. SOVIET- IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE MODERN PERIOD
Iran's political and economic relations with the Soviet
Union began at a time when both countries were struggling
against foreign military intervention and insurmountable
domestic problems. At the war's outset, Persia attempted
to avoid being swept up in the conflict by declaring its
neutrality. Nevertheless, northern Persia became a battle-
ground for the Turks and Russians, while the British
launched land operations against the Turks in southern
Persia
.
In 1915, Great Britain and Russia concluded the Constan-
tinople Agreement, which recognized Russian aspirations to
possess Constantinople in exchange for British incorporation
59
of the "neutral zone" in Iran into their sphere of influence.
This treaty was destined never to reach fruition, as the
Czarist regime was overthrown by the 1917 Russian Revolution.
A. THE EARLY SOVIET PERIOD
The successive June and October Revolutions in Russia
and the Bolshevik seizure of power seemed to offer the possi-
bility of significant change in the course of Russian-Iranian
relations. In June, Kerensky had ordered Russian troops to
withdraw from Iran. Following the Bolshevik uprising, the
Russian front rapidly disintegrated, placing the burden of
holding the northeastern front against Turkey on Great Britain
44

alone. Britain occupied all of Iran, which was also to be-
come a base for Allied operations against the Bolshevik
regime at war's end.
Primarily because of the problems of consolidation it
now faced, but also because of the prominent position the
countries of the Near East occupied in Bolshevik policy and
doctrine, the new Soviet regime immediately made an effort
to convince Iran, as well as Turkey, that it would be a
62friend in the future.
In December 1917, the "Soviet Appeal to Muslim workers
in Russia and the East," with regard to Persia, declared,
...that the treaty for the division of Persia is null
and void. Immediately after the cessation of mili-
tary activities troops will be withdrawn from Persia
and the Persians will be guaranteed the right of free
self-determination . ^^
In March 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk provided
for withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia. More explicit
Soviet guarantees came in the form of a note from Soviet
Foreign Commissar Chicherin to the Persian government in
June 1918. In this note, the Soviet government formally
denounced Tsarist Russian privileges in Persia, and annullQcl
all Persian debts, and divested itself of all Czarist bank
and commercial holdings, and railways, telegraph and postal
property.
These moves were motivated by both short and long-term
Soviet interests. In the short-term, the Soviets hoped to
win Persian sympathy and thereby undermine British ability
to use Persia as a base for intervention in the Russian Civil
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War. Ultimately/ however, the main Soviet objective in
Iran, and Afghanistan as well, may have been "to eliminate
British influence and create a buffer zone of the two states
between Soviet territory and British India, hoping to make
them dependent on Soviet Russia and use them as springboards
for further Soviet advancement .
"
To a degree, these hopes were not totally unfounded.
Many Persian nationalists saw, in these initial Soviet acts,
the hope that British influence might also be removed and
Persia would be left alone to arrange her own affairs. As
Joseph Upton has noted, however, there existed within Persia
"great differences in the conception of what an ideal arrange-
ment might be.
"
On the basis of the Chicherin note, and in reaction to
Britain's attempt to establish a virtual protectorate in
Persia via the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, negotiations
between Persia and Russia began in 1920. Meanwhile, Soviet
forces in Azerbaijan pursued White Russian troops into Iran,
and, within a short time, occupied the entire province of
Gilan, There they supported a local rebel, Kuchek Khan, and
6 7
the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan was proclaimed.
The continued Soviet occupation and the rebellion in
Gilan contributed to the overthrow of the Shah on February
21, 1921 by a coup d'etat led by Sayed Zia Tabataba-i and
Reza Khan. The Persian government, hardly an effective
organization under the best of circumstances, had been further
weakened by a series of cabinet crises in late 1920 and early
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1921. The government was unable to secure either withdrawal
of Soviet forces from northern Iran or British assistance
to suppress the rebellion.
One of Sayed Zia's first steps was to have the newly-
formed Majlis formally repudiate the Anglo-Persian Treaty of
1919, which opened the way for signature of the Soviet-Persian
Treaty of Friendship on February 26, 1921. This treaty nor-
malized relations between Russia and Persia, formally repudiated
all Tsarist treaties and rights, recognized the 1881 delinea-
tion of the Russo-Iranian border, and promised non-intervention
by Russia in Iran's internal affairs. However, Articles V
and VI of the Treaty, which were to remain a point of conten-
tion, provided that "if a third party should attempt to
carry out a policy of usurpation by means of amned interven-
tion in Persia, or if such power should desire to use Persian
territory as its base of operation against Russia... and if
the Persian government should not be able to put a stop to
such a menace after having been once called upon to do so by
Russia, Russian troops shall have the right to advance into
the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the
military operation necessary for defense. Russia, however,
shall withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as
6 p
the danger has been removed."
This treaty is important, if for no other reason, be-
cause it symbolized in many ways the efforts of the Soviet
leadership to deal with the post-World War I international
situation, and the role of the Soviet state in it. Prior to
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the revolution, Lenin had predicted that Russia would pre-
vail in the war with Germany, but that even if it did not,
the Russian revolution would trigger a world socialist
revolution by a proletariat unwilling to allow the undoing
of the new Socialist Society. When that world revolution
failed to materialize in Europe, he was compelled to seek
peace rather than risk continued war and the probable destruc-
69tion of the fledgling Soviet state. The survival of the
state was thus of paramount importance if it was to inspire
a world socialist revolution at the proper time.
Until 1920, the Soviets had expected the world revolution
to begin in Europe. After that, they gradually came to view
the colonies and other areas of imperialist exploitation and
oppression (a category into which Persia was placed) as the
most-likely location of at least nationalist bourgeois revo-
lutions. These would generate, in turn^ the proletarian
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revolution led by the USSR. The Soviet Union would, mean-
while, befriend these areas and provide the guidance and
encouragement necessary to undermine the imperialist powers
and to advance revolutionary socialist aims.
Each of these concepts found expression in the liberal
treatment accorded Persia in the Treaty of Friendship. The
Treaty itself demonstrated the sensitivity of the early Soviet
leaders to the presence of major powers along the littoral
of a Russia significantly weakened by foreign and civil war.
The Soviet state occupied, more or less, the same geographical
space as its Czarist predecessor; hence, the traditional
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territorial and psychological security problems of Russia
were still operative. These were only compounded by the
Allies' use of Persia and other areas as bases of operations
for the anti-Bolshevik effort after World War I and resulted
in Soviet insistence on the inclusion of Articles V and VI
in the Treaty.
Early Soviet policy thus endeavored to deny these areas
to the European powers. As J.C. Hurewitz has emphasized,
"The treaty with Iran represented the first of a cluster of
treaties that the USSR framed in the interwar years with its
nextdoor Muslim neighbors to reconstruct, on the relic of an
earlier century, a buffer separating the Russian and British
72
empires," and, in this case, the insulating of the socialist
state from the "encircling capitalists." The treaty also
served Communist propaganda purposes well. "It was widely
published and distributed in the Near East and Asia as an
example of Russia's anti-imperialist position and her good
73intentions and generosity."
From this point until the eve of World War II, Soviet
influence in the Middle East was, for all practical purposes,
at low ebb. The problem of succession in the Soviet Union,
Stalin's shift to "socialism in one country," and his own
personal (and not totally unwarranted) paranoia, effectively
occupied much of Moscow's attention during the inter-war period
After 1920, therefore, the Soviet leadership increasingly
tended to divide the Middle East into two regions; Iran and
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Turkey, whose geographical proximity dictated the continued
application of pressure and efforts to maintain influence;
and the Arab world, whose importance was confined to its
potential as a breeding ground for anti-imperialist, pro-
Communist revolution. The task of inspiring such activity
was entrusted to the Communist International, and these
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efforts met with only mixed results.
Even along its littoral, when the predicted world revo-
lution failed to materialize, Moscow found itself unable to
gain a position of predominant influence. In Persia, which
had been viewed by early Bolshevik leaders as the key to an
75
oriental revolution, the rise of Reza Khan signalled the
beginning of a more positive Persian foreign policy, more
resistant to external pressures and less susceptible to
foreign manipulation. Reza's consolidation of power as Minister
of War (1921-1923) and Prime Minister (1923-1925) had been
facilitated in part by Moscow's internal preoccupations and
by the relatively low-profile approach adopted by the British.
His formal assumption of power as the first Pahlavi Shah in
1925, and his reforms, including suppression of Iranian
76Communist party activities, caused the Soviet leadership
much concern . These developments reinforced Soviet fears
that the British might strengthen their position along
Russia's borders and frustrated Soviet expectations that
Persia would trigger the oriental revolt. One Soviet writer's
assessment of Persia under the revitalized monarchy noted.
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The main problem of Persia's development turns out
to be the question whether it can skip the phase of
a gradual ripening of capitalism and the period of
absolute monarchy, and go directly to the democracy
of her working classes. The theses on the national
and colonial question of the Second Congress of the
Comintern forsee the possibility of skipping if the
popular masses of the backward countries are given
help by the enlightened proletariat of advanced coun-
tries. Persia, no doubt, presents a typical picture of
a delayed development caused by imperialism, and it
remains to diagnose how much the existing international
situation favors the solution of the Persian problem
by way of such a jump.^"^
Reza, meanwhile, sought to involve other European
countries in his programs of modernization to demonstrate
Iran's independence and to offset British and Russian influ-
ence. In particular, he cultivated Germany as a "third force,"
which quickened the deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations
in the late 1920 's. If, as his supporters maintain, the Shah
intended to use German assistance to his own advantage with-
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out being subjected to German domination, then it must be
said that, were it not for the outbreak of the Second World
War, he might have succeeded. As it was, however, Reza
overestimated his own ability to play off Russian, British
and German interests in Iran once Hitler attacked his former
ally in 1941, Conversely, he may have also underestimated
the desperate situation the allies were in with regard to
79
maintaining the Soviet War effort.
Consequently, Reza's declaration of neutrality was seen
as an opening for German subversion and a threat to the
Allied effort, Iran was invaded and occupied by Britain
80
and the Soviet Union and Reza Shah was forced to abdicate.
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B. WORLD WAR II AND IRAN
Prior to Hitler's attack on his former ally in 1941,
Moscow and Berlin had formulated a plan for the prospective
establishment of spheres of influence in the post-war world.
Negotiations carried on between Molotov and Ribbentrop in
November 1940, following conclusion of a four-power mutual
assistance pact between Germany, the USSR, Italy and Japan
(September 1940) , resulted in the draft of a Secret Protocol
to the Treaty in which "the Soviet Union (declared) that its
territorial aspirations center south of the national terri-
81tory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean."
This provision was the consequence both of Hitler's desire to
focus Soviet attention outside of Europe, where Hitler wanted
a free hand, as well as Soviet desires to reserve for them-
selves this strategic area, heretofore dominated by the
British.
The German attack on the USSR overthrew these plans. As
a result, it was Soviet-British cooperation, rather than
Soviet-German concurrence, which furnished Moscow with an
opening in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Both Allies
cited the threat of a German takeover of Iran, the Russians
relying on the provisions of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship
for justification of their occupation of the northern
82provinces.
The Anglo-Russian invasion and occupation, the abdication
of Reza Shah and collapse of the Iranian military; all had
a disintegrating effect on the political stability which Reza
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Shah had endeavored to bring to his country. With Iran
again divided between these powers, as it had been after
the 1907 partition, the authority of the central government
under the new, inexperienced Shah was negligible.
Soviet activities in Iran during and after the War are
significant for a number of reasons. In the first place,
Russian efforts to undermine the authority of the central
government posed the clearest and most imminent danger to
Iran's independence. Moscow's political and military repre-
sentatives controlled virtually every aspect of economic
and political life in their zone of occupation, and sought
to influence policies throughout the country.
It is also important to note that the various tactics
employed by the Soviets in Iran were precisely the same
tools Moscow used, albeit with greater success, to secure
its hold on eastern Europe at the close of World War II.
Despite disclaimers that "the Soviet government (had) no
designs affecting the territorial integrity and independence
of the Iranian state" and that, in Stalin's own words, "We
have not nor can we have such war aims as the seizure of
foreign territories or the conquest of other peoples. . .including
8 3
Iran," the measures undertaken by the Soviets were intended
to do just that. These included a massive Soviet propaganda
effort controlled by the Russian Embassy in Tehran, and
carried out after 1943 by the "Irano-Soviet Society for
Cultural Relations." In the northern provinces, the Soviets
53

restricted travel of other westerners, caused a crisis over
oil concessions in 1944-45, censored the Iranian and western
press, confiscated property and arrested and deported opponents
84
of Soviet-inspired activities. Soviet representatives
exercised virtual veto power over the Iranian government's
appointment of provincial governors within the Soviet zone
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and they furnished increasing support to the Tudeh Party.
At the close of the war, the Soviets refused to remove their
troops, in violation of the pledges of the Tripartite Treaty
and the Tehran Declration of 1943 to respect Iran's terri-
torial integrity, and actively backed the establishment of
the seperatist regimes in Azerbaijan and the "Kurdish Repub-
lic." This included disarming Iranian forces and actively
8 6preventing the restoration of the central government authority.
The net effect of these developments was, as George
Lenczowski has observed, that,
Iran served as a catalyst which changed the American
perspective of the nature of Soviet policies in the
post-war period and provided the first stimulus for
a radical reorientation of United States foreign
policy and strategy, 87
C. THE COLD WAR
The Soviet decision to withdraw from Iran in 1946 followed
an Iranian protest to the United Nations over continued Soviet
occupation, and negotiations between the Iranian Prime
Minister, Ahmad Qavam os-Saltaneh and Molotov. As Mohammed
Reza Shah Pahlavi later recounted.
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Qavam, dealing from a position of weakness, .. .agreed
to recommend to Parliament the establishment of a
joint Russian- Iranian oil company (the Soviets to
hold 51 percent of the stock) to exploit the oil
resources of northern Iran; to grant three cabinet
posts to Tudeh party members; to recognize the rebel
Azerbaijan Government; and, finally, to withdraw Iran's
complaint against Russia before the United Nations. ^^
Although the Soviets have never published the reasons for
their withdrawal from Iran, there were probably two primary
causes. Given Qavam's apparent concessions, the Soviets
were confident that they achieved their goal of an Azerbaijan
separated from Iran and subservient to their wishes, as well
as the promise, through Tudeh participation in the govern-
ment, of continued influence in Iranian policy-making. At
this particular juncture, unless Stalin had intended to seize
additional Iranian territory, there was nothing further to
be gained by the continued occupation. On the contrary, given
growing US and British impatience over the Soviet troop
issue, Stalin risked arousing even greater opposition which
might cost him his as yet unconsolidated gains in Eastern
89Europe. Winston Churchill was one of those who in fact
strongly advocated applying just such pressure to gain a
satisfactory solution for the future of Eastern Europe. In
a speech given in October 1948, for example, he urged:
The question is asked: What will happen when the
(the Soviets) get the atomic bomb themselves and
have accumulated a large store?...We ought to bring
matters to a head and make a final settlement. We
ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompe-
tent, waiting for something to turn up... The Western
Nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting
settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their
just demands while they have the atomic power and
before the Russian Communists have got it too.^*^
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As a result of some rather delicate diplomatic moves,
encouraged no doubt by the stiffening of the American atti-
91tude towards Russian designs in Iran, the central govern-
ment gradually overcame the concessions wrested from Qavam
by the Soviets. The first step was taken in December 1946,
over protests from Moscow and the Soviet Embassy, when
government troops entered Azerbaijan and overcame seperatist
92
resistance. The Kurdish revolt was also suppressed. In
the autumn of 1947, another blow was struck when the Majlis
refused to ratify the oil agreement which would have given
the Russians a 25-year controlling interest in northern
93Iranian oil.
In a sense, the events of 1945-1947 in Iran both ended
one era and began another for the Soviet Union and Iran.
The latter had survived, albeit just barely, a significant
Soviet threat to divide and dominate the country. Iran ex-
perienced a resurgence of nationalism and the determination
to resist in the future all forms of domination. But the
Iranian regime was unsure of its capability for dealing with
Moscow in the future, and had not yet determined the best
means for insuring the country's security. Almost immediately,
the national leadership split over these issues, until matters
were ultimately brought to a head in the confrontation between
94the Shah and the Mossaddegh in 19 53.
Meanwhile, Stalin had clearly realized that the oppor-
tunity for the imposition of military solutions in Iran and
elsewhere had passed. The survival of the Soviet Union
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dictated greater attention to the USSR's desperate post-war
domestic situation, as well as the avoidance of an outright
confrontation with the US, which might risk Soviet security.
Stalin sought, therefore, to consolidate his gains in Europe
and to unify the "Communist bloc." After 1947, this meant
increasing isolation from the West, as the Kremlin revived
Lenin's thesis of the capitalist menace and the irreconcilable
95
antagonism between capitalism and communism. In Stalin's
mind, this rigid categorization meant that any non-Communist
country was capitalist or capitalist-controlled. As Professor
Ben-Cion Pinchuk has observed, this "attitude prevented the
Kremlin from exploiting the opportunities arising from the
disintegration of the Western empires" and, until Stalin's
death, "made it difficult for the Soviet Union to cooperate
with the countries that had only recently acquired independence
96from their Western masters."
The alternative Soviet strategy came to be a reliance on
Communist parties around the world to achieve Moscow's aims.
In Europe, this became almost immediately apparent as the
Soviet-inspired Communist coup brought Czechoslovakia behind
the "Iron Curtain" in 1948. In Iran, increasing support was
furnished to the Tudeh, which, it was hoped, might eventually
win control of the government. And indeed, the rise of
Mohammed Mossaddegh seemed, for a time, to hold out that





Of Mossaddegh himself, however, the Soviets were
less sure and the dilemma of Stalinist policy towards non-
Communist nationalists in the Third World was clearly demon-
strated in Moscow's general ambivalence towards him. Pre-
dictably/ the Kremlin saw Mossaddegh 's oil nationalization
efforts as "anti-imperialist," while they termed his renewal
of the US military advisorship of Iran's armed forces, in




In March of 19 53, Stalin died. The Kremlin's new
leadership was quick to realize that Stalin's policies had
been a mistake, although new policy implementations evolved
slowly, and did not fully take form until after Khrushchev's
emergence in 1956. This revised thinking held that Soviet
interests would best be served through gaining influence in
the "Third World", promoting the "historical process" of
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world socialism while continuing to avoid nuclear war.
The Kremlin would have to involve itself with non-communist
nationalists, and encourage local communist parties to work
with the nationalists in the establishment of "national demo-
99
cratic regimes," friendly to Moscow.
In the case of Iran, the Kremlin had taken some initial
steps to improve relations soon after Stalin died. The new,
Soviet leadership chose to ignore Mossaddegh 's growing rejec-
tion of leftist support of his premiership, which, at times,
nearly achieved control of the National Front Movement.
In a review of world affairs conducted in August, 1953, G.M.
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Malenkov spoke about Soviet-Iranian mutual interests,
claiming that, "the experience of thirty-five years has
shown that the Soviet Union and Persia are interested in
mutual friendship and collaboration," and offered to hold
talks on border issues and outstanding financial claims.
This process was interrupted by the final confrontation
between Mossaddegh and the Shah. At first, Mossaddegh's
refusal to step down as Prime Minister was strongly supported
102by the Tudeh, which planned to take over from him. How-
ever, alarmed by their growing strength, the Prime Minister
ordered nationalist supporters to quell Tudeh demonstrations.
In the midst of the Tudeh-nationalist clashes, the pro-Shah
coup occurred on August 19, 1953, resulting in the defeat of
both factions
.
In retrospect, as will be discussed, the Soviet reaction
to this crisis paralleled, in many ways, its response to the
1978 crisis in Iran. (As Firuz Kazemzadeh has noted, "...the
Soviet Union remained on the sidelines. The press, of course,
hailed the 'anti-imperialist struggle of the Iranian people'.")
Indeed, at the crucial moment in the struggle, when the Tudeh,
which was the best organized faction involved, had the chance
to seize control of the government, Moscow remained mysteri-
104
ously aloof and furnished no encouragement. As a result,
the Tudeh made no attempt to resort to arms following a govern-
ment plea to resist the Royalist coup, "even though they had
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long prepared for it and had carefully infiltrated the
military for that purpose.
"
One effect of the Royalist success was that it was the
Shah's view of Iran's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union
and the West which prevailed. To be sure, the Shah accepted
Soviet overtures when they were offered, but as he consoli-
dated and strengthened his position, he moved Iran into
106
alliance with the West.
The only negative gestures made by the Soviet Union for
over a year after the return of the Shah were directed at
Iran's prospective adherence to the Turkish-Pakistani Treaty
of 1954 and discussions related to the formation of a new
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consortium of oil companies.
The Shah's decision to include Iran in the Baghdad Pact
in October 1955 marked a significant break with traditional
Iranian foreign policy. Iran's foreign policy had previously
sought to maintain a neutralist stance between stronger
powers, with the occasional incorporation of a "third force"
when one was available. But World War II had undermined
one of the traditional Iranian powers - Great Britain - and
the Shah saw US power as the best guarantee of lan's security
against the Soviet Union. The US, for its part, given the
rigid bi-polarity of the international system at the time,
seemed prepared to support Iran only if it abandoned its
neutrality.
Moscow was now confronted with what it saw as the possi-
bility of the establishment of American military and strategic
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bomber bases along the USSR's southern border. This fear
would be compounded by the end of the decade by US deploy-
ment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Turkey
and Italy, the strategic implications of which would event-
ually lead to Khrushchev's Cuban missile gamble. The chief
Soviet aim throughout the 1955-1962 period with regard to
Iran was therefore to detach Iran from the West and persuade
it to readopt its traditional neutralist policies. Ulti-
mately, the Soviets would have liked to have attained a posi-
tion where they might exercise "the right of veto or the right
to dictate or prevent a particular foreign policy orientation"
by Iran.
Although the methodology employed to accomplish these
ends varied, it is not an overstatement to say that hostility
and disapproval characterized the Soviet reaction during this
period. The Soviets irately protested Iran's membership in
the Baghdad Pact as "incompatible with the interests of
strengthening peace and security in the area of the Near and
Middle East and is incompatible with Iran's good neighborly
relations with the Soviet Union and the known treaty obligations
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of Iran." This same theme was repeatedly pressed during
the remainder of 1955 in press and diplomatic channels. In
November, a Soviet note charged that the Baghdad Pact was an
aggressive military pact (clearly it was not) , and warned:
The situation which is being created by Iran's
accession to the aggressive Gaghdad bloc is fraught
with dangers to the frontier of the Soviet Union.
Therefore the Soviet government cannot remain
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indifferent to Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact...
(The Soviet Union places) on the Iranian Government
the entire responsibility for the probable conse-
quences of the Iranian government's decision to
join the Baghdad military bloc.^-^^
Another tactic employed by the Soviets was an attempt
to portray treaty participation not so much as a threat to
the USSR, but as a threat to the members themselves. A 1956
Pravda article noted.
The establishment of American military bases on foreign
territories does not pursue any other objective but
the preparation of an aggressive war and imperialist
expansion of the USA. . .American bases represent a serious
threat to the peoples on whose territories they are
located. Ill
Having failed to deter the Shah with threats, Moscow
was not ashamed to attempt a "softer" approach, and in 1955
an invitation to visit Moscow was extended to the Shah. That
visit was undertaken, in 1956, and the Shah later recalled
his meetings with Khrushchev,
The Russians claimed that their policy was one of
peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the
affairs of other countries. Then why, they asked,
had we joined the Baghdad Pact? I told them that
they could find the answer to that question in the
history of relations between our two countries...
Khrushchev and his colleagues replied that they
were not responsible for these aggressions, which
had been committed before they assumed leadership...
Khrushchev spoke of what he considered to be the
aggressive and militaristic implications of the
Baghdad Pact... (He) agreed that Iran had no aggressive
intentions against the Soviet Union, but he suggested
that some big power might compel us against our
will to make our territory available for an attack
on Russia. . .H^
One of the Shah's hopes in visiting Moscow was to demon-
strate that aid which the US had been slow to provide could
be attained elsewhere. Following the Shah's visit, during
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which he had assured Khrushchev that "Iran would not in
any way countenance or take part in any aggressive schemes
113
against his country," relations between Moscow and Tehran
underwent cosmetic improvement. New agreements were nego-
tiated on questions of transit, frontiers, water utilization
from the Aras and Atrah Rivers, and hydroelectric power
development. Soviet propaganda attacks, although they con-
tinued to target the Baghdad Pact, tended to ignore Iran's
membership. It should be noted, however, that although the
agreements were negotiated in the 1955-1957 period, many were
114
not implemented until after 1962.
The most violent Soviet protestations, however, were yet
to come. Prompted by the violent 1958 Iraqi coup, and the
death of King Faisal, the Shah pressed the United States for
greater assurances of support. Along with Pakistan and Tur-
key, Iran had again urged the US to formally join the Baghdad
Pact, or as it came to be known, CENTO. The US response was to
offer to sign bilateral, defensive agreements with these
^ . 115countries
.
Learning of the Shah's readiness to commit Iran to a
bilateral agreement with, what Moscow termed, "a country
that makes no secret of its insane plans to wipe the Soviet
Union off the face of the earth," the Kremlin acted immedi-
ately to forestall such an eventuality. Moscow, either
with or without the Shah's encouragement (the Shah, by his
own testimony, was dissatisfied with the first US proposal
for an agreement) , attempted to prevail upon the Shah to sign
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a non-aggression pact in place of a defensive agreement
with the US. The failure of this effort signalled the begin-
ning of what one observer has termed a period of "unprece-
dented hostility in Iran's postwar relations with the Soviet
Union. "-^-^^
Moscow's failures to "neutralize" Iran contrasted with
early apparent successes elsewhere in the Middle East region.
The Kremlin had, by this time, long since recognized that
its southern neighbors viewed the USSR with suspicion and
hostility. In line with Khrushchev's concept of seeking
influence with "anti-imperialist nationalists," Moscow had
therefore focused its efforts on the "Arab half" of the
Middle East. In that region the Soviets had the advantage of
not being confronted with the legacy of Russian imperialism
and Soviet intrigues. At the same time, they hoped to exploit
Arab anti-western sentiments evoked by the history of Euro-
pean involvement in the region, and western sponsorship of
the state of Israel. The achievement of Soviet influence in
Nasser's Egypt thus represented a base for further penetra-
tion of the Arab Middle East, as well as a first step in
the circumvention, or outflanking, of the carefully constructed
118US treaty system. There was thus a marked contrast in
Soviet-Iranian (or Soviet-Turkish) relations at this time and,
for example, Soviet-Egyptian, relations. Iran and Turkey
bore the brunt of Soviet threats and pressure.
The central theme of the Soviet campaign of intimidation
against Iran between 19 59 and 1962 was the perceived threat,
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on the Kremlin's part, that Iran would permit the stationing
of US IRBM's on Iranian soil. As has been mentioned, this
fear was accentuated in 1959 when Ankara had joined Italy
and Great Britain in agreeing to permit the deployment of
Jupiter and Thor missiles on its territory, and by the signa-
ture of the Iranian-American Agreement, which Moscow saw
as a step towards the establishment of IRBM bases in Iran.
Typical of the charges levelled by the Soviet Union was its
claim that Iran was "allowing the U.S. to build a missile
119base in the Zagros Mountains."
Despite occasional signs of easing tension between Iran
and the USSR after 1959, such as the return of the Soviet
ambassador to Tehran in 1960 after an eight month absence,
120
and a decline in propaganda attacks at about the same time,
it was not until the Shah's December 1962 pledge not to allow
the erection of any rocket bases on Iranian soil and that
Iran would not be a party to any act of aggression against the
USSR that Moscow proved ready to "agree to a Soviet-Iranian
detente without Iran having to abandon her alignment with
the United States. ""'^'"
D. SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE "ERA OF DETENTE"
The Shah's pledge to the Kremlin leadership concerning
the stationing of strategic missiles in Iran cam.e at a time
when both Iran and the USSR were faced .with changing domestic
and international environments. These new realities required
some adjustment of their respective foreign policies in
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general, and with regard to one another. This is not to
imply that an immediate, or for that matter, permanent trans-
formation of relations occurred; rather, both Moscow and
Tehran sought to take advantage of opportunities for change
as they developed.
The single most important factor in this regard was the
evolution of what came to be termed "Super-power Detente."
The changing American-Soviet relationship, from one of total
hostility, toward a "limited adversary" relationship, char-
acterized both by conflict and cooperation, altered the
framework of the international system to a significant degree
With Soviet-American recognition of a "balance of terror"
requiring restraint and a lowering of tension, weaker allied
states gained a greater degree of independence in foreign
122policy areas previously thought of only in Cold War terms.
Thus, in contrast to Iran's strict adherence to the west
in the "bi-polar" post-WW II period, the Shah now felt able
to chart a more "independent foreign policy." For Iran, the
gradual erosion of "strict bi-polarity" permitted more flexi-
bility in dealing with the Soviets, without giving the
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appearance of abandoning her western orientation. There
were other considerations as well. The Shah viewed "detente"
as both a danger and an opportunity. As one study notes.
It was a danger because it could mean that matters
involving what (the Shah) saw as Iran's vital
interests would be settled by a Soviet-United States
double hegemonie, over his head and without his being
consulted. It was an opportunity because it meant that
the immediate Soviet threat to Iranian security would
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decline and that therefore Iran would become more
secure and need not have such close ties with the
United States. ^24
The framework established by the changing superpower
relationship both coincided with, ^nd caused, other impor-
tant changes in domestic and foreign policy areas in Iran
and the Soviet Union. Detente was, as has been stated,
important, but it was not the only development which influ-
enced the Soviet-Iranian rapproachment
.
1, The Iranian Perspective
The Shah's decision to seek some form of reconcilia-
tion with Moscow in the mid-1960 's was very much related to
Iran's domestic situation. The Shah, had by the early 1960 's
largely succeeded in consolidating his personal power.
Additionally, some social progress had been achieved and
125Iran's economy was entering a stage of impressive growth.
Nevertheless, the Shah's land reform program had engendered
significant opposition, which required even greater attention
to domestic matters. Rapproachment with the USSR was thus,
at one and the same time, facilitated by the somewhat improved
domestic conditions in Iran, and a result of the necessity
126for devoting more attention to those conditions.
Externally, the impact of the changing super-power rela-
tionship has already been mentioned. A related development
which facilitated a new Iranian approach to Moscow was the emer-
gence of a serious Sino-Soviet dispute. The Shah had, early in
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the 1960 's, come to share General de Gaulle's opinion
that differences between the USSR and China would result
in greater Russian willingness to reach an understanding
with the noncoininunist powers, including those along the
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southern border of the USSR.
At the same time, there were, however, adequate
reasons for apprehension over regional political developments.
The first of these was the increasing appeal in the Arab
world of "Nasserism," with its anti-monarchist overtones.
Across the Persian Gulf, Egyptian forces were actively
engaged in support of an anti-royalist regime in Yemen. The
Shah's perception of himself as a prime target for such
radical revolts contributed to his desire to seek greater
freedom to concentrate Iranian resources on countering regional
threats to the country and his position. To accomplish such
a shift in emphasis, rapproachment with the USSR was a necessary
ingredient.
The regional event which most convinced the Shah of
the need for a new approach for Iran's foreign relations
was the Indo-Pakistani War of 19 65. The Shah's early reser-
vations concerning CENTO ' s usefulness, and even the limits
of bilateral agreements with the US, seemed confirmed by US
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refusal to aid Pakistan, another nominal ally. In con-
trast to the Shah's disappointment over what he viewed as the
US failure to stand by Pakistan the Shah found reason for
encouragement in the Soviet role in settling the conflict.
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The emergence of the Soviet Union as a chief inter-
mediary for the termination of this war... lent weight
to the impression that the Soviet Union had (been)
transformed into a regional status quo power, which
far from seeking to exploit national and social
conflicts on its periphery, utilized its power and
influence in the opposite direction. 129
Not totally unrelated to this problem was the con-
tinued debate over arms for Iran. In the 1960 's, the US
did not share the Shah's appreciation of the Arab threat
to Iran, nor did it, at that time, envision for Iran the
special role in regional stability which later evolved.
US policy was very much tied to British primacy in the area,
and the Kennedy Administration was making yeoman efforts to
achieve reconciliation with President Nasser, who was opposed
to the Iranian monarchy. A personal appeal by the Shah to
President Kennedy during his 1962 visit to the US failed to
influence US thinking on the subject. It was only under the
Johnson Administration that a regular military aid program
was established for Iran. When the Indo-Pakistani conflict
broke in 1965, and the Shah was unable to use his American-
provided weaponry to aid Pakistan, he concluded that diversi-
fied sources of arms were not only desirable, but necessary.
All of these developments were taken into account in
the shift in Iranian policy from "positive nationalism" to
what the Shah termed "independent foreign policy." This new
policy reflected continuity as well as change. The contrast
in the two policies was seen in the shift from a somewhat
ill-defined position of alignment with the US to a position
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in which Iran would seek to "maintain friendly or neutral
relations with all powers, big or small irrespective of
131their Eastern or Western bloc affiliations," The con-
tinuous theme was the "national interest." The Shah com-
mitted Iran to a greater preparedness to protect its own
vital national interests. He nevertheless carefully pre-
served Iran's membership in CENTO and other ties to the
132West, including requests for economic and military support.
Thus, the Shah's proclamation of Iran's "independent national
policy" was a logical development in light of the changing
domestic Iranian and international scenes.
2. Soviet Considerations
Just as the early 1960 's marked the emergence of
"new leadership" in Iran (in the person and institution of
the Shah) , so too did the USSR find itself under new leader-
ship, as Khrushchev was ousted by Brezhnev and Kosygin. The
immediate concern of the new regime was the establishment of
its power at home and "the need to liquidate the dangerous
consequences of Khrushchev's adventurism. Internal, mainly
economic difficulties compelled the USSR to seek a reduction
in its expenditures on armaments, to procure food from abroad,
and to give a boost to the declining rate of Soviet indus-
trial growth through wider commercial and technological
133intercourse with the West."
Perhaps the most important foreign policy concern the
Kremlin faced was coming to grips with the growing permanency
of the Sino-Soviet split. The long-standing national.
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ideological and policy differences between the two were
complicated by increased tensions over the Soviet position
134
on Vietnam. Moscow's new attempts to begin a rapproach-
ment with Peking in 1964-1965, including Kosygin's February
1965 visit, did not succeed. And the onset of the Chinese
Cultural Revolution in 1966 must surely have convinced any
remaining optimists in the Kremlin that a reconciliation
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with China was not imminent.
In the immediate post-Khrushchev era, Soviet policy
in the Middle East remained concentrated on Egypt and Syria,
where significant applications of aid, trade and arms had
won the Soviets a special role and influence. The Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean were important, but as yet secondary,
areas of interest in these terms. Moscow was concerned pri-
marily with neutralizing states along the southern Soviet
periphery and maintaining regional stability. The Kremlin
strategy to "contain" and "encircle" the PRC by developing
close relations with the states of the south and southeast
was, in the mid-19 60 's, only just emerging.
The first tangible manifestation of Soviet concerns
over the area was Moscow's reaction to the Indo-Pakistani War
of 1965. Viewing Chinese support of Pakistan as contrary to
Soviet interests in the area, the Kremlin endeavored to play
137the role of "peacemaker," lest a larger Asian war develop.
The result, facilitated no doubt by the previously-discussed
US attitude, was a Soviet diplomatic success, as Kosygin
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mediated the Indo-Pakistani talks at Tashkent in January
1966.
Other demonstrations of the Soviet concern for
stability to the south was the easing of Soviet pressure
over Iran's membership in CENTO and the Regional Coopera-
tive Development (RCD) . Previous efforts to move Iran away
from these arrangements had served only to strengthen Iran's
resolve to adhere to her membership. The priority accorded
to Iran in Moscow's policy towards the area dictated a more
subtle approach. Additionally, Moscow may have privately
come to share the Shah's opinion that CENTO credibility, and
thereby its usefulness (particularly as a tool of American
138policy) , was on shaky ground.
3 . Improved Relations (19 65-19 71) ; The Economic Sphere
The result of these developments was a much improved
environment for the "normalization" of Irano-Soviet relations.
It is important to stress, though, that in this period, as
in all others, Soviet political and strategic objectives
out-weighed economic relations between the two countries.
The basic Soviet aim remained the neutralization of key actors
in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region, while the
methodology employed substituted accommodation and even
139flattery for intimidation. In this respect, Soviet policy
lacked a positive thrust, i.e., it was still characterized,
as it had been under Khrushchev, by improvization and oppor-
tunism, stressing the denial function of Soviet policy in the
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area - that of reducing or minimizing western influence
along the Soviet periphery.
"Aid and trade" had become tools of Soviet foreign
policy \inder Khrushchev in the mid-1950 's, but the political
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returns were often less than the Kremlin had hoped for.
The expansion of economic ties between the USSR and Iran in
the mid-1960 's, however, reflected a more conservative appli-
cation of these tools, both in planning and emphasis.
In contrast to the extravagant optimism which char-
acterized Soviet aid thinking in earlier years, the
Kosygin-Brezhnev regime seem(ed) disposed to assess
more realistically just what it (could) expect from
its economic aid commitments abroad. It .. .evidenced
a more cautious and businesslike approach to aid-
giving. .
.
(and) placed greater emphasis on trade rather
than aid by committing a larger share of its new
aid as commercial credits, designed primarily to
promote Soviet exports. ^^i
The development of Soviet-Iranian trade and commercial
relations since the mid-1960 's has been well documented else-
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where and need not be replicated in this paper. Mention
of a few key agreements is sufficient, however, to illustrate
the growth of the Irano-Soviet commercial relations. These
included the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement
(July 27, 1963)
,
pertaining to dam construction, fish and
sturgeon breeding, and grain storage, and the October 19 6 5
and January 1966 Trade Agreements, which provided Soviet
technical and economic assistance for construction of a steel
mill, hydroelectric facilities and a natural gas pipeline
from Iran to the USSR."'"'*'^
In March 1967, a 5-year trade agreement was concluded,
and subsequently renewed, and was followed by agreements for
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low-interest economic credit from the Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries for industrial and agricultural
products
.
Perhaps the most controversial agreement was the
Iranian agreement^ in February 1967, to purchase $110 million
worth of military equipment (vehicles, trucks, anti-aircraft
guns, etc.) from the Soviet Union. This development was a
direct result of the US prohibition on Iran's using US mili-
tary aid items to assist Pakistan in 1965 and the Shah's
determination to diversify Iran's sources of arms, in light
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of US reluctance to meet his requests.
In the 19 70 's, despite a noticeable cooling of Irano-
Soviet relations, Iran secured aid credits from the USSR for
development of Caspian Sea ports and finally, on October
12, 1972, the Soviet Union and Iran signed a fifteen-year
treaty on economic and technical cooperation. Such was the
scope of Soviet involvement in economic relations with Iran
that by 1973, Moscow could claim to have assisted in over 90
major construction projects in Iran, of which 39 were said
to have been completed. Economic ties between the two coun-
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tries had thus come to be the main feature of their relations.
Nor did alarming Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa and
Indian Ocean in 19 77, or the rising spectre of internal re-
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volt in Iran m 1978 affect continuing economic cooperation.
There is no doubt that these and other agreements
were mutaully beneficial. The Soviet Union, during a time of
domestic economic difficulty, found a new market for her
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products and access to external energy. Iran received
critical assistance in key industrial and agricultural
spheres. But, there were other benefits as well. George
Lenczowski, for example, contends that Iran's modified pos-
ture during the late 1960 's presented "distinct advantages"
for the USSR.
It legitimized the Soviet Union as a partner in Iranian
development .. .gave her an opportunity to publicize
herself as a builder of a spectacular and prestigious
project - the steel plant. . .provided opportunities
for Soviet representatives to establish direct con-
tacts with the Iranian labor force, technocrats and
military. They also generated a political situation
in which certain Soviet expectations and requests
would have to be met on a day-to-day basis to avoid
irritations likely to delay the completion of various
economic projects. 1^7
Likewise, Chubin and Zabih observed that the Soviet
Union's gains included "security to its frontiers while it
dealt with the other more pressing problems in Asia... the
possibility of the continued supply of cheap accessible fuel
for its central Asian republics," and the anticipation of
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a future "need to import oil."
From the Iranian perspective, rapproachment with the
Soviets had a beneficial impact in both domestic and foreign
policy areas. Chubin and Zabih, for example, note:
The movement toward reconciliation substantially
decreased the type and frequency of Soviet attacks
on the regime, and criticism of the Shah. . .virtually
disappeared. 149
Furthermore, the Kremlin maintained a "neutral" position
regarding Iran's claims to Bahrain, and generally refrained
from taking sides in other regional issues of importance to
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the Shah, such as the Shatt al-Arab question in the late
1960 's and the controversy over the federation of the Arab
Emirates in 1971.
Indeed, Soviet behavior towards Iran during the
period seemed to justify the Shah's belief
...that the economic element, the dependence of the
USSR on imported oil, the desire for secure frontiers,
its commitments and preoccupations elsewhere, and
the desire not to revive NATO and the cold war, or to
antagonize the (Indian Ocean) region, (would) adequately
deter the Soviets from aggressive designs on Iran or
any other Gulf oil producing state in the near
future. 1^1
E. THE INDIAN OCEAN: SOVIET POLICY AND IRANIAN REACTION
(1971-1978)
Beginning in the late 1960 's and continuing into the
1970 's, a complex of events had the effect of causing Iran's
reassessment of Soviet foreign policy behavior. A real shift
was taking place in Soviet policy, one aspect of which was
a new focus on an area of vital interest to Iran and the
West - the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.
As previously noted, Soviet Middle Eastern policy in the
immediate post-Khruschev era had a primarily negative thrust
to it
.
No clear Soviet policy or conceptions existed for
the Middle East - much less for the Persian Gulf...
the Soviets had general ideas of what they wanted:
to remove the West and Western influence from the
area and hopefully to replace it, to establish
friendly regimes and further relations with those
regimes on a strategic as well as an ideological
basis. How to achieve these goals and what to do until
they transpired was not entirely clear to them. -'^2
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By the early 1970 's, many of these ambiguities showed
evidence of having been cleared up. A new drive in Soviet
policy toward the Middle and Near East occurred, and a
changed Iranian policy resulted.
1. The Six-Day War
Earlier in the discussion it was mentioned that Soviet
Middle East policy in the late 19 60 's was primarily "Mediter-
ranean-oriented," concentrating on Egypt and Syria. There
was, nevertheless, a growing interest in the Indian Ocean,
particularly as the Sino-Soviet rift "pulled" the Kremlin's
attention to the east.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, in addition to its
regional impact, served to hasten what was to be a major
shift of focus in Soviet policy. The Arab defeat had a
catastrophic effect on Soviet policy, which had been in-
timately tied to the image of Nasser, the call to Pan-Arabism
and the "Arab cause" versus Israel. Furthermore, the Soviet
Union's outright complicity - and possible duplicity - in
instigating Egyptian and Syrian military activity brought
the Soviets at least their fair share of the blame for the
153Arab defeat. Egypt's post-war abandonment of revolution-
ary activity, exemplified in the evacuation of Egyptian forces
in Yemen in December 1967, as well as Egypt's moderate
reconciliation with conservative Arab regimes - Saudi Arabia,
and later Iran, necessitated a new Soviet approach. The
net result was a gradual shift in focus of Soviet efforts
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farther to the east in the Arab world, particularly to Syria
and Iraq. The new Soviet approach thus combined renewed
support for its traditional client, Egypt (particularly
during Nasser's "war of attrition"), with an influx of direct
aid to such places as Yemen and the PFLOAG insurrection in
Dhofar. This new involvement was also intended to offset
the heretofore unchallenged Chinese support of area revo-
lutionary movements. In a short time, Chinese influence
was undermined, and eventually replaced.
2. British Withdrawal From "East of Suez"
The announcement, in January 19 68, by British Prime
Minister Harold Wilson that Britain would withdraw its
military forces from "east of Suez" by 1971 coincided with
developments mentioned above. Soviet reaction was one of
surprise and suspicion. The Kremlin thoroughly expected
that the British move was a preliminary step to replacement
by a U.S. presence in the area. In March, 1968, Tass pub-
lished an article which noted the Soviet Union's "policy
of protecting the national interests of sovereign countries
or peoples against the encroachments of imperialists, and
realizing that the plans of neo-colonialism are also directed
against the security of the southern frontiers of the USSR,
firmly comes forth against new attempts in the Persian Gulf
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area , to dictate their will to them."
In March 1968, the first Soviet warship had visited




region totaled over 1400. By that time, the Soviets
had also issued their proposal for an "Asian security
system.
"
3. The Iranian Reaction
The Shah had reason to view all of these developments
with skepticism. A re-armed, revitalized Nasserite Egypt
was seen as a potential threat to Iran. Likewise, substi-
tution of Soviet aid to Yemen after Egypt ' s withdrawal did
not promise an improvement in prospects for area stability.
The development of increased Soviet ties to Syria and Iraq
after 1970 were also seen as potentially de-stabilizing.
Nevertheless, both the Kremlin and the Shah, for their own
reasons, pursued development of economic ties throughout
the period and refrained from excessive criticism of each
other's activities. For example, the Shah maintained a
"neutral" position on the Soviet incursion into Czechoslo-
1 C.f.
vakia in October 196 8.
Similarly, the Kremlin adopted what may be described
as a "wait-and-see" approach to Iranian activities in the
Gulf. Perhaps no other event points up the Soviet dilemma
in this case as Iranian 1968 efforts to prevent a federation
of Arab Emirates. Several of the Kremlin's primary regional
clients - particularly Egypt and Iraq - favored the federation
Soviet interest in maintaining good relations with both sides
deterred the Soviet leadership from taking a firm position
on the matter. When a federation finally did take place,
the Soviets merely noted that "the new federation should be
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directed against imperialism if it is to win the support
157
of all the Arab peoples and the forces of progress."
The Shah made clear the Iranian position on the
matter at the same time.
I warn even our present friends that if they ignore
Iran's interest in any respect, expecially in the
Persian Gulf, they should expect from Iran treatment
befitting their attitude. 1^8
Premier Kosygin subsequently endorsed the Shah's position in
his visit to Tehran in 196 8, but in such a manner so as to
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not alienate other concerned parties. Moscow's concern
over her relationship with Tehran was also demonstrated in
the Kremlin's quiesence over Iranian seizure of Persian
Gulf islands in 19 71, a situation over which Moscow had
little influence in any case.
4. The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War
The gradual shift of Soviet Mideast policy to the
east brought inevitable conflicts of interest with Iran.
Following Nasser's death in September 1970, Anwar Sadat
became the Egyptian President. In May of 1971, a Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between the
Soviet Union and Egypt. On 9 August 19 71, the Soviets
concluded a similar treaty with India. It had already be-
come evident that the US had no intention, in light of the
Nixon Doctrine, of replacing the British presence in the
area. The announcement, in May 19 71, that President Nixon
would visit the PRC in 1972 dramatically affected both Soviet
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and Iranian security perceptions on a regional, as well as
international strategic level.
Relations with President Sadat began auspiciously
enough for the Soviets, and for a time, Soviet influence
in Egypt looked secure. Upon assuming office, Sadat was
confronted with the immediate problems of consolidating his
personal position and Egypt's massive domestic economic
predicament. The unfulfilled foreign policy goals of
avenging the 1967 loss to Israel and recovering the lost
territories also had to be dealt with.
The legacy Nasser left me was in a pitiable condi-
tion. In the sphere of foreign policy I found that
we had no relations .. .with any country except the
Soviet Union... The economic legacy... was in even
poorer shape... our liquidity problem was such that we
might soon find it difficult to pay the salaries of
our soldiers... I was confident that they key to
everything - politically, economically, and mili-
tarily - was to redress the situation following from
the 1967 defeat... The basic task was to wipe out the
disgrace and humiliation that followed from the 196 7
defeat. 1^0
When the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty failed to meet
Sadat's expectations in terms of arms and assistance, thereby
forcing postponement of his "Year of Decision," Sadat
eliminated the substantial Soviet presence and influence
in Egypt. This event set off a series of reactions.
The Soviet response was to redouble its efforts
further east. Support for Syria was increased, including
new arms deliveries. On April 9, 1972, a fifteen-year
"unbreakable" Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was con-
eluded between the USSR and Iraq. Meanwhile, Iran re-
established diplomatic relations with Egypt.
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On the other side of the Indian Ocean, the Soviets
had concluded a Friendship Treaty with India on 9 August
1971, in the midst of increasing Indo-Pakistani hostility.
The USSR had previously sought such an agreement with India
without success. India's fear of a US-China-Pakistan axis,
in the wake of the announcement of Nixon's upcoming China
visit, now prompted Prime Minister Ghandi to conclude the
Treaty.
In the Indo-Pakistani clash which followed - commencing
in November 1971 - Treaty provisions were invoked by India.
The Soviet Union took the steps necessary to insure an Indian
victory. Diplomatically, she blocked Security Council action
until India had conquered East Pakistan. In the military
sphere, Soviet troop units were moved into areas north of
the Soviet-Iranian border to discourage Iranian interven-
tion. And Soviet fleet elements moved into the Indian Ocean
in an attempt to pre-empt possible interference by the US
Seventh Fleet.
5 . Iran's Non-Alignment Re-defined
The late 1960 's witnessed renewed efforts by the
Shah to upgrade Iranian military capabilities and to propel
Iran into a dominant role in the region. In the aftermath
of the 1967 Arab-Israeli V7ar, the Shah had convinced the US
of the threat of increased instability and had secured US
agreement for Iran's purchase of F-4 fighter-bombers and other
hardware. Events now combined to reinforce the Shah's
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determination to increase Iran's capability to perform a
special role in the area.
First came the British decision in 1968 to phase
out of the Gulf in 19 71 - and the obvious power
vacuum that would ensue. Then we suddenly saw (mili-
tary) divisions crossing international borders, the
dismemberment of Pakistan, the mass media applauding,
the UN once again paralyzed and the powers sitting
their hands. . .We 're talking about a dangerous pre-
cedent for the future. . .Then there was the Soviet
treaty with Iraq. . .another alarm bell. Couple with
this America's reluctance to play the role of
gendarme even when its vital interests are concerned
and anyone with a modicum of geopolitical sense will
conclude we didn't have much choice in the matter. -^^-^
As Chubin and Zabih have argued in their book,
such statements reveal "a sense of isolationism (which)
characterized the Iranian attitude in 19 72-73 when some
journalists used the term Moscow-Baghdad - New Delhi axis,
embracing Iran on all three sides. Reaction to this concern
was partially responsible for the renewed interest in
164
resurrecting the CENTO Treaty in the summer of 1973."
Perhaps the most discomforting aspect of Soviet activity
was Moscow's seeming inconsistency. The Kremlin had taken
special pains in the late 1960 's to cultivate its relations
with the Shah. Then, during the Indo-Pakistani War in 19 71,
Moscow risked these relations by troop movements on Iran's
borders. Similarly, having previously refrained from taking
sides in Iranian-Iraqi disputes over the Shatt al-Arab and
the Kurdish questions, Moscow concluded the Treaty of Friend-
ship and Cooperation with Iraq, which was anathema to the
Shah. The Soviets then hastened to "reassure" the Shah
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of their good intentions via a Treaty of Cooperation with
165
Iran.
In 1972, President Nixon visited Tehran and learned
firsthand of the Shah's apprehensions. On his return to
the US, the President effectively exempted Iran from con-
trols on arms sales. In succeeding years, Iran purchased
a variety of increasingly sophisticated military hardware,
and sought to consolidate its regional standing by settling
existing local disputes. In doing so, the Shah became a
de facto, if not willing, supporter of the US policy (based
on the Nixon Doctrine) of relying on "regional stabilizers"
16 6
to protect their mutual interests.
Accordingly, the Shah, in the mid-1970 's, used Iran's
increased oil revenues to expand the Iranian military,
lavishingly furnishing it with sophisticated weaponry, and
16 7
committed Iran to the role of Persian Gulf "policeman."
And it was at that point that the events of 1978 so decisively
intervened.
As the discussion to this point has demonstrated,
the Russian/Soviet presence has been of primary concern to
Iranian rulers and foreign-policy makers for nearly a century-
and-a-half. Soviet policy has tended to display the same
opportunistic tendencies with regard to Iran as did its Czarist
predecessors. In times when Iran was internally weakened,
with little or no external support, the Russians/Soviets
pressed their advantages. When forced to deal with a united
Iran, particularly when another power, such as Great Britain
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or the U.S. were involved, a more cautious approach has been
the order of the day. Having reviewed the development of
Iran's relationship with the Soviet Union, this study will
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The change in the Shah's views of the USSR and Iran's
position vis-a-vis the superpower in the mid-1970 's is best
described in his own words.
If Moscow wants a real detente in Europe, it will
have to play the game here too. European security is
sheer mockery without stability and security in
the Persian Gulf,
Interview with the Shah, Newsweek, May 21, 1973, p. 44.
See also, Interview, US News and World Report , May 6, 1974.
The Shah also restated his view, in an interview with
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Iran in the 19 80 's , (Tehran, IIPES, 1978), p. 298.
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IV. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION; DOMESTIC
AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
At the beginning of 19 78, even after the onset of public
demonstrations in Iran, one would have been hard-pressed to
find anyone who would have predicted that, within a year,
the Pahlavi Dynasty would be toppled by mass demonstrations
and protests. Despite increasing speculation concerning
Iran's domestic, economic, social and political problems,
the general consensus, even among the Shah's most ardent
critics, was that the regime's power and resources were
largely intact and capable of dealing with any potential
threat to the monarchy. Thus, in March 1978, in the after-
math of widespread rioting, it was still possible for one
writer to note that.
Most observers agree that the situation is difficult
but by no means critical. This analysis is based
on the disunity of the opposition, the apparent
continued loyalty of the armed services and the
fervent commitment to ongoing stability of the
vast new middle class, created and enriched by the
oil boom. -^^2
That the Shah was eventually overthrown is attributable,
at least in part, to the nature of both the regime and its
opposition, which made accommodation and compromise increasing-
ly difficult, and ultimately, impossible to achieve, .z^other
contributing factor was the international setting at the
time that the revolution in Iran was growing. A discussion





The events of 1978-1979 in Iran were the climax of a
series of developments which stretch back over the course
of nearly the Shah's entire reign. The confrontation be-
tween the monarchy and the anti-royalist elements, previously
brought to a head in 1953, and although muted at times by
the Shah's co-option efforts and security apparatus, was
never completely silenced or eliminated.
In 1958, John C. Campbell had somewhat prophetically
assessed that:
...nationalism has not been tempered and disciplined.
The violent expression of anti-Western feeling and the
religious fanaticism of men who can stir mobs to
violence did not disappear with Mossaddegh. It merely
lurks under the surface. . .Much, indeed too much, depends
on the Shah himself, who rules as well as reigns. The
existing political institutions are not rooted in
popular acceptance and will attain stability only if
they can attract the support of the rising middle class
and eventually the peasantry . -^^^
Likewise, in 1964, a report compiled by the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran concluded that "the Shah's regime is regarded as
an unpopular dictatorship not only by its opponents, but
far more significantly, by its proponents as well... In 1964,
organized opposition to the Shah was divided and ineffectual,
but if one thinks of the opposition as a state of mind, it
extended right into the establishment itself... one of the
remarkable intangible factors in the present situation is
that the regime has so few convinced supporters .. .even
members of the establishment, while loyal to the Shah, are
suffering from a malaise, from lack of conviction in what
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they are doing, from doubts whether the regime deserves
to endure.
"
Reduced to its simplest terms, the single most important
point of contention between the Shah and his competitors
for power was the question of the proper role of the monarchy
in Iran. The Shah, like many of the other elements in
Iranian society, believed that only under a strong central
government would Iran possess the unity and strength to with-
stand foreign domination. In the Shah's scheme of things,
however, it was the monarchy which was to be the focus, or
hub of that strength. As James Bill noted in his study of
Iranian politics, the Shah was "the heart... the vital power
point in the (political) system."
The Shah's philosophical concept of the role of the
monarchy stemmed from two sources. In the first place, the
monarchy was a traditional Iranian institution. Its origins
could be traced both to the pre-Islamic Persian divine-right
kingships, as well as to Safavid Shi 'a religo-politics . Thus,
in Professor Lenczowski's view.
The assumption by Mohammed Reza Shah of the title
of Aryamehr reaffirmed (the) revival of the primordial
spirit of Iran fostered by a monarchy whose aim was
to combine the continuity of the ancient principles
with modern transformation .1^2
The other ingredient was the Shah's increasing tendency to
identify the institution itself and his personal role as




I will frankly confess that I was convinced that God
had ordained me to do certain things for the service
of my nation, things that perhaps could not be done
by anyone else. 173
It was not until the early 1960 's that the Shah was in
a sufficiently secure position to press these views. He
had barely survived the 1953 attempt to remove him, and he
had returned determined to never again undergo such humilia-
tion. The decade following the Shah's triumph over Mossaddegh
was one of chronic instability in Iran, during which he
sought to consolidate his power.
The Shah's pronouncement of the "White Revolution" in
1963, if nothing else, symbolized the emergence of the
monarchy as the center of power in Iran. The religious-
based opposition made its last serious bid for power in June
1963 and was crushed. The Tudeh, abandoned for all practi-
cal purposes by the Soviets, distrusted by most Iranians,
and persecuted by the Shah's security service, SAVAK, had
ceased to be an important source of opposition. The National
Front, which had been offered, but refused the opportunity to
cooperate with the government of Prime Minister Ali Amini
in 1962, remained a loose coalition of opposing factions
(intellectuals, bazaari, etc.) with no effective leadership
and few, if any, positive programs of its own.
From the mid-1960 's until the early 1970 's, with the
consolidation of political power under the institution of
the monarchy, Iran registered increasing political stability
174
and remarkable economic achievement. Active opposition
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to the regime was largely confined to student groups and
disaffected young extremists.
Several factors accounted for this phenomenon. Foremost
among them was the Shah's ability to co-opt and "balance
off" competitors for power and potential opponents to his
regime. This system of checks and balances permeated Iranian
political life, from top to bottom. Professor Bill once
noted, for example, the existence of "two-way tension be-
tween virtually every power point (in the elite network)
"
stemming from "the struggle of the individuals concerned to
gain greater favor with the Shah and at the same time to
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capture more control in the Iranian economic arena."
Further observation of the system by Bill and Leiden con-
fiinned the assessment that the practice of balancing had
resulting in "a dynamically stable balance of tension in which
ministers, courtiers, security agents, military leaders,
industrialists and clerics are systematically divided against
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one another at all levels."
A related element of the Shah's strategy was the channel-
ing of political "participation" into one, or at the most
two, recognized and controllable political parties, and
the suppression of those who could not, or would not, be
co-opted. In Professor Zabih ' s estimation.
The regime hoped to be able to confine (political)
participation to competition and mobilization for
allocation of rewards . It intended that the politically
articulate Iranians would acquire a sense of identity
with the system, without challenging its policies.
Apparently, the party was viewed by those in power
merely as a mechanism of mass cooptionof alienated or
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apathetic groups... A broad-based political party could
extend the same cooptation program to the lower middle
class and simultaneously bring it into conformity
with the already coopted intelligentsia. ^^^
Ultimately, the key ingredient of the formula was the
regime's ability to anticipate and adopt as its own demands
for certain improvements, and the substitution of economic
and selective social development for political liberalization
In a 1978 assessment of the Iranian political scene by James
Bill, it was noted that.
An examination of the Shah's reform program indicates
overriding emphasis on industrial growth, technologi-
cal progress and military development. Lagging far
behind has been. . .social change. . .Political development
has been completely ignored. What the Shah has done,
in effect, has been to encourage enormous economic
change and some social change in order to prevent any
basic political change. 178
This "grand strategy" turned out to be a two-edged
sword. There is no denying that it succeeded in part, inso-
far as the Shah's position was maintained and his programs
were carried out until 19 78. At the same time, however, many
underlying causes of grievances remained unaddressed, and
the integration of the other traditional power centers,
i.e., the ulema and the bazaar, under the institution of the
monarchy was never achieved.
The Shah's reliance on manipulation rather than recog-
nition of the need to create viable secular institutions
must be regarded as one of the great failures of his regime,




The simplest political system is that which depends
on one individual. It is also the least stable. . .A
political system with several different political
institutions, on the other hand, is much more likely
to adapt. The needs of one age may be met by one set
of institutions; the needs of the next by a different
set. The system possesses within itself the means
of its own renewal and adaptation . -'-'^^
The Shah overestimated the ability of the monarchy as
an institution and of himself as Shah to propel Iranian
society in the direction he wanted it to go. If the Iranian
people wouldn't come along peacefully, they could be pushed,
coerced, or suppressed.
To be sure, if there was to be any change under the
conditions which existed in Iran at the time of his suc-
cession and after WW II into the 1950 's and 1960 's, a strong
executive was required. But to attempt it alone - as was
increasingly the case from the mid-1960 's on - practically
guaranteed that, just as all credit was claimed by the
monarchy, all blame would be heaped upon it.
The net effect of these factors was perhaps best des-
cribed in a perceptive editorial in Kayhan International
in September 19 78.
By anticipating what people wanted, the government
effectively deprived them of the satisfaction of
getting what they demanded. Thus, in the long run,
the government was caught up in a race against time
to retain its position as the "Grand Benefactor" from
whom all the good things flowed to everyone in increasing
abundance. .
.
The famous economic and social reforms that launched
and maintained the enterprise of national reconstruction
in Iran had two sides: an economic one and a politi-
cal one. Originally, the idea was first to give
everyone a stake in the system by the creation of a
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better life for all, and then introduce democracy that
would flourish on the basis of this common stake in
the system.
But the more economic development paid results, the
more complacent became the government about the
need for participatory politics. At the beginning,
economic development was rightly thought of as a pre-
requisite for a smoothly functioning democracy. But
later, economic growth was seen as a substitute for
politics. 180
In the inflation and overheated economic conditions
which prevailed in Iran, particularly after 1974, the Shah's
181delicately balanced arrangement began to show signs of strain.
As that happened, the Shah's regime - always a harsh, tra-
ditional Persian monarchy - crossed the line and became a
modern, pervasive police state, in which the Shah's vision
of an economically developed and socially modern Iran was
advanced increasingly at the cost of personal and political
freedoms, and in which overt suppression was increasingly
relied upon to maintain the stability and political status-
18 2quo previously provided for by improving economic conditions
.
According to Professor Bill,
Between 19 71 and 19 76, the Shah's carefully blended —
tactics broke down. . .A period of un-Persian rule by
repression set in and a group of hard-liners in the
intelligence organization took charge. The Shah, who
was certainly aware of the nature of this rule, did
nothing to stop the reign of terror, which included
the systematic use of torture. Prisons were full and
hundreds were executed. The religious establishment
was attacked frontally . 183
Moreover, in 1977, the Shah promised programs of liberali-
zation, but failed to follow through with them. He thereby
not only prolonged the repression, but as events were to
prove, also undermined his own credibility. When, in 1978,
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in response to mass protests, he evidently really intended
to carry out reforms, the Shah found that no one believed
him.
As a commentary in Arab Report and Memo in August 19 78
noted.
The Shah has sought to defuse (the) dangerous situation
by timid measures of liberalization introduced over
the past few months. The climate has certainly been
less oppressive, the use of torture less systematic
against political prisoners, the press somewhat freer.
In June 1978 the Shah dismissed the head of the SAVAK
secret police. Gen. Nasiri...The Shah has also promised
that general elections due in the summer of 1979 will
be "one hundred percent free" .. .These sops thrown to
public opinion have been largely ineffective, first
because the Shah's late conversion to democracy is
not believed. In that he is prepared to dismantle
the Rastakhiz single-party structure and allow contending
parties to contest the elections; second, because he
has used great ferocity in putting down the demonstra-
tions. Leading divines have been arrested, and Ayatollah
Madari • s own home was entered by the police and two
of his pupils killed there. Such incidents inflame
passions and far outweigh gestures of conciliation. 184
The Shah also failed to properly gauge the extent of
opposition with which he was faced as the revolt spread. In
recent years, the Shah had repeatedly characterized the
opposition as an extremist minority, an "unholy alliance
between extremists of both left and right," the "black reac-
18 5tion coupled with the red destruction." His belief - that
the vast majority of Iranians supported him and that it was
18 6primarily, in his terms, "Islamic-Narxists" who opposed
the regime - if indeed ever accurate, appears to have been
most valid during the late 1960 's and into the early 1970 's.
By 1978, although the Shah's perception of his opposi-
187tion as an extremist minority remained largely the same,
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the reality was that it had developed into a growing,
188broad-based rejection of the regime's arbitrary style of rule.
The identification of repressive measures with the monarchy,
and the excesses of the regime, whether or not the Shah fully
engineered and directed them, ultimately led to the events of
1978.
B. THE OPPOSITION
It is not a difficult task to identify and categorize
the various groups which combined to challenge, and ulti-
mately overthrow the Shah's regime. On the one hand were
those groups which composed the traditional forces in Iran,
namely, the ulema and the bazaar i. Since the late Qajar
Dynasty, these elements had been the primary sources of opposi-
tion to the throne. They had played a pivotal role in fomenting
the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911, and were the main-
stays of Mossaddegh's nationalist movement. Their role in
the 1978 revolution was to prove no less crucial.
Aligned with the traditional forces in 1978 in opposing
the Shah was a second category of opposition elements, those
which may be termed "non- traditional" or modern, comprised
of Iran's intellectual elite, middle class and labor activists,
and the radical left. These groups were relative newcomers
to the Iranian political scene, having developed largely as
a result of the increasingly rapid influx of western education,





Opposition views in 1978, as in 1953, at first ranged
from the desire to eliminate the monarchy completely (few
foresaw this as an achievable goal early in the revolt) to
those which favored some type of working arrangement, in
which the Shah would play the role of a Constitutional
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monarch, and actual power would be wielded by the Majlis.
As has been discussed, until 1978 the Shah had been able
to balance off and check the various opposition groups,
largely through the exploitation of their natural differences
His success in doing so had evidently lulled the regime into
believing that the very diversity of the groups mitigated
against their forming any viable coalition. The religious
and secular elements had heretofore proved unable to achieve
any lasting cooperation (a situation which continues in
post-Shah Iran) and, in any case, it was difficult to imagine
that any possible coalition could successfully challenge the
regime. And yet, that is exactly what happened, as the
opposition groups overcame their differences, even if only
temporarily, and focused on their single common objective -
the disposal of the Shah.
1. The Traditional Elements
a . The Religious Dimension
Perhaps no aspect of the Iranian Revolution has
received more comment, and, at the same time, been less
understood than has the religious aspect of the anti-Shah
protest. This misunderstanding generally stems from the
tendency of Westerners to downplay or disregard the role of
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religion in the Islamic societies, where religious principles
govern not only spiritual, but political, economic and social
aspects of life. This is as especially true in Iran where
the dynamic fusion of ancient Persian culture and Shi'ite
Islam produced an institution which has proved uniquely
suited to meeting the social, economic and political demands
of the Iranian people.
The religious dimension of the revolution was important
in two ways. First of all, tenets of Shi 'a Islam provided
the moral basis for anti-regime struggle as an effort to
overcome a corrupt, oppressive and illegitimate government
which was subservient to foreign (U.S.) domination. Secondly,
there was the emergent role of the ulema as the leaders and
192
mobilizers of the population-at-large for political action.
That the ulema was able to do so stems from their traditional
role and prestige as protectors of the Iranian people, a role
which is historically derived from the following factors:
...Twelver Shi'a theory, which considered all tem-
poral rulers illegitimate and came increasingly to
assert that legitimate guidance, pending the return
of the "hidden" Twelfth Imam, is to be found in the
Shi'a religious leaders, the moj taheds : . .
.
...the great veneration for the ulama leaders by most
Iranians, along with very close ties between the guilds
and the ulama...
...identification of the ulama with the popular anti-
foreign cause, ever since the first wars against
Russia in the early nineteenth century; and...
...the material wealth of the ulama... and their control
over the low courts and education. .. 19 3
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From its very inception, the relationship between
the Pahlavi Dynasty and the Mujtahedin was influenced by
these factors. In the 1920 's and 19 30 's, Reza Shah's
secular reforms had had the effect of partially undermining
religious authority. This trend continued under his son.
Among the personal grievances of the mullahs was (1) the
Shah's land reform program, which reduced the "Oghaf" shrine-
controlled lands (thereby reducing the revenues of the
Mujtahids) ; and (2) , judicial modernization measures which
reduced their functions in marriage, divorce and other
194family matters
.
As one religious scholar commented in 1967,
Reza Shah did not even go through the motions of
appealing to the religious. This is in a way what
has happened again in Iran during the last several
years. In the land reform, for example, the mujtahids
were not even consulted nor was the Islamic method even
considered. Thus, the opposition of mujtahids like
Khomeini was not to the idea of land reform, but rather
to the manner in which it was implemented. 195
In more recent years, the Shah continued to
unnecessarily antagonize the religious sector. No effort
was made to reconcile modernization programs with what the
Shah considered reactionary religious views. Other irri-
tants included the adoption of the Imperial calendar in place
of the Shi 'a Islamic Calendar, and the reduction, in 1977-
1978, of the annual subsidy regularly given to the religious





Thus as the protests and demonstrations developed
in 1978/ the Mujtahids came to play an increasingly important
role. Although by no means of one mind concerning alterna-
tives to the Shah's regime - the quiet debate between those
religious leaders who favored a "mash routeh" or Constitu-
tional monarchy versus those who supported "mashrou'eh,
"
or theocracy, had continued unabated since the 1906 revolu-
tion - it was clear that the majority of the clergy was dis-
satisfied with the prospect of the indefinite continuance of
197the regime as it then existed.
An important consideration in the clergy's ability
to play a role of active leadership, from a practical stand-
point, was the continued viability of the mosque as an insti-
tution. It was the mosque which had, through the years,
proven most resistant to the regime's efforts to reduce the
influence of other traditional power centers. According to
one observer, although the mosque did not totally escape the
effects of these measures,
...the progressive weakening of all other institutions
in our society, especially during the past half decade,
cleared the ground for the return of the mosque in
renewed s trength
.
The banning of political parties, the turning of
the parliament into a club for sychnophants , the
muzzling of the press and the continued underdevelop-
ment of trade unions and other associations, deprived
society of its natural means of self-expression and
political activity. This led to a gradual return of
the mosque as a multi-purpose institution that could
counter the inordinant expansion of the state as a
super-institution. 198
The mosques were thus not only natural, but ready centers
199for the direction of the revolution as it developed.
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The emergence of the Ayatollah Khomeini as the
symbolic and titular head of the opposition in late 19 78
culminated the revolution's process of gravitation towards
religion. The reasons for Khomeini's assumption of this
role included his philosophy of politics as a logical exten-
sion of Shi 'ism, his exile following his condemnation of
the Shah in 1964, and his persistent criticism of the Iranian
regime over the years. Additionally, there was the emotional
issue of the mysterious death of the Ayatollah 's son in
October 1977, which was attributed by many to SAVAK.
The regime also proved to be its own worst enemy
when, in January 1978, the Ministry of Information caused the
daily newspaper Ettela ' at to print an attack on Khomeini,
alleging that he was a homosexual and a British stooge. This
attack touched off the first massive anti-government riots
201by the Ayatollah 's supporters in Qom that same month.
An event that proved to be just as important was the regime's
apparent engineering of Khomeini's explusion from Iraq. His
residence in Najaf had provided the Ayatollah rather easy
access to visiting Iranians over the years, and it was apparent
that liaison between domestic opponents and the Ayatollah
was being facilitated by his continued presence there. As
it turned out, however, Khomeini's move to France proved to
be even more critical - increased access to the international
media was both available, and very effectively employed.
Khomeini thus came to symbolize the unity of
202purpose of the revolutionary coalition, although it soon
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became clear that even his prestige was insufficient to




As was mentioned early in this discussion, since
the Qajar Dynasty the bazaari has been the traditional part-
ner of the religious leadership in opposing certain aspects
of secular rule. This is based primarily on the commonality
of interests which binds the two groups, not the least of
which is bazaari financing of clergy charities, hospitals,
schools, orphanages and theological colleges.
The animosity of the bazaar towards the regime
stems from the economic policies pursued by the Pahlavis.
Beginning in the 1930 's, the development of a state-controlled
economy and the growth of imports gradually undermined the
economic base of the bazaari. As Zabih notes, the accelera-
tion of the decline of the bazaari 's economic strength under
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi is specifically attributable to:
a) Huge government-owned industrial units which sprang
up throughout the country over the 15 years 1963-1978.
b) Increased involvement and near monopoly of the
state in export-import businesses.
c) Expansion of the banking system which first rivaled
and then pre-empted the credit institutions of the
bazaari.
d) Breakdown of traditional patterns of socio-economic
organization which served to accentuate the opposition
of the bazaari to what was vaguely termed "moderniza-
tion. "205
Other observers cite such symptoms as the state's direct or
indirect control of more than 80% of the Gross National
Product. Moreover, the bazaar was partially displaced by
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the growth of the nouveau-riche, who administered and
20 6participated in the new economic programs.
In the aftermath of the oil price increases after
1973, a "truce-of-sorts " existed for a time between the
regime and the bazaar as a result of the influx of increased
revenues to the merchants. This truce ended, however, when
the regime, in 1975, launched an "anti-profiteering campaign,"
which imposed guilds onto the bazaar, and subjected shop-
keepers and merchants to arbitrary fines and imprisonment
for hoarding and profiteering.
Thus, there were adequate grievances for coopera-
tion between the ulema and the bazaar in the 1978 protests,
in which the bazaari played the role of protest organizers.
As one observer noted early in the crisis.
If the demands of the clergy have had such serious
repercussions, it is precisely because they corres-
pond to a very deep discontent among urban sectors,
especially those of the merchants and artisans. With
religious life and social life so closely linked, the
call to revolt spreads immediately through the maze
of tiny streets, through the stalls and workshops
of the bazaars around each mosque. 208
At the same time, neither of these groups, either
alone or together, had the power to bring down the government.
The clergy and the bazaari could and did provide the leader-
ship and organization, but the cooperation and participation




2. The Non-Traditional Opposition
The second category of regime opposition in Iran
in 19 78 consisted of what may be broadly defined as the
modern middle class, comprised of such diverse elements as
professional people, industrial managers and labor, students
and extremists.
a. The "New Middle Class"
James Bill has used this term to describe what
he calls the "professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia" in
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Iran. According to Bill, included in this group are
not only students, teachers, professors, writers and artists,
but technocrats and administrators, managers and clerks.
As such, they are distinguishable from the traditional middle
class (bazaari, landowners, etc.) in that its members:
...refuse to accept the traditional power relationships
that dominate Iranian Society...
...possess or are in the process of acquiring a higher
education (i.e., a modern or 'new' education as opposed
to the traditional maktab - madrasah education) . .
.
...owe their power position to... the skill or talent
that they possess due to their modern formal education...
...have been exposed in varying degrees to outside
philosophies, thoughts, and ideas...
...are free of any rigid religious2^Qgmatism and of
any blind worship of past history.
Despite these differences, the existence of continued strong
relationships to the more traditional elements should be
noted. In the words of one commentator.
As the bazaaris were until a few years ago the only
large social group capable of financing higher education
for their children, an unusually high proportion of the
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new "intellectual elite" is related to the bazaar. A
majority of university teachers / lawyers, media men,
technocrats, and the middle "cadres" of the service
and armed forces comes from bazaari families. 211
Perhaps the most volatile elements of this group
were the students. The regime had realized the dangers
associated with the introduction of modern western education
and training into a traditional society and had thus sought
to minimize them through a combination of intimidation,
bribery and selected concessions directed at students and
academics. Thus, in the view of one observer, the central
political authority came to view the Iranian universities
"more in terms of control and as .. .center (s) for producing
the skills needed to carry out its programs than as serious
212
... center (s) of learning."
Direct offspring of the Iranian students were
the small leftist groups which had begun to operate in the
late 1960 's and early 1970 's, and among whose membership
students or former students played a prominent role. These
organizations were undoubtedly among the most cohesive and
best organized of the groups opposing the Shah. Over the
past decade many of them had received training from PLO,
PFLP-GC, and other Palestinian groups, which they applied
213to terrorist activities within Iran. In the early stages
of the revolt, these types of activities continued to receive
prominence in the headlines of the domestic and foreign
press. But the regime was not undone by selective terrorist
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acts and the importance of these groups transcends that
aspect of their role in the revolution. It must be recog-
nized that, just as the ulema provided the moral direction
and impetus of the revolt, and the bazaar i the structure
for the organization for popular participation, the extremist
groups were at the forefront of the leadership of mass
street demonstrations which resulted. It is also apparent
that the larger extremist groups like the Mujahedeen and
Fedayeen-e Khalq will continue to play important roles in
the continued internal turbulence in that country,
b. The Working Class
The most important participants, in terms of
numbers, were the industrial working class members -
laborers, workers, housewives, the unemployed, etc. Since
the regime had effectively prevented the formation of insti-
tutions capable of channeling their demands and needs or
responding to them, these people had "no legally recognized
political party or social organizations able or willing to
alleviate their discontent and to protect and promote their
interests," and were thus "left to the mosques or to the
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underground leftist organizations to exploit their grievances."
The involvement of the industrial working class, centered as
it was in the cities, transformed regime opposition into a
mass popular movement.
One final point should be made before leaving this
topic. The most important aspect of this coalition of oppo-
sition groups, so often cited as a major weakness, was its
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very diversity. A September 1978 Time Magazine assessment
that the Shah's problems in dealing with the crisis were
magnified by the fact that the opposition was not confined
to a single political sector was, at the time, a minority
215
view.
The regime was obviously shocked and caught off
balance by the extent of the opposition which evidenced it-
self in 1978. The diversity of the opposition increasingly
rendered ineffective appeasement and/or suppressive efforts
directed at any single group - tactics which in the past
had worked largely because of economic incentives. As the
crisis worsened, however, no measure or combination of
measures proved sufficient to win new support for the regime,
or quiet the growing opposition, whose common focus had
become the Shah. Just as all credit for progress had been
claimed by the monarchy, so too would all blame be heaped
upon it
.
C. ARMS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SHAH: THE AMERICAN CONNECTION
The special relationship which existed between Washington
and Tehran, focused as it was on Western access to oil and
regional stability, has been well-documented elsewhere and
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need not be further replicated here. Suffice it to say
that, by the beginning of 19 78, ties between the two coun-
tries were at least as strong, if not stronger than at any
218time in the past.
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There is, at this time, no clear answer to the question
of the U.S. role in and responsibility for the course of
events in Iran, and, if the dialogue carried on to date
is any indication, the subject will continue to be debated
for some time to come. For every critic of U.S. support
for and reliance upon the Shah, there was an ardent supporter,
with both sides equally able to argue their respective
viewpoints
.
Thus, at one extreme, for example, there were those who
argued that American support for the Shah was, at best, a
risky investment in an unreliable and unstable regime. At
the opposite pole were those who viewed the Shah as little
more than an American puppet, whose ties to Washington served
only to strengthen the repressiveness of his regime.
It is not possible, in this brief space, to resolve this
controversy. Nor will there be an attempt to disavow American
involvement in Iran. Rather, there will be an attempt to
place in perspective some of these arguments and the reasons
for them.
Iranian criticism of the nature of past US involvement
with the Shah was based primarily on complaints highlighted
by Abol-Hassan Banisadr in a December 19 78 article published
in the New York Times . Among the grievances cited were the
CIA's role in the 1953 coup which restored the Shah to power,
continued CIA links to SAVAK which, according to Banisadr
made the American people "a party to every kind of degradation
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and cruelty inflicted by the Shah's secret police on his
political opponents," and the massive arms sales to Iran,
219
at the expense of social and economic development.
It is clear that Banisadr ' s position was fairly repre-
sentative of the attitude of the opposition-at-large, if
not a substantial number of politically-aware Iranians. In
the minds of many of these people, US involvement in the
1953 coup placed Washington in a position of responsibility
for any and all consequences of that act. Continued American
support for the Shah was therefore seen as nothing more than
a further manifestation of interference in Iran's domestic
220
affairs. The convergence of American and Iranian policy
and interests in so many areas, and the visible and growing
American presence in Iran was, to many nationalistic Iranians,
221
equatable with subservience, and even colonialism.
1. Arms Sales to the Shah
There is no doubt that the issue most responsible
for the often-voiced contention that the US did, in fact,
hold the "strings" to the Shah's regime was that of American
arms sales to Iran. Proponents of this view held that
Washington's continued sales of arms to the Shah were par-
tially responsible, on the one hand, for the increasing
oppressiveness of the regime, and on the other, for the lack
of progress in curing Iran's economic and social ills. Such
was the concern of Professor Marvin Zonis that, in testimony
to the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia in
1973, he charged, that, "...American foreign policy is
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contributing to the suppression and the postponement of
222fundamental changes in Iran."
The implications of this charge are threefold. First
of all/ the extensive arms purchases were seen as diverting
capital and skilled human resources from much-needed economic
and social programs. Secondly, the Shah's pursuit of an
arms build-up was perceived by many as the means of strengthen-
ing the military's traditional role (since the inception of
223the Pahlavi Dynasty) as the power behind the throne. There
was apparently little popular concern with the Shah's view
of regional threats to Iran, but much fear that his real
interest was to enhance the tools of political repression
224withm the country.
The third implication is that the United States,
through some adjustment of its arms sales policies (i.e.,
restriction or termination or the threat to do so) would have
forced the Shah to make substantive changes in the nature of
his regime. Furthermore, it hints that by failing to do so,
the US acquiesed in - and abetted - the use of repression by
225the Shah. ^
This is a flawed argument in several respects. In
the first place, it overlooks the changed nature of the US-
Iranian relationship during the decade prior to the crisis.
Secondly, it exaggerates the amount of leverage the US had
acquired through arms sales by assuming that the Shah was
so reliant on US arms that the threat to terminate their
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supply would have automatically required his compliance
with whatever demands Washington cared to make.
The reality of the relationship which existed between
Washington and Tehran does not coincide with the myth of
the Shah as a puppet of American administrations. While
the US/ by virtue of the Nixon Doctrine did encourage the
Shah to play the role of "gendainne" in the Gulf, it did not
dictate that he do so. Clearly, this was a role which the
Shah himself chose to pursue. Indeed, given the underlying
premise of the Doctrine - that being that the US would refrain
from involving itself in regional security problems short
of a threat by the USSR - it is difficult to see how Washington
could have prevented the Shah from assuming that role even
had it desired to do so.
Another factor in the more balanced U.S. -Iranian
relationship was the final unmasking of U.S. and Western
dependence on Middle East oil in 1973-1974, and the inability
of the United States and other oil consuming nations to pre-
vent the escalation of oil prices. The net effect was that
the U.S. found itself reliant on the Shah - for his influence
within OPEC and as a stabilizing force in the region - while
the huge influx of oil revenues after 19 73 gave the Shah in-
creased discretion in the conduct of domestic and foreign
policy. The Shah, for example, sold Iranian oil to Israel,
an act which earned him the emnity of the Palestinians, and




with reference to the arms sales themselves, one of
the ironies of the controversy over this subject during the
19 70 's is that while many American opponents were loudly
complaining that, despite U.S. willingness to sell arms to
Iran, the U.S. had not secured the Shah's cooperation on
some important issues (e.g., oil prices), the Shah's critics
cited arms sales as proof positive of his subservience to
Washington's desires. The somewhat popularized American
portrayal of the Shah as an unreliable megalomaniac, bent
on rebuilding the Persian Empire, even at the cost of dragging
the U.S. into war, starkly contrasted the Iranian view of
227the Shah as a tool of American imperialism.
It would therefore seem that the true impact of the
arms sales lies somewhere in between these two extremes.
The US role as Iran's primary weapons source, even when other
forms of influence are taken into account, simply never
"bought" the amount of influence over the Shah's policies
which some proponents of the program promised it would. Nor
did it translate into the domination of the Shah critics
allege it did. Thus, William B. Quandt ' s assessment of 1978
prior to the Iranian revolution found that:
All in all, despite the enormous size of the US-
Iranian arms relationship, it does not have the
characteristics .. .that help insure a measure of
U.S. influence... It is noteworthy that the United
States did not invoke the arms supply relationship
in an attempt to influence the Shah... After all, the
Shah was paying for arms in hard currency, his orders
were welcomed by arms manufacturers, and alternative
arms suppliers stood eager to enter the Iranian market.
In these circumstances, it would have been surprising
127

had the United States been able to influence the Shah
outside the military sphere by manipulating the
flow of weapons. 228
2. The Issue of Human Rights
The one aspect of the arms issue which perhaps best
demonstrates the true nature of the US-Iranian relationship,
and Washington's own perception of its ability to pressure
the Shah was the apparent reluctance on the part of the Carter
Administration to strictly apply human rights policies to
Iran. Several observations are in order in this regard.
It is clear, first of all, that, for better or worse,
increased emphasis on human rights aspects of American
foreign policy, beginning in 1976, ultimately had the effect
of raising expectations in som.e quarters that a redefinition
of the US-Iranian relationship was imminent. In 1976, Con-
gress had passed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 which linked American provision of security assistance
229to human rights considerations. Almost immediately after
the bill's passage, military aid to Uruguay was cancelled
because of human rights violations. Similarly, in 1977, the
new Carter Administration had refused to even consider
Chile's military assistance request on the same grounds.
Many thought that Iran would be the next to face at least
230the threat of such action.
This view was further encouraged by Mr. Carter's
evident sincerity, both during the Presidential campaign and
231
after having assumed office, in stressing human rights issues.
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He had, in fact, singled out "the deplorable state of human
232
rights in Iran" during his campaign.
That the U.S. did not resort to threats to curtail
arms supplies to Iran or to turn down future requests is
attributable primarily to two factors. One was that the
Shah had obviously taken note of the increased discussion of
the subject and Mr. Carter's personal views and had moved to
defuse the issue. The timing of his prnouncement of a pro-
gram of "liberalization" in 1977 - his oft-stated concerns
for his own image and intentions of turning over a different
kind of system to his son taken aside - does indicate that
the program had as a primary goal the avoidance of possible
tensions with the new Administration in Washington and the
233
reduction of criticism of Iran in the American press.
At the same time, it is also apparent that, with
or without American pressure, the Shah was fully determined
that it was to be he, not Washington, the media, nor any
of his domestic opponents, who would decide upon the extent
and pace of reforms, and who would fix the limits on the
amount of open opposition which would be permitted. By mid-
1978, there were indications that those limits had been
reached. The Shah chose not to try to return completely
to repressive measures, but, as previously mentioned, sought
to divide the opposition into "reformists" and "revolution-
234
aries." Liberalization would be reserved for those who
would go along with his stated intentions of gradually moving
129

towards closer adherance to the Constitution. Those who
235
sought an end to the monarchy would not be tolerated.
As has already been suggested, the second reason that
further U.S. pressure was not applied was because, once in
office, President Carter was faced with the practical con-
sequences of attempting to force the human rights issue upon
the Shah. The President assessed that, while American
influence was sufficient to encourage the Shah to liberalize,
the U.S. was ultimately not in the position to dictate
23 6domestic change in Iran. While the President had indeed
sought to make the human rights issue a key ingredient of
his Administration's foreign policy, the basic problem of
how to confront the Shah - or for that matter any other foreign
government with whom the U.S. shared vital interests - with-
237
out risking those interests had not been solved.
By the end of 1977, with the Shah apparently moving
in the direction of liberalization, such pressures, having
already been deemed inadvisable, were further adjudged to be
unnecessary. The Shah visited Washington in November 1977
and was praised by the President as an enlightened leader,
238
whose alliance with Washington was unbreakable. Subse-
quently, during the 1977 New Year's Eve stopover in Tehran,
Mr. Carter commended the Shah's leadership and the stability
239
of Iran. The President later noted that he and the Shah
had discussed human rights and that, in his view, the Shah
240
was "very deeply concerned about human rights."
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To some of the Iranian opposition, these developments
amounted to little more than a "betrayal" on the issue of
241human rights. No sooner had the President departed
Tehran when the regime verbally attacked the Ayatollah
Khomeini in January 19 78, and forcefully suppressed resulting
242
noting in Qom, with the reported loss of 100 lives.
Critics tended to overlook the fact that the Shah's reform
program - however half-hearted it might have been - had
resulted in part from the U.S. stand on human rights.
Rather, they faulted President Carter for not going even
further in pressuring the Shah, and some have interpreted
his failure to do so as an outright endorsement of not only
past regime policies, but also of whatever actions the Shah
might choose to undertake in the future. And, as subsequent
events have demonstrated (i.e., the "hostage crisis" of
1979-1980) this view has continued implications for future
U.S. -Iranian relations.
3 . American Reaction to the Crisis
As events unfolded in Iran in 1978, the Administra-
tion's policies gave the appearance of being indecisive
and even contradictory. That this was so is attributable
to a number of factors, some aspects of which are discussed
below.
In the first place, one should recall the atmosphere
in which the Carter Administration's foreign policy was
operating at the time. Having entered the second year of
his presidency under fire for his approach to and handling of
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foreign policy issues, Mr. Carter had sought to redefine
243
some of his earlier objectives. He faced the task of
overcoming the impression that his foreign policies were
based on flawed strategy, poor tactics and a shrinking base
244
of domestic and Congressional support.
As a result, the Administration seemed determined
to concentrate on a few issues which held promise of pro-
ducing foreign policy victories, which, according to one
observer, were needed to "bolster Mr. Carter's prestige
245before Congress, the country and, incidentally, the world."
By the beginning of 19 78, two such issues had emerged. The
first was the Panama Canal Treaty which the President had
signed in September 1977, and was due to go before Congress
246for ratification in March 1978. According to one report
at the time.
The President has lived, thought and talked Panama for
the past several weeks. Says an aide: There's no
other single foreign policy issue that, politically,
consumed more of his time.^^^
The second, and decidedly more important issue was
that of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations which, in the
aftermath of President Sadat's journey to Israel, had added
a whole new dimension to the Mideast peace process. It was
this issue, the related Mideast plane deal, and the series
of events which led to Camp David in September 1978, which
was to occupy most of Mr. Carter's foreign policy attention
248
and energy until the autumn of 19 78. It was obvious that
President Carter sincerely believed that an agreement between
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Egypt and Israel would be an important step towards the
solution of the Mideast problem. At the same time, however,
if handled successfully, it also offered him the possibility
of an achievement as significant to the foreign policy record
of his own presidency as the opening to China had been to
249Richard Nixon's. The net effect of these circumstances
was that, until late in the year, the Administration was
250preoccupied with foreign policy issues other than Iran,
and "the failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation
in time to devote systematic presidential attention to
it...""i
This leads to a second observation concerning the
lack of American response, namely that the anti-regime
demonstrations in Iran, at least at the outset, were not
immediately perceived, either in the White House or Niavaran
Palace, as constituting a "crisis." As has previously been
mentioned, there seemed to be every reason to believe that
the Shah, who had periodically faced similar outbursts of
protests, was still in firm control. For the most part,
Washington's reaction to events from January until late
summer 19 78 was limited to watching events and occasional
expressions of confidence in the Shah, This continued to
be the case at least until the period August-September, when
252
events took a decided turn for the worst.
From that point on, Washington's reaction to the




a. Continued expressions of support for the Shah ;
The Administration, through September and October and into
November, privately and publicly voiced its support for the
Shah. In the President's September 10 phone call to the
Shah, in the aftermath of what came to be known as Tehran's
"Black Friday," Mr. Carter reaffirmed U.S. -Iranian ties and
expressed "regret over the loss of life and his hope that
the violence would soon be ended. He further expressed the




This same theme, stressing U.S. support and urging
continued moderation, continued to be voiced as late as
November, despite the possibility that other actions might
254have alleviated the continuously worsening situation. It
was, in fact, not until November, after most other observers
had already given up on the Shah's chances of remaining in
power, that Washington finally agreed to support "sterner"
measures, including the Shah's appointment of a military
government. The State Department also reluctantly approved
255the sale of riot batons and tear gas to the Shah. By
that time, however, the combination of continued unrest,
labor stoppages, and growing confusion within the regime
9 s fi
rendered these measures useless.
Thereafter, American statements of support became
more tentative. The Administration was known to be divided
over the issue of the prospects of the Shah's survival,
although Mr. Brzezinski, for one, continued to encourage
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the Shah. The President himself expressed reservations on
257 . . .December 1
,
and further indications of American pessimism
were evident in the U.S. decision to fly military and civilian
dependents out of Iran at Government expense, and in the
revelation that the U.S. had discreetly encouraged contacts
258
with the Ayatollah Khomeini.
b. The Disavowal of Any Intention to Intervene in
Iran's Internal Affairs ; The Administration's expressions
of support for the Shah were almost invariably coupled with
the assertion that the U.S. had "no intention of interfering
in the internal affairs of Iran, and we have no intention of
259permitting others to interfere..." The President further
expressed "confidence in the Iranian people to make the
26
ultimate judgements about their own government."
With the appointment of the Bakhtiar government
in January 1979, the White House at first attempted to
encourage the Shah to remain in Iran. The President apparently
believed that his presence was essential to that government's
chances for success, and to the future of a Constitutional
261
monarchy in Iran. Ultimately, however, Washington was
forced to accept the reality of Iranian demands for the
Shah's departure, and noted U.S. readiness to cooperate with
26 2
the new government, whether or not the Shah remained.
Within a matter of weeks, U.S. efforts to rally
support for Bakhtiar notwithstanding, the Ayatollah Khomeini
staged his triumphant return to Iran and the U.S. was faced
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with the problems of attempting to establish normalized
relations with a fragmented ruling coalition in Tehran.
A retrospective look at these policies yields
several criticisms. First of all, despite whatever impressions
the Iranian opposition might have held, American options for
influencing the situation were clearly limited. Of the
extreme alternatives - either urging a "crackdown" or en-
couraging the Shah to a speedier return to Constitutional
government - neither was attractive to the White House, On
the one hand, the President's personal convictions and public
stand on human rights argued against even the hint of U.S.
263
support for a return to the "old order" in Iran. And,
on the other hand, it was argued that the urging of quicker
liberalization would be interpreted by an Iranian opposition
already convinced of the Shah's dependence on Washington,
as withdrawal of support for the Shah, thereby further
264
weakening his position.
What the Administration did not perceive was that
its resultant rather ambiguous and often contradictory stand
was itself a source of encouragement to the Shah's opposition.
As Shahram Chubin has pointed out.
The myths of pervasive Western influence and cunning
Occidentals congenitally conspiring die hard in the
Middle East, and Washington's curiously equivocal
statements and desultory responses to the crisis
lent credence to the Iranian view that Carter was
dumping the Shah. In the cacophony of voices one theme
stood out: that the United States could not and
would not intervene in Iran's internal affairs.
After more than thirty years of pervasive interfer-
ence, this statement during a crisis was an advertisement
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of retreat; to Iranians it signalled the withdrawal
of the American veto against opposition to the
Shah. 265
An unwelcome side-effect of this situation was the
diminishing of the confidence of other regional actors, the
Saudis in particular, as to the American commitment to its
friends. This damage was not destined to be easily repaired
by the dispatch of unarmed F-15's to the Kingdom, or the
indecision apparent in the dispatch and subsequent recall
of the aircraft carrier Constellation to the Gulf region in
u 266December.
Even the White House's stated policy of non-
interference was not without problems. In January 1979,
the Administration dispatched General Robert E. Huyser to
Tehran. The purpose of the Huyser mission, though controversy '
persists, appears to have been two-fold:
(1) to preserve order in the Iranian military
and to insure that it remained a viable force for the future;
(2) to discourage a military coup and, at least
initially, to persuade the military to support Shapur Bakhtiar.
There is some indication, however, that Washington had
decided that it would be best for the Iranian military not
to intervene at all, even if Bakhtiar 's government was to
,, 267
collapse.
It is obvious in retrospect that the effect
of Huyser 's mission was to demoralize and neutralize the
Iranian military and to remove it as a force to be reckoned
with in the showdown between Bakhtiar and the revolutionary
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movement. This has lead to charges by the Shah and Bakhtiar
that Huyser's mission from the outset was to prevent military
from intervening to save the monarchy in order to allow
Moslem, an ti-communist forces to gain control in Iran.
Whatever Huyser's original purposes may have been, however,
it is inconceivable that the mission could be interpreted as
26 8
anything but interference.
There are, of course, many other aspects
of the question of American involvement in Iran and the U.S.
reaction to the crisis which merit examination not possible
within the scope of this paper. There are also many lessons
which may be drawn from this experience, two of which bear
re-emphasis
.
The first is that U.S. failure to encourage
the Shah - to curb his appetite for weaponry and particularly
to implement political liberalization in the early 1970 's -
has had the unfortunate consequence of contributing to the
269illusion of unqualified support for his policies. This
illusion will not be easily dissipated and should be borne
in mind by American policy-makers once events permit a
normalization of U.S. -Iranian relations.
From the standpoint of American foreign
policy-making, the Iranian experience has graphically demon-
strated the dangers of over-reliance on a single foreign
leader. The contradictions inherent in the Nixon Doctrine's
urging of "self-reliance" on the part of others while the
U.S. was itself in search of "pillars," if not apparent
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270before, should be at this time. In the case of Iran,
the failure to realize this and the continued over-reliance
on the Shah, ironically not only contributed to the demise
of his regime, but has also left a residue of misunderstanding
which is likely to bedevil American-Iranian relations for
some time to come.
D. THE STAGES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS: FROM PROTEST
TO REVOLT
In his study of revolutions. Crane Brinton observed that,
"The first steps in revolution are by no means clear to the
revolutionists themselves, and the transition from agitation
271
to action is not a sudden and definite thing..." As has
been indicated, this was certainly true of the Iranian revolu-
tion, which began as a protest against the Shah's excesses
and developed into a revolution which succeeded partly be-
cause of the initial failure of the regime to adequately
perceive and react to the threat posed by growing demonstra-
272tions.
The effect of these circumstances on American policy has
already been generally described, and its impact on the
Soviet reaction will be dealt with in the following chapter.
In order to do this, it is first necessary to outline in
greater detail the phases through which Iran's revolution
progressed and to highlight some crucial events. The estab-
lishment of this framework of dates and events is essential
to the examination of the nature and timing of Moscow's
reaction, and resulting Soviet policy towards Iran.
139

Brinton's analysis of revolutions proposed several
"uniformities/" which may be summarized as follows:
1. Each revolution begins with a period of agitation,
during which the constituted authority is eventually
challenged by illegal acts.
2. The government ultimately invokes the use of police
and/or military force to meet these acts.
3. For one reason or another - either because the opposi-
tion is too well-organized, or because its attempts at
suppression are carried out half-heartedly or inefficiently,
the government fails to smother the rebellion.
4. The government falls only after it has lost control
over its armed forces or lost the ability to use them
effectively.
5. This stage of the revolution ends with the victory
of the revolutionaries after what is dramatic rather than
serious bloodshed.
6. In the first stages, and at the critical moment when
the test of force comes, the old regime is faced by a solid
opposition. The opposition is indeed composed of various
groups, but welded together by the necessity of effectively
opposing the old government. Once the opposition itself
becomes the new government, however, it faces a different
set of problems. When it actually begins to deal with these




In the case of the Iranian Revolution, the existence of
each of these uniformities is, to one degree or another,
detectable during the period under study in this paper, from
January 1978 to March 1979. And within that period, it is
possible to identify four "stages" which the revolt under-
went, each of which displayed "distinct features with respect
274
to strategy and participants."
The first stage, which may generally be termed the "agi-
tation or protest stage," began with a series of demonstra-
tions during the months of January through May. This was
probably the least revolutionary of the stages. Protest
focused primarily on regime repression, the lack of serious
reform and the country's economic conditions. The opposition
had not yet coalesced and the overthrow of the regime had
not yet become the opposition's central objective.
On 9 January a protest march in Qom against the regime's
character assassination on the Ayatollah Khomeini had re-
sulted in a clash with police and the deaths of twelve stu-
275dents. Following this incident and the traditional Shi ' ite
40-day mourning period, a nationwide demonstration and strike
was called to mourn the deaths of the students. This resulted
in further clashes with the authorities and new casualties
and established a 40-day cycle of demonstrations, deaths,
2 7 6
mourning, etc., which endured until May.
During the months of June and July, there appeared to be
a slight change in tactics on the part of the opposition.
A general strike was called on 5 June 19 78, and the bazaars
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in Tehran, Mashad, Qoiti/ Tabriz and other large cities shut
277down, but no demonstrations were held. Similarly on
June 17th, the 40th day since the last deaths in Qom in
May, the bazaar in Tehran was closed, but no mass demonstra-
278tions occurred.
During this deceptive lull, the opposition was apparently
279
reorganizing and regrouping, as they waited to see what
the regime might do. In an interview in late June, Ayatollah
Shariatmadari noted, "The government must accede to our
demands (for a return to constitutional monarchy and a
stricter adherence to Islamic law) sooner or later. We
have started our campaign and we will pursue it." He further
warned that if the Shah did not liberalize fast enough, the
opposition "would give the order to our followers to go on
280the streets, to come out and fight."
The pause in street demonstrations was broken by the
start of a new round of public protests on July 22 in
2 81Mashad. On August 11, angry crowds in Esfahan publicly
protested and attacked government buildings to protest pre-
vious killings and demand the release of a local religious
leader. The government did not regain control of Esfahan
until two days later when it declared martial law and rushed
282in army units. With these developments, and the Shah's
decision to change his prime-minister. Phase I of the revo-
lution ended.
For his own part, as has been indicated, the Shah failed
to properly assess the danger of the situation and take the
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steps necessary to truly defuse the situation. Having noted
the diversity and disorganization of the opposition, and
having further miscalculated that opposition demands might
be satisfied through what were in fact half-measures de-
signed to placate opponents rather than actually reform,
the Shah failed to realize the very real danger that the
opposition's demonstrated ability to organize nationwide
protests and strikes posed. Opposition warnings were ignored,
while the Shah confidently proclaimed, "Nobody can overthrow
me. I have the support of 700,000 troops, all of the workers
283
and most of the people."
Thus, instead of undertaking serious reform when there
284
was apparently still time to do so, the regime sought to
court its moderate opposition. "It apologized to Shariatmadari
for police intrusion into his home; promised to reopen the
Fuzieh seminary; banned pornographic movies; removed the
hardline head of SAVAK; and vowed to proceed with the pro-
2 85
cess of 'liberalization'."
The fact that these measures were probably insufficient
to head off further protest anyway was complicated by regime
activity which reinforced the impression that the opposition
was not being taken seriously. In May, for example, in the
midst of protests stemming partly from Iran's economic prob-
lems, the Shah's approval of a $1.3 billion purchase of
Chieftan tanks from Britain could only have further aggra-
286
vated the opposition. Furthermore, commencing with the
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Shah's delayed Eastern European trip (Hungary and Bulgaria
in late May 19 78) , there was a flurry of diplomatic activity,
which, if nothing else, encouraged the view that domestic
problems were continuing to be ignored. Among the visitors
to Iran were Shayk ' Isa Ibn Sahman, the amir of Bahrain and
287Bohuslav Chnoupek, the Czechoslovakian foreign minister.
Most importantly, the Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua
2 88
visited Tehran on 15-18 June 1978. And, according to
one report.
Instead of taking advantage of the relative calm
of the month of July to mount some decisive action
and open a dialogue with the religious and lay oppo-
sition, the Shah went off on his annual vacation by
the Caspian Sea with his friends ex-King Constantine
of Greece and King Hussein of Jordan. ^89
Finally, the Shah's August 5th address to the nation on
the Anniversary of the 1906 Constitution did nothing to
convince the population of his sincerity. The Shah praised
"the Shah-nation revolution" and "the astounding achievements
290
we have scored in the past 15 years" at length. At the
same time, he pledged complete freedom in the next Parlia-
mentary elections, which he scheduled for June 1979. By
this time, however, the Shah's credibility had been badly
eroded and his pledge was seen by the opposition as "either
a mask or a concession which had come too late and had done
291too little to satisfy their fundamental demands .
"
The second stage of the revolution was marked by the
renewed violence of August and corresponded roughly with
Sharif Emami ' s tenure as Prime Minister (27 August - 6
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November) . By this time, the regime was faced with well-
organized opposition whose demands could no longer be put
292
off. Furthermore, while it had been primarily the
bazaari, clergy and some middle class groups, notably stu-
dents and professional workers, who had carried the revolu-
tion to this point, they were now joined by the working
class - laborers, factory workers and construction workers.
As a result, Emami was charged by the Shah to solve the
293public's grievances and fight corruption.
Emami 's initial actions - reverting to the Islamic
calendar, closing down casinos and gambling houses, dis-
missal of several officials and generals and attempts to
open a dialogue with the religious leaders - evoked only
294
a "wait and see" attitude from some opposition leaders.
Nevertheless, demonstrations, civil disobedience and sporadic
strikes in both the public and private sectors continued
295
unabated throughout the country.
On 7 September 1978, the government declard martial law
throughout the country. This failed, however, to prevent
a demonstration in Tehran the following day in which several
296hundred people lost their lives in clashes with army forces
.
Friday, 8 September 19 78, became "Black Friday" and thus
marked a major turning point in the revolution. The new
government, which had entered office with two strikes against
it because of Emami 's previous connections with the Pahlavi
Foundation and what appeared to be a lack of serious intent
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to fix blame for the Abadan cinema fire, now lost all
297
credibility. As an editorial in Kayhan International
noted on the first anniversary of that day,
Black Friday .. .shattered the reputation of the
already discredited monarchy. It destroyed the
flimsy credibility of the newly installed Sharif-Emami
government .. .Black Friday also deeply affected
the attitude of the security forces . .
.
(and) eroded
the centre position in Iranian politics . 2^8 (Emphasis
added.
)
Largely as a result of martial law, and the ban on
demonstrations, there were no further major outbursts of
violence in September. Instead strikes for better wages
and working conditions spread throughout Iran during that
month. By October, the strikes had taken on a distinctly
political tone. "Under the guise of supporting an end to
martial law, freedom of political prisoners, and the return
of political exiles, the strikers were joining the more
radical opposition groups, and agitating for progressively
299
more revolutionary demands."
None of the regime's attempts at reconciliation, includ-
ing the Shah's extraordinary admission of "mistakes, excesses
and misappropriations," or Emami ' s charter guaranteeing
freedom of the press proved sufficient to prevent continuing
^ 300unrest.
By the end of October 1978, the revolution had become
completely radicalized. Iranians from virtually every
social/economic strata had joined the opposition. The last
significant element of moderate opposition, the National




as long as the Shah remained in power. Moreover, during
this period, the Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been forced to
leave Iraq and moved to France in October, emerged as the
symbolic head of the revolution.
During the first week of November, strikes, shut-downs
302
and protests spread throughout Iran. On 5 November, the
first openly anti-Shah rioting erupted on the campus of
Tehran University, thereby leading to the resignation of
Sharif-Emami and the installation of the military cabinet
under General Ahzari.
The third stage of the revolution coincided with the
period of military government and lasted until the estab-
lishment of the Bakhtiar government and departure of the
Shah on January 16. It was characterized by the growing
determination of the opposition to force the collapse of
the regime, and by the growing inability of the Shah, his
advisors and the military to act decisively to prevent that
development.
The opposition's reaction to the installation of the
military government and the Shah's declaration of support
304for the people's efforts to overcome cruelty and corruption
was immediate. Ayatollah Khomeini declared,
...I am sure that (the brave Iranian people) will
not be deceived by the Shah's intrigues or softened
by his sweet talk or be intimidated by his iron
fist... The goal is the same as I have outlined in
my speeches and statements: (a) The overthrow of
the Pahlavi Dynasty and the sinister monarchical
regime. (b) The establishment of an Islamic republic




By mid-November, the labor stoppages had brought the
3 fi
Iranian economy to a virtual standstill. The month of
Moharram (22 November - 11 December) witnessed a worsening
of the situation as the military proved incapable of pre-
venting or controlling traditional religious processions
307
and related demonstrations. On 10 December, the ninth
day of Moharram, over a million people peacefully marched
in Tehran in support of the religious and political leader-
ship's demand for dissolution of the military government and
removal of the Shah in favor of an Islamic Republic. The
following day similar marches were held throughout the
308
country.
Meanwhile, a decidedly gloomy and irresolute Shah was
engaged in efforts to form a coalition government. Karim
Sanjabi, the National Front leader who had been imprisoned,
was released and asked to form a cabinet, but refused to do
so. In mid-December, Gholam Sadigi, a former minister under
309Mossaddegh, was approached, but proved unable to do so.
Thereupon, Shahpur Bakhtiar, vice-president of the National
Front, was asked to form a civilian government. He agreed to
do so provided that the Majlis gave its prior approval, the
military declared its support, and the Shah pledged to leave
310the country.
On 6 January, Bakhtiar presented his cabinet to the
Shah amidst continued rioting, strikes and growing rumors
of an Army coup. The Regency Council was named on 13
148

January and the Shah departed Tehran for Egypt on the 16 ,
leaving Bakhtiar and the Regency Council to face an unre-
lenting opposition with the support of a divided and dis-
313
couraged military. As events were to prove, the third
stage of the revolution had significantly diminished the
ability of Iran's armed forces to play a decisive role in
determining the outcome of the revolt, which now entered
its fourth stage.
Iran was plunged into a state of chaos during this phase,
which lasted from 16 January until 11 February 1979. As
Bakhtiar attempted to open a dialogue with Khomeini, who
refused to have any dealings with the "illegal" government
or Regency Council, mass demonstrations were held in favor
314
of Khomeini's return. The military closed off Iran's
airports on 24 January to thwart Khomeini's plans to return
to Iran, but merely succeeded in postponing the inevitable
315
until 1 February.
On February 6, the Ayatollah named Mehdi Bazargan prime
minister and demanded the resignation of Bakhtiar, who con-
tinued to refuse to do so despite his increasingly isolated
•3 1 zr
position. Nevertheless, the two days of fighting between
the Imperial Guard and Air Force elements in Tehran decided
the issue for him. The Army leadership, without further
instructions from the Shah, divided as to the possibilities
of a coup, and having noted General Huyser's advice, declared
the military's neutrality and ordered the units back to their
149

317barracks. Prime Minister Bakhtiar resigned and fled on
11 February 19 79, thereby bringing to an end the Pahlavi
4- 318Dynasty.
As events since that time have demonstrated, however,
Iran's revolution may be far from over. The "honeymoon"
between the secular leadership and elements under Bazargan
and the Ayatollah, true to Brinton's formula, immediately
showed signs of strain as the provisional government set
319
to work on the nation's problems. And, if Brinton's
model continues to hold true, the rule of the "moderates"
(Bazargan ^nd Banisadr) may eventually give way, in the
face of the continued assertiveness of the Ayatollah 's
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V. THE IMPACT OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
ON SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS
It is generally agreed that the fall of the Shah and
his replacement by a decidedly neutralist Islamic regime
in 1979 represented a setback for American interests in
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions. Conversely, the
loss of U.S. influence in Iran and prestige in the region
321
IS, m Itself, a gam for Moscow.
Beyond that, however, and despite its best efforts to
preserve Soviet interests in Iran (primarily economic) and
to develop normalized relations with the new Iranian leader-
ship, the Kremlin has yet to achieve meaningful success.
In short, Moscow has been unable to translate the potential
benefits of Washington's expulsion from Iran into real influ-
ence for itself.
The key factors of this dilemma are to be found in the
hesitant Soviet reaction to the events which led to the
Shah's overthrow, and in the perceptions of his successors
concerning the future of Iran's relations with the super-
powers in general, and the Soviet Union in particular.
A. THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: THE
DILEMMA OF OPPORTUNISM
From the outbreak of the very first protests in Iran
in early 1978 until nearly the last crucial month prior
to the Shah's departure, Moscow's reaction was studiously
non-committal. The Soviets, like many other observers.
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were obviously unsure as to the true meaning and signifi-
cance of these early developments, and what the outcome might
be. Thus, as the Kremlin attempted to discern some pattern
in the rapid course of events in Iran, the Soviet reaction
developed several characteristics.
1. Moscow's Neutrality
Particularly during the initial stages of protest,
when no serious threat to the Shah's regime was perceived,
there was a noticeable absence of official Soviet govern-
ment comment concerning events in Iran. Even as the crisis
deepened, however, there appeared to be a conscious effort
322
to "avoid taking sides."
The initial outbreak of demonstrations in January
and February 197 8 received only brief comment in the Soviet
press, indicating that the Kremlin saw no reason to disrupt
its generally correct relations with the Shah for simple
323
reasons of propaganda. Thus, for example, the third
series of protests in Iran in April 1978 received sparse
commentary in the Soviet press. A New Times article devoted
three short paragraphs to the subject, citing the official
324Iranian Pars news agency as its source. One Western
commentator attributed this lack of criticism to a Soviet-
325Iranian "conspiracy of silence."
One notable exception to the reserved commentary was
the Soviet reaction to a May speech by Iranian Ambassador
Zahedi in Washington, charging that "the USSR seeks to control
326
the oil-rich areas of the Middle East." Isvestiya labeled
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such behavior "contrary to the interests of good-neighborly
327Soviet-Iranian relations .
"
The worsening of the Iranian crisis in late-August
1978 and during the revolution's second stage marked the
beginning of what might best be termed a growing "dilemma
of opportunism" for Moscow. Until that point, Soviet
involvement in the anti-regime activities had been limited
primarily to the printing of Tudeh Party materials and the
financing and support of the PLO/PFLP, which was training
328Iranian extremist organizations. The renewed and wide-
spread clashes throughout Iran, however, created a situation
which the Kremlin's essentially opportunistic leadership
might be able to exploit in the future, particularly if
the Shah's connections with the U.S. were weakened, or if he
329
were to be removed completely.
To the Soviets, the prospects of the demise of the
Shah might be advantageous in some respects, but there were
also a number of risks to their interests. On the one hand,
Moscow's relations with the Shah were, at best, admittedly
only "correct." Since the early 1970 's, his increasingly
assertive foreign policy had conflicted with Soviet strategy
and activities in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Of
particular note were the Shah's military expansion, Iran's
intervention against the Soviet-supported Dhofari rebellion
330m Oman and encouragement of the Kurdish rebellion m
331
Iraq. Outside of the Persian Gulf proper, Iran had joined
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Saudi Arabia in furnishing financial support to Somalia
against the Soviet and Cuban- supported Ethiopians, and,
even more importantly, the Shah was openly seeking to promote
332
more extensive relations with the People's Republic of China.
At the same time, Moscow's leadership no doubt
recognized it had somewhat of a "stake" in the Shah. They
were accustomed to dealing with him, and under his regime
Iran had established a record of stability in a volatile
region which was of extreme sensitivity to Soviet security
interests. There were also tangible interests, not the
least of which were gas and petroleum deals which were
important to the Soviet economy.
An examination of the two extreme alternatives
open to the Kremlin - either support of the Shah or encourage-
ment of his opposition - clearly reveals some important
considerations and the nature of Moscow's dilemma.
a. In the first place, on an ideological level,
the Kremlin has often found itself hard-pressed to support
"popular" revolts abroad, while suppressing such developments
"at home" (e.g., Czechoslovakia - 1968). Furthermore, in
the case of Iran, the Soviets were virtually without repre-
sentation among the opposition forces. The Tudeh Party -
its leadership in exile and its membership depleted - had
been thoroughly discredited as a result of its historic
subservience to Moscow.
b. Until relatively late in the crisis, it seemed
unlikely that any opposition movement in Iran could succeed
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in either reducing the Shah's power or removing him.
Advocation of regime opposition, if the Shah did survive,
would have had a ruinous effect on relations with Iran.
At the same time, if the Soviets did indeed desire the
elimination of the Shah, such pronouncements might have had
the opposite effect. The Shah would undoubtedly have played
up Iranian fears of historic Russian and Soviet designs on
Iran, attributing the protests to an external. Communist
threat and proceeded to defuse the opposition in the process.
Any overt Soviet involvement in the anti-Shah movement was
also likely to provoke a U.S. response.
c. The proximity of Iran, and the ethnic and
religious makeup of the populations along the common border,
argued against Moscow's encouragement of a revolt. However
attractive the prospects of an Iran minus the Shah might have
appeared, the potential "spill-over" effect of the increasingly
dominant religious dimension of the opposition posed serious
problems for the Soviets.
d. Finally, even given the case that Moscow supported
an opposition which succeeded in forcing some change in
the Shah's regime, or in removing him, the Soviets could not
be sure that his successors' foreign policy would be any
more considerate of their interests than had the Shah's.
The Kremlin therefore made no apparent moves to
alter its practice of brief, balanced reporting of events
333in Iran, with no official notice of the protests. Amidst
175

commentary regarding continued anti-government riots on
September 1 , Foreign Minister Gromyko cabled a congratu-
334latory note to Iran's newly appointed foreign minister,
and Brezhnev telegramed his condolences to the Shah for the
335heavy loss of life m the Tabas earthquake.
Although the lifting of press censorship in Iran
in September enabled Moscow to increase the volume of its
reportage on events there, commentaries continued to rely
on foreign and domestic press sources, and editorializing
was avoided. Soviet newspapers and broadcasts in September
and October carried details of demonstrations, explaining
the reasons for the disturbances through quotes of articles
from such publications as The Christian Science Monitor , Time ,
"^ "? 6 -DOT
Ettelaat, Reuters , Ayandegan and Kayhan. Additionally,
there was an attempt made to "balance" Soviet reporting by
33 8pointing out positive aspects of the Shah's rule.
By the end of October, the opposition in Iran
had become completely radicalized and the regime had failed
to avert a deepening of the crisis. Having sensed that the
revolution in Iran was entering a critical stage, Moscow
altered its approach. Although Moscow did not commit itself,
there was a gradual shift away from the practice of couching
Soviet reportage of events in Iran in the terms of foreign
press commentaries. Moreover, it was possible to discern
the increasing prominence of the other important character-
istics of the Soviet reaction during and after November 1978.
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2. The Anti-Imperialism Theme
Commencing in November, Moscow began to stress the
"anti-western" aspect of the revolution. Although the
Soviets had previously made references to Iran's importance
339
as a source of oil and strategic bridgehead for the U.S.,
after October "American imperialism," and the Iranian revo-
lution as a manifestation of a "backlash" against its
effects, became the dominant theme of Soviet commentaries.
The Kremlin apparently saw this as a comparatively
"safe" manner in which to voice its point of view. Direct
criticism of the Shah was avoided, and Moscow could not be
accused of taking the opposition's point of view. At the
same time, some influence with the opposition might be ob-
tained as a result of statements which demonstrated under-
standing and sympathy for the grievances of the protestors.
The most attractive feature of this approach, no doubt,
was that it added to American discomfort over the course
of events in Iran.
The most startling of Moscow's efforts to emphasize
this theme was Premier Brezhnev's "warning" to the U.S.,
in the form of a personal statement to Pravda on November
19, not to interfere in Iran. Mr. Brezhnev stated.
The Soviet Union, which maintains traditional,
neighborly relations with Iran, resolutely states
it is against foreign interference in Iran's internal
affairs by anyone, in any form and under any pre-
text... It must be also clear that any interference,
especially military, in the affairs of Iran - a state
directly bordering on the Soviet Union - would be




Undoubtedly, this comment was prompted by hints
that the U.S. was indeed preparing to intervene in some
manner on behalf of the Shah. On 18 November, for example,
TASS had reported that "the United States continued making
plans for military interference in Iran's internal affairs.
The main part in this is played by the Pentagon and the
341Central Intelligence Agency."
It should be noted that it is entirely possible
that, despite this "warning," the Soviet leadership actually
expected the U.S. to act. The Kremlin's expressions of
doubts concerning American denials of any intention to inter-
vene were probably induced, at least in part, by honest
disbelief that the United States would stand by while its
stated vital interests in Iran were threatened. The Presi-
dent's somewhat timid response, reaffirming that position,
342
could only have been a pleasant surprise for Moscow.
Brezhnev's statement was also significant in that
it was the first official Soviet government comment con-
cerning events in Iran. Its blunt tone was in marked con-
trast to his cordial telegram to the Shah only three weeks
before expressing his congratulations on Iran's national
343day. This deliberate change was no doubt a reflection
of Moscow's perception that events in Iran had reached a
critical point. Meanwhile, the Soviets complained that
American speculation that the Kremlin itself was interfering
in Iran was nothing more than "an attempt to cover their
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own responsibility for the situation which has taken shape
344in Iran and for the causes of unrest."
The revolution's anti-U.S ./anti-imperialist aspect
was stressed both in Russian domestic coiranentaries and
in those broadcast to Iran in the Persian language. A
26 November Moscow radio broadcast alleged that, "The threat
of imperialist intervention is hanging over our neighbor
345Iran," while Pravda repeated charges that the CIA and
346Pentagon were initiating plans for military interference.
Similarly, a broadcast in Persian on 12 December
attributed the huge demonstrations at the end of Moharram
to a desire for "the eradication of imperialist oppression
347
and tyranny." Moscow also broadcast the news that U.S.
348
aircraft had delivered not control equipment to Iran.
On 15 December, another statement charged "U.S. CIA officers




Typical of the anti-U.S. broadcasts was a December
24 commentary which told the Iranians:
Being apprehensive of losing their control in Iran,
U.S. imperialists are helping to crush the national
movement, which has been gaining momentum in Iran.
Participants in peaceful demonstrations have been
executed in dozens of Iranian cities with U.S. -made
weapons; it was U .S .-manufactured gases which were
used to poison those who had taken part in strikes
and demonstrations. Washington statesmen who give
so much voice to their defense of human rights have
not uttered a word in defense of the Iranians struggling
for freedom and democracy. U.S. imperialists are




Direct criticism of the Shah also emerged for the
first time in December, but Moscow reverted to its past
practice of citing foreign sources. An Isvestiya article
stated:
Without venturing to make categorical forecasts,
many foreign observers are stressing several facts.
First, to judge from the intensified fierceness of
the antagonism, the trial of strength is acquiring a
decisive nature and matters are evidently coming to
a head. Second, even those whose sympathies are fully
on the side of the ruling Iranian regime are now seeing
the Shah's throne as a frail little ship bobbing on
the waves in a raging sea of the people's anger. It
is unanimously noted that there is virtually not a
single social group expressing support for the regime
and that there is no complete guarantee of the army's
continued loyalty. ^51
With the failure of Iran's military government to
restore order and the Shah's attempts to organize a coali-
tion government, the Soviets hastened to adopt a stance more
favorable to opposition success. Commentaries openly engaged
in propaganda. By the beginning of January, Isvestiya was
telling its readers that the Shah's opponents regarded the
352Americans as "the mainstay of the anti-popular regime."
General Ahzari's resignation as Prime Minister was reported
353
without comment, but in succeeding days, Soviet commenta-
tors noted the uncertainty as to whether Bakhtiar would be
354
able to form a new government. A Russian radio broadcast
observed that it was obvious that "Bakhtiar 's Cabinet, even
if it is formed and wins a vote of confidence, will find it
355far from easy to perform its duties."
The threat of impending U.S. intervention continued




"drawing up a script for Iran's future political life,"
while a 5 January broadcast in Persian alleged that.
According to foreign correspondents ,... the CIA has
put forward a detailed plan for Iran and now attempts
to bring to power its puppet, whom the Americans have
trained and coached over many long years, as prime
minister of Iran.357
On January 6, 1979, Isvestiya again stated Brezhnev's
warning that "any outside interference in Iran's inter-
358
national affairs cannot be permitted." For the first
time, however, the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty was mentioned.
According to Moscow, the Treaty was the basis of "equality,
mutual respect for each other's sovereign rights and inter-
ests, non-interference in one another's internal affairs and
359businesslike cooperation." American protests over Soviet
propagandizing continued to be dismissed.
As rumors that the Shah might leave Iran increased,
and particularly during the period between his actual
departure on 16 January, which Moscow saw as the beginning
361
of the "decisive phase" of the crisis, and the final
neutralization of the military in February, the Soviets con-




coup. Broadcasts in Persian alleged "U.S. offic are
dragging matters to a military coup d'etat in Iran.
Among the evidence cited was General Huyser's mission, de-
signed "to instruct Iranian generals in how to combat popular
364demonstrations." An 8 February Persian language broadcast
reiterated these charges, stated that the U.S. objective was




Following Bakhtiar's resignation and the assump-
tion of office of Mehdi Bazargan's provisional government on
February 14, Moscow was among the first governments to
extend congratulations and recognition. Chairman Kosygin's
message expressed "readiness to maintain and develop rela-
tions between our two countries on the basis of the princi-
ples of equality, good-neighborliness , respect for national
sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal
3 g "7
affairs." At the same time, the Soviet press was to con-
tinue its efforts to stress the dangers of American efforts
•3 g O
to subvert Iran's revolution in following months.
3. Emphasis of Socio-economic Causes and Downplay
of the Religious Aspects of the Revolt
Accompanying the Soviet Union's attempts to portray
the Iranian revolution as an anti-imperialist struggle was
a conscious effort to downplay the role of the religious
factor and emphasize social causes as the principal reason
for popular unrest. This was particularly true in the Soviet
domestic press and broadcasts. In one of its first efforts
at explaining the motivations for unrest in Iran in August
1978, Moscow noted that foreign analysts attributed the
worsening situation to the sharpening of the religious-secular
confrontation, but hastened to add that "clashes between
secular authorities and the religious opposition are of course
nothing new in Iran." Instead, a New Times article stated,
the roots of the protests were "the serious economic and
369
social difficulties Iran is experiencing."
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Further commentaries carried this explanation for-
ward. Isvestiya explained to its readers that Iran's revolu-
tion was caused by inflation, corruption, a shortage of
medical personnel, and a lack of public services in the
370
country. An October Russian radio broadcast further
explained, "This crisis is caused by the growth in social
inequality, the general corruption of the government
371bureaucracy and the unrestramable inflation."
Commenting on the role of the clergy in early
November, Moscow conceded that "representatives of the
Islamic clergy are taking part in the turbulent events in
Iran," but voiced the opinion that "...it is not these
opponents of the regime who are playing the main role in
the anti-government demonstrations .. .the clergy's slogans
were interwoven with the demands by millions of people for
372long-needed social, economic and political reforms..."
Another commentary evidenced deliberate distortion
of the facts to de-emphasize the religious aspect of events
in Iran.
There has been unrest in Iran for nearly a year now.
Impetus was given to the mass disturbances by events
last January in Qom , a major religious center, when
prices for a series of articles and for accommodation
and water tariffs were raised . Stirred up by the
preaching of the Mullahs, tens of thousands of people
went into the streets. This demonstration took place
during the 16th anniversary of the adoption of the"
land reform law, which substantially affected the
interests of the major priesthood. They wanted to use
the broad masses' dissatisfaction for their own pur -
poses. But events took on a different character.
The priests' slogans .. .have been overwhelmed by the
demands by millions of people to implement long-pressing
socio-economic and political reforms ... -^"-^ (emphasis added)
183

similarly, a Pravda article acknowledged the "religious
coloration" of the demonstrations, but asserted that "the
real reasons for the disturbances are the grim material
situations of the broad people's masses, the dominance of




Moscow persisted in this fashion even after the
assumption of leadership of the opposition by the Ayatollah
Khomeini was an established fact. In December, Isvestiya
informed its readers that, "there is nothing surprising
in the fact that the current movement has acquired religious
overtones. In the absence of legal political parties and
organizations, and with military and security organs dominant,
the people can at times express their dissatisfaction only
through religious organizations and congregate only in
375
mosques." And, although the people's social complaints
were often voiced "in a religious guise," Isvestiya asserted
that religious leaders were really opposed to modernization,
but had been forced to take account of the feelings of the
3 7 6
masses, who were demanding widespread socio-economic reform.
Another aspect of the Soviet effort to downplay
religion was the lack of comment concerning Ayatollah Khomeini's
role as the head of the opposition. Russian newspaper arti-
cles instead claimed that the National Front was "the country's
prime political force," and grouped the religious, middle




opposition and religious organizations." Statements by
Ayatollah Khomeini and other prominent religious leaders
378drew only brief mention.
Once the Shah had departed the country and Moscow
sensed that the government of Prime Minister Bakhtiar and
379the Regency Council were not likely to endure, Moscow
began to devote more attention to Khomeini and portrayed
380his efforts favorably. Moreover, Russian reports des-
cribed the ulema as "Iranian patriots and supporters of
381
economic and political independence." Additionally some
details of Ayatollah Khomeini's plans for an Islamic Repub-
3 8 2lie were set forth.
An interesting contrast to a previous commentaries
was evident in a Pravda article on 24 January 1979, in
which it was noted that "A specific feature of Iran is
that a large proportion of its population is linked with
the traditions of Shi ' ism whose slogans are of an objec-
383tively progressive nature..." Nevertheless, the article
continued to stress social inequality, inflation, weapons
purchases, and even regime links to Israel as the roots of
4.U . . 384the crisis.
The impending return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran
left the Soviets with no alternative but to report his
385
efforts to do so, and his eventual homecoming in February.
The victory of the revolutionary forces was noted, and
congratulations expressed, and on 25 February Vladimir




to personally convey Moscow's congratulations. As sub-
sequent events were to demonstrate, however, Moscow con-
tinued to have difficulties in the confusing weeks following
the installation of Bazargan's Provisional government in
attempting to understand and describe what was happening in
387Iran.
4, Prominence Accorded to the Tudeh Party Position
A final feature of the Soviet response to events
in Iran was its attempt to promote the viewpoint of the
Communist Iranian Tudeh Party (ITP) . Initially, Moscow
published brief Tudeh statements which expressed the party's
388
support for the anti-Shah movement. In November, how-
ever, a lengthy interview with party leader Eskandari was
published, in which the Tudeh view of events in Iran was
389defined. The statement noted that "there is no official
cooperation" between the Tudeh and other opposition groups,
and that the party was "merely participating in the same
390
movement armed against the present regime."
By January 1979, Moscow had publicized the Tudeh '
s
parroting of Soviet condemnation of U.S. interference in
391Iran's affairs, and a call for the "formation of a
government of national unity capable of implementing free-
doms, guaranteeing independence and ending the economic
392
and social crisis in the country." On 23 January, the
Tudeh Party endorsed the plan for the establishment of an




Following an unexplained change in Party leadership,
with Eskandari being replaced by Nureoddin Kianuri in Feb-
394
ruary, the Tudeh called for "a national front of all
395
anti-imperialist and democratic forces," in which presuma-
bly the Tudeh would be able to participate. Subsequently,
the Tudeh Central Committee congratulated the opposition on
the installation of Bazargan ' s government, and the Soviets
broadcast a party statement which reiterated support for the
Provisional Government to Iran, and in which the Tudeh ex-
39 6pressed the intention of resuming open political activities.
Thus, Moscow's approach to events in Iran derived
from a combination of factors. First of all, Moscow's
assessment and understanding of initial developments in
1978 was flawed; like other observers, the Kremlin leader-
ship failed to perceive the rapidity with which events would
overtake the Shah's regime. The Soviets were no more posi-
tive than the U.S., or even the Shah himself, as to the even-
tual outcome of the unrest. Accordingly, they proceeded
cautiously, and avoided unnecessary and risky speculation
and editorializing.
As the crisis deepened, there was a need to keep
pace with events, and, at the same time, not to commit them-
selves to one side or the other too soon. The Kremlin thus
adopted a "proper" neutral stance, stressing their own non-
interference, and exploiting the decidedly more exposed
American position of support for its ally.
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Commentaries concerning the social, political and
economic grievances of the opposition, based on statistics
and quotes from foreign publications, and the Iranian govern-
ment's own sources, were safe methods of evaluating the
situation in Iran without criticizing the Shah directly.
At the same time, prudence dictated de-emphasizing the
fundamentalist Islamic overtones which the revolution quickly
took on. The potential for "spill-over" involved both other
regional countries, such as the "progressive" regimes of
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Soviet Unions' Moslem repub-
lics.
Through this essentially conservative, and at the
same time, opportunistic policy, the Kremlin obviously intended
to safeguard its interests, while maintaining the best posi-
tion possible for future dealings with whatever regime was
to govern Iran, Despite these hopes, however, the Kremlin's
policy did not completely achieve these goals.
One problem was that, in spite of Moscow's later
claims that "the Soviet Union most emphatically supported
397the Iranian revolution," the Kremlin's "neutrality" and
"non-interference" resulted in what was seen by the Shah's
opponents as only a "tardy" endorsement of the movement to
398
overthrow the Shah. An Iranian opposition spokesman
observed that the Soviet Union
...maintained excellent relations with the Shah's
regime, but it is obvious that the Iranian people's
movement very soon made it change its attitude and





Moreover, the religious leadership specifically
resented Moscow's treatment of the Islamic aspects of the
revolt and the attempts to promote the Tudeh as the
"spokesman" for the entire revolutionary movement, even
though the party's role as a political organizer among the
oil-workers in southern Iran may have been a crucial factor
in the success of the anti-regime strikes. Nor did
Soviet support of the PLO and other Palestinian organiza-
tions, which trained certain of the Fedayeen and Mu.jahadeen
401groups, win the Kremlin special recognition as a friend
of the Islamic Republic. It soon became apparent that the
nature of Moscow's future relationship with Iran's new govern-
ment would depend on how successful both parties were at
resolving differences on a number of specific issues.
B. ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS
On the surface, relations between the Kremlin and the
new Iranian leadership began on a cordial note. Moscow had
quickly recognized Mehdi Bazargan's Provisional Government
in February, and Kosygin and Bazargan had exchanged greetings
in March. Following Khomeini's proclamation of the Islamic
402Republic of Iran, Brezhnev sent a telegram of congratula-
403tions to Khomeini. Nevertheless, fundamentally divisive
issues had emerged which could not be avoided.
1. The Continued Threat of Soviet Interference in
Iran's Internal Affairs
Although much of the anti-imperialist rhetoric of
the revolution was directed at the United States, it was also
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clear that the fear of Soviet intervention in Iran's internal
affairs is an on-going concern of Iranian foreign policy.
This concern manifested itself almost immediately as the
Bazargan government was installed, and it involves three
issues
.
a. The "Tudeh Card"
The first of these is Moscow's persistent support
of the Tudeh Party. Although the Iranian Tudeh Party voiced
its support for Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic
404
after January 1979, most of Iran's leaders doubt its
sincerity. In a January interview, Ebraheim Yazdi asserted
that:
The Tudeh Party in particular is not a nationalist
party, not to mention the applicability of the
requirement of "faith" to it... the truth as we have
known it in Iran is that this party has always moved
according to the interests of the Soviet policy and
not according to the Iranian national interests . ^05
Nevertheless, the Tudeh mounted a campaign
designed to win for itself a legitimate role in the Iranian
political arena. The Party manifesto published in April
1979, after duly noting the revolution's accomplishments
and Tudeh support for the Islamic Republic, set forth
its program for a "people's unity front" consisting of "all
the forces of the revolution ... from the conservative parti-
sans of Ayatollah Khomeini to the ITP and other forces of
407the revolutionary left..."
A second proposal was for the establishment of
a "people's democratic army," or national guard, to be
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composed of "all sincere national and patriotic forces,
without any prejudices, without any discrimination and with-
out any monopoly." The net effect of adoption of these
proposals would have been not only a recognized political
voice for the Tudeh, but a legally armed faction within the
409government composed of Tudeh and other Marxist groups.
In an April interview. Prime Minister Bazargan
explained his attitude towards the Tudeh Party. He accused
it of "playing a double game. That section of the left now
claims to be favorable to the Iranian Government with a view
410to winning votes, but we know what they are after." In
July 19 79, the Tudeh announced several candidates, including
411
Party Secretary Kianuri, for election to the Assembly.
For its part, Moscow publicized the Tudeh 's
viewpoints on the need to safeguard the revolution against
imperialism, and the party's favorable reactions to the
412draft Constitution. Furthermore, the Soviets reacted
strongly to an Iranian government crackdown against Tudeh
activities in August 19 79, including the banning of Mardom,
413the party newspaper.
Since that time, the USSR and Tudeh have been
proclaiming a second and higher stage to the revolution. In
a November interview, Kianuri declared
Indisputably a new stage of the revolution has started.
Its two main aims are the liquidation of all manifes-
tations of U.S. rule in Iran as well as a deepening
of the class content of the revolution through drawing
the mass of the people into a more active struggle
against the big bourgeoisie . ^14
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The Tudeh has continued to express its support
for the major aims of Khomeini's policies, in the hopes of
recognition of a broad popular front including both Khomeini
415
and the ITP. Moreover, Kianuri has asserted that Iran's
leadership recognizes that the U.S. is its enemy, and that
416the Soviet Union is a friend.
Although the actual strength of the Tudeh Party
is difficult to assess, its importance in any future struggle
for power in Iran cannot be overlooked. It claims to have
established links with the oil workers and, as a result,
possesses a potential economic and political strength not
measureable in numbers alone. Furthermore, in line with
the party platform, support has been voiced for granting
"cultural and administrative autonomy" to all the national
417
minorities, a step which would certainly accentuate
existing separatist tendencies. In October 19 79, Kianuri
announced that the Tudeh intended to become active in Kurdestan,
where it would supposedly back Kurdish demands for cultural
418
autonomy and self-management.
Dealing with the Tudeh will be no easy matter
for the Iranian leaders. The lifting of the ban against
the party previously in force under the Shah's regime has
undoubtedly facilitated its reassertiveness , although the
government has demonstrated that it will curb what it per-
ceives as excessive activities.
Of greater importance, however, would be the
ability of Iran's leadership to deal with an overt threat by
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the Tudeh and other leftist factions. Despite its professed
support for the Islamic Republic, Tudeh backing is little
419
more than a "marriage of convenience," Kianuri himself
has repeatedly stressed the need for "combat readiness" to
420prevent a repetition of the repression of 1953. In
February 1979, Kianuri noted the ready availability of arms
421in Iran for an armed struggle, while clandestine broad-
casts to Iran from the USSR urged leftist forces to retain
their weapons and noted that thousands of Iranian exiles
422
were willing to return to "help" the revolution.
Iran's leadership would be hard-pressed to counter
such a challenge, given the decimation of the country's
armed forces. In April 1979, Prime Minister Bazargan noted
that Iran's "armed forces have been greatly weakened both
morally and materially" and observed that the communist
groups were asserting that "all army and police officers
are imperialist stooges and must be eliminated. In fact,
the aim of their maneuvers is to secure the total disarming
423
of the government." Not surprisingly, the Tudeh platform
contains provisions for a purge of the army of all anti-
national and corrupt elements, fundamental altering of the
internal structure of the army, and cuts in the army budget
424
and manpower.
Moscow obviously views the Tudeh in its traditional
role as a representative and advocate of Soviet interests in
Iran. Despite the fact that their support of the ITP is an
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irritant to the Iranian leadership, the Soviets have
apparently concluded that its potential value exceeds
whatever damage might be done to Soviet-Iranian relations,
b. Exploitation of Autonomous Movements
A second aspect of the question of Soviet inter-
ference is centered on the problem of the autonomous separa-
tist movements in Iran. Historically, demands for autonomy
have occurred in Azerbaijan, Kurdestan, Baluchistan,
Khuzistan and the Turcoman regions along the Caspian and
adjacent to the Soviet Turcoman Republic. Of particular
sensitivity has been the Kurdish issue, because of the dis-
tribution of the Kurd population astride the borders of
Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the USSR.
It will be recalled that the Soviet Union backed
the establishment of "independent" republics in Azerbaijan
and Kurdestan at the end of the Second World War. Further-
more, they had supported a Kurdish revolt in the early 1960 's,
both as a lever to apply pressure on the Iraqi government,
and because they realized that an autonomous Kurdestan had
425potential anti-CENTO implications
.
Following the improvement of relations with Iran,
and in conjunction with a move to improve ties with the
Ba'thist regime after its 196 8 takeover in Iraq, the Soviets
had attempted to disassociate themselves from the Kurdish
military struggle for autonomy, and sought to promote a
political solution to the problem. Following the conclusion
of an agreement between Baghdad and the Kurds in 1970, Moscow
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claimed it had "helped to clear the atmosphere with the aim
of encouraging dialogue and furthered the attainment of
results necessary to insure Arab and Kurd national inter-
426
ests." The Soviets encouraged both sides to move towards
the establishment of an autonomous Kurdestan, citing their
own "experience of building their state" through "the just
427
solution of the nationalities issue."
During 1974, elements of the Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP) continued their military struggle against
Baghdad, largely with the support of Iran. The Soviets,
rather than risk their now substantial ties with Iraq,
abandoned the Kurds and supported Baghdad's efforts to solve
428the issue. In 197 5, Iran and Iraq reached an agreement
by which Iran agreed to terminate its support to the Kurds
in exchange for recognition of Iranian demands concerning
429the Irano-Iraqi border. Without this support, the Kurdish
rebellion in Iraq collapsed.
In Iran, the strength of the central government
and the military under the Shah had generally kept Kurdish
and other separatist tendencies in check. With the overthrow
of the regime in 1979, however, and the resultant weakening
of political and military authority in these provinces, re-
newed demands for autonomy immediately arose. Unrest first
broke out in January 1979 among rival Kurdish tribes, quickly




Although there was little conclusive proof
of Soviet involvement, the timing of these new demands prompted
speculation that Moscow might somehow be involved. There
were unconfirmed reports of arms being transported south
431
across the Soviet-Iranian border into Kurdestan, the
432direct involvement of Soviet Turcomans in the fighting,
433
and indirect interference in Baluchistan. Moscow immediately
responded to these allegations. Pravda labeled such reports
"lies" and "slander", charging in turn that
...it is characteristic that the enemies of the revo-
lution, the forces that bear direct responsibilities
for the systematic suppression in the recent past
of lawful democratic and national aspirations of
various peoples of Iran—SAVAK agents, former officials
of the state apparatus, officers of the Shah's army,
courtiers, CIA agents and other reactionaries--now try
to aggravate problems in establishing new life, to
raise friction among nationalities and religious strife
to an explosion, to stir up separatist attitudes . ^3"*
Similarly, New Times found that "agents of the CIA and the
Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, as well as former
informers of the Shah's secret police, SAVAK, are concen-
435trating their counter-revolutionary machinations."
Further charges of Soviet interference, however,
continued to appear. In May, a Tehran magazine asserted that
"relations between Iran and the Soviet Union are based on
fear" and that "the Soviet Union is perpetuating the policy
of Peter the Great, and is awaiting the moment when Iran will
436fall like rotten fruit under its feet." in July and





The collapse of negotiations between the Iranian
government and several Kurdish groups in July and August
1979 led to renewed clashes and threatened to again spread
438
to Khuzestan. This resulted in renewed charges of Soviet
interference. On 31 August, Ayatollah Teleqhani accused
the Soviet Union of helping the Kurdish insurgents, while
Khomeini asserted that "we are not facing a Kurdish ques-
tion; we are up against a Communist question aimed... at the
439destruction of Islam."
On 2 September, government spokesman Sadegh
Tabatabai spoke of "conclusive evidence of superpower
involvement" and claimed that "several thousands of Soviet-
made AK 4 7 Kalashnikov rifles had been smuggled into Iran
440
via Bulgaria." Tass on September 4 denied these allega-
tions, and, in an obvious reference to Khomeini himself,
the Soviet press attacked the "religious fanatics" who were
441
running Iran's payalyzed government. Furthermore, Moscow
charged that the Kurds and other ethnic minorities "are being
executed and the Shi'ite religion (a Moslem sect headed in
442Iran by Khomeini) is being forced on them."
The Kurdish situation is clearly problematic
for the Soviet Union. In the first place, largely because
of past attempts to manipulate the issue for its own benefit,
renewed unrest during a time of apparent disorganization
and weakness in Tehran immediately made Moscow the target of
suspicion. At the same time, the issue of Kurdish separatism
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has implications for larger Soviet interests, in that it
has again "spilled over" into Irano-Iraqi relations and, in
fact, has become a kind of "surrogate war" between Khomeini
443
and President Saddam Husayn. In response to the Ayatollah's
instigation of Iraqi Shi'ite and Kurdish activity against
the Sunni Iraqi regime in early 1979, Baghdad retaliated by
444lending its support to Iranian Kurdish unrest.
The eruption of new fighting in early 198 led
445
to border clashes between Iraqi and Iranian forces. In
April, an Iranian-backed assassination attempt against an
446 . .Iraqi deputy minister accelerated the deterioration of
447
relations between the two countries. Iran threatened
war, while the Iraqis demanded renegotiation of the 1975
Irano-Iraqi Treaty, and Iranian withdrawal from the Gulf
448islands it occupied in 1971.
The Kremlin, whatever its long term plans for
a Kurdestan might be, clearly perceives its more immediate
interest as having good relations with both Iran and Iraq.
Furthermore, the Soviets are aware that stirring up Kurdish
unrest might adversely affect relations with Turkey, which
also has a significant Kurdish minority. Moscow therefore
quickly conveyed its concern that the confrontation between
Iran and Iraq was getting out of hand. A broadcast to Iran
cautioned:
If Iran and Iraq lose control of this situation and
allow the tension of the situation to intensify, it
could be greatly detrimental to both countries, espec-
ially under present conditions when U.S. imperialism
198

is stationing military forces in the Persian Gulf
region, and is threatening to resort to mlitary
intervention in Iran and to intervene in the aaq
affairs of other oil-producing countries like Iraq.
At present, Moscow's position, echoed by the
Tudeh, is to support greater Kurdish autonomy within a
450
united Iran. However, should future developments in Iran
not meet with Soviet satisfaction, Moscow has the demon-
strated ability to exploit the Kurdish issue, as well as
the cause of Arab minorities in Iranian oil areas.
c. The 19 21 Soviet-Iranian Treaty
A final concern involved in the threat of Soviet
interference is Moscow's continued reference to the 1921
451Soviet-Iranian Treaty. It is Article 6 which still
causes the greatest amount of controversy, in that it re-
served to the Soviet Union "the right to advance her troops
into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out
the military operations necessary for its defense," if the
452Soviets perceived a threat to the security of the USSR.
Brezhnev's November 1978 warning to the U.S.
"that any interference, especially military, in the affairs
of Iran - a state directly bordering on the Soviet Union -
would be regarded by the USSR as a matter affecting its
453
security interest," although it did not specifically
mention the Treaty, was a clear inference to it. In
January 1979, lest any doubt remain, Isvestiya linked the
454two, describing the treaty as "operative even now."
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since that time, Moscow has repeatedly sought to
remind Iran that it considers the treaty a valid basis for
455the Soviet-Iranian relationship. In February 1979, a
broadcast in Persian to Iran stated that the treaty
. . .was the first equal rights treaty that Iran signed
with a big power based on Leninist principles of non-
interference in affairs of others... As you are aware,
the Soviet Union has consistently followed Lenin's
policy of good-neighborly relations and cooperation
with Iran. The Soviet- Iran treaty signed in 1921,
the anniversary of which is now occurring, is a clear
example of this policy. ^56
Similarly, an August newspaper article asserted
that "Articles 5 and 6 guaranteed the security and integrity
of both sides" and constituted a "serious warning to world
reaction which has on several occasions encroached upon
457Iran." Despite the fact that Iran's Revolutionary Coun-
cil abrogated Articles 5 and 6 in January 1980, in the
aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a February
1980 Moscow broadcast in Persian declared that the policy of
"equality of rights, mutual respect for national sovereignty
and territorial integrity, non-interference in one another's
affairs, and the principles of peace, cooperation and good
neighborliness.
. .set during the first years of Soviet rule,
458IS manifested m the 1921 Soviet-Iranian agreement."
It can be of little comfort to the present Iranian
government that the Kremlin resurfaced the treaty under the
pretext of defending Iran's independence. Nor can they afford
to ignore the fact that Soviet coverage of developments in
Iran has increasingly sought to depict a situation comparable
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to the one purported to have prompted Soviet "assistance"
to Afghanistan: that is, one in which a revolutionary regime
on the border of the Soviet Union is being threatened by the
459United States. Indeed, in March 1980, an Iranian commen-
tary noted that the Soviet Union had "lost much of its repu-
tation after its invasion of Afghanistan, and will lose the
rest if it stands against Iran."
2 . Afghanistan
Pleasantries had barely been exchanged between Moscow
and Iran's new regime in 1979 when it became apparent that
Tehran considered Soviet activity in Afghanistan an issue
for Soviet-Iranian relations. Although there are no indica-
tions that the Kremlin was directly involved in the April
4611978 coup, the Soviets had immediately recognized the
regime of Nur Mohammed Taraki, who proclaimed the Democratic
462Republic of Afghanistan. Moscow's satisfaction with the
new government's pronounced progressive tendencies was evi-
dent. In May, Isvestiya declared that "the Democratic Repub-
lic of Afghanistan is undergoing profound democratic trans-
formations that have never been seen before in this country
463throughout its ancient history."
By the summer of 1978, Moscow and Kabul had
concluded more than twenty-five agreements covering trade,
464
oil and gas projects, and government affairs. Furthermore,
the Soviets assisted Taraki "in what became the transformation
465
of a neutral buffer state into a Soviet satellite." This
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process included the signature, on 5 December 19 78, of a
4 6 6
twenty year treaty of friendship and cooperation.
The stability of the Taraki regime however, was
faced with two challenges. The first of these was an internal
struggle between the Communist Parcham and Khalq factions
within Taraki 's People's Democratic Party. This resulted
in a purge of the Parcham group, and relegation of its
leader Babrak Karmal to de-facto exile as am±)assador of
Czechoslovakia, while the Khalquists (the faction to which
Taraki belonged) consolidated their control, with Hafizullah
467Amin becoming Prime Minister and second-in-command. As
a result of the purge, the Afghan bureaucracy , military and
economy were nearly crippled, and Moscow responded by dis-
patching Soviet civilian technicians to run various minis-
tries. 468
The second challenge was the development, in late
1978, of an anti-regime insurgency centered primarily among
Afghanistan's tribes. As the Taraki regime's policies and
the growing Soviet presence continued to alienate the popula-
tion, the rebel movement gathered momentum. In March 19 79,
rebel forces temporarily overran Herat, with the resultant
469deaths of between 60-100 Russian advisors.
The Afghan regime and Moscow immediately implicated
Iran, Pakistan, the PRC and the U.S. An Afghan declaration
alleged that "nearly 10 weeks ago 7,000 soldiers were sent
from Iran to Afghanistan on the pretext of repatriating
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Afghan nationals. These soldiers settled in and around
470Herat and created anti-government disturbances."
Reacting to Ayatollah Shariat-Madari ' s 16 March 1979 state-
ment, which urged Moslems around the world to rally to the
support of the Afghan Moslems who were suffering the worst
medieval tortures, a Moscow broadcast in Persian charged that
Iran's intent was to "destabilize the conference of the people
471toward the revolution of the Afghan masses."
In further commentary, Pravda denounced such statements
as inflammatory, while another broadcast inferred that Iranian
and Pakistani support of an Afghan counter-revolution would
only serve the PRC's "notorious aims of hegemonism and direct
servility to the West." All of the charges were denied by
472Iran.
Nevertheless, it was clear that Iran's leadership was
not prepared to ignore the Soviet role in the persecution
473
of Moslems in Afghanistan. Ayatollah Khomeini told a group
of Soviet journalists that the Soviet Union "should not allow
the Government of Afghanistan to deal harshly with the Muslims
of that country and with the Islamic personalities and thinkers
of Afghanistan. . .It is in the best interests of the USSR and
Afghanistan to let the nation of Afghanistan live in peace
474withm the framework of Islamic principles." In June,
Iran attacked the Soviets for attempting "to force the Indian




As the rebellion in Afghanistan intensifed in mid-
1979, the Afghan army began to suffer from increasing defec-
tions, casualties among the approximately 1,000 Soviet advisors
476began to climb, and Taraki's regime grew more unstable.
By August, with the rebellion having spread to virtually
every one of Afghanistan's 28 provinces, the Soviets appar-
ently attempted to take some steps to moderate the situation.
It was reported, for example, that Noor Ahmad Etemade, the
Prime Minister under the monarchy, had been taken from pri-
477
son for talks with Soviet representatives. Moreover,
Moscow dispatched Deputy Defense Minister and Commander of
Soviet Ground Forces Pavlovsky to Afghanistan to evaluate
478the situation.
According to one source, Pavlovsky determined "that
the Afghans could no longer control the situation and that
an effort should be made to appease the opposition by slowing
down the revolution and getting rid of its most visible sym-
479bol - Hafizullah Amin . " Nevertheless, Amin pre-empted
this plan and Taraki was killed. Although the Soviets con-
tinued aid to the new Afghan regime, the insurgency continued
to accelerate in November and December, as Amin disregarded
Moscow's advice to moderate his policies and broaden his
political base. By year's end, it was apparent that no
amount of aid would be sufficient to contain the rebellion,
and that more direct action was necessary to install a more
J. 1 -, ^1 480controllable regime.
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The Soviets attempted to defuse the impact of their
December invasion of Afghanistan, following yet another
481
attempt to assassinate Amin, by claiming they had merely
met an Afghan request for aid "including military aid which
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
repeatedly requested from the Government of the Soviet Union.
Anticipating a strong reaction from the Moslem world, the
Kremlin sought to conjure up an external imperialist threat
to Afghanistan and other regional Islamic governments,
Pravda asserted that
There is no need for special insight to be able to
see through the motives of the United States' actions.
There are figures in Washington who persistently look
for replacements for the positions that were lost as
a result of the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran.
Cracks appeared in the notorious 'strategic arc' that
Americans have been building for decades close to
the southern borders of the Soviet Union, and in
order to mend these cracks, it was sought to bring
to heel the Afghan people and also peoples of other
countries of the region... 483
Another article claimed that Washington had instigated and
directed the aggressive actions of the anti-Afghan forces,
carried out increasingly flagrant interference in the internal
affairs of Afghanistan, and deliberately brought tension to
484
a fever pitch.
With regard to Iran, Moscow endeavored to reaffirm
its good will, disavow any expansionist aims in the region,
and focus Tehran's attention on the U.S. threat to Iran,
particularly over the ongoing hostage question. Pravda
printed a statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko alleging




of the U.S. hostages in Tehran to attempt to divert the
attention of the Iranians from U.S. gross threats and
pressures including that of concentrating its naval forces
485
near the Iranian shores."
Nevertheless, in line with its previous statements
on Soviet pressures in Afghanistan, Iran rejected Moscow's
claims. An official statement to that affect was issued
on 29 December 1979. Subsequently, Khomeini reportedly told
the Soviet Ambassador to Iran that "Brezhnev was stepping
into the Shah's shoes and was heading for the same catas-
trophe that befell the ex-dictator. He said that the Soviets
4 fl fi
would come to grief if they remained in Afghanistan."
Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh asserted that "we cannot tolerate
this intervention, which we consider a threat to our vital
interests." Furthermore, he announced that Iran would help
the Afghans, possibly through aid to the Afghan mujahedin
487(guerilla) organization. Ettela'at termed the invasion
of Afghanistan a danger to the "security of Iran's Baluchestan
va Sistan Province," and Iran joined in the February 1980
488Islamic Conference's condemnation of the invasion.
While the Kremlin did not respond directly to Iran's
statements of intent to aid the Afghan insurgents, there are
grounds to believe that other forms of pressure to deter such
action were being undertaken by Moscow. In early February,
Washington reported "unusual" Soviet military activity to the
north of Iran, reports quickly rejected by Tass as a lie
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designed "to distract the attention of Iranians from the
489
real. . .threat coming from the American armada." A
spokesman for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how-
ever, opined that the Soviet troop movements in the republics
of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan "are for the purpose of
putting pressure on Iran to refrain from insisting the with-
490drawal of the Soviet troops from the soil of Afghanistan."
Iran has nonetheless continued to voice its objec-
tions to Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and will undoubtedly
continue to do so. Moscow has generally tended to ignore
statements by Khomeini and other religious leaders, probably
so as not to further antagonize Islamic opposition. Mean-
while, Tass reacted strongly to statements by President Bani-
sadr, including a demand that the Russian Government "make
a statement without any condition or pretext and leave
491Ajfghanistan speedily. There is no need for any negotiations."
For Iran's leadership, the lesson of the invasion of Afghanis-
tan must be that the Soviet Union has the capability, and,
given what Moscow sees as just cause, the will to re-enact
the Afghan scenario elsewhere.
3 . Religion
A related issue which was raised by the Islamic
fundamentalist aspect of the Iranian Revolution, and one
which Soviet action in Afghanistan further complicated, is
that of religion. It is an issue that clearly has the
Kremlin's leadership on the defensive, both with regard to
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its impact within the Soviet Union, and in Moscow's relations
with the Moslem world.
Soviet policy towards its own Moslem population and
the persistence of religious feelings has always been
ambiguous. In her study of religion and nationalities in
the USSR, Helen Carrere d'Encausse observed,
At times, Moscow boasts loudly about this phenomenon
as tangible proof of its democratic attitude toward
all religious beliefs. At other times the Soviets
grow quite uneasy about religious sentiment, and
then the organs specializing in antireligious
propaganda are mobilized. '^^^
In its early dealings with Moslem populations, not
only did the Soviets stress the latter aspect, but they
overtly repressed religion. This was true of Islam in
particular because of its claim to being a community, with
its own juridicial, legal and financial institutions, which
493transcended national boundaries. Prior to the Bolshevik
Revolution, Russia had 26,000 mosques and 45,000 officiating
mullahs, imams and muezzins to serve 18 million Muslims.
Between 1928 and 1933 alone, over 10,000 mosques, 14,000
Muslim elementary schools and 500 madresehs were closed down.
By 1979, as a result of the repressive policies of the 1920 's/
1930 's and subsequent discouragement of religious practice,
there were approximately only 200 mosques and fewer than 3,000
working clerics to administer to approximately 45-50 million
Soviet Moslems. Shi'ites comprise some 3.2 million, or
494
roughly 6 percent of the total Moslem population.
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World War II and Khrushchev's attempts to build
Moscow's influence in the Middle East in the 1950 's and
1960 's had the general effect of restraining Moscow's use
of direct pressure on the nationalities. In recent years,
although the use of pressure has been present in subtler
forms, such as in only infrequent and limited publications
of the Koran, the Soviet Union has increasingly sought to
portray to the outside world the rights and freedoms its
495Islamic peoples enjoy.
For the Kremlin, the religious dimension of the
Iranian revolution compounded on-going concerns over how to
deal with its own Moslem populations. In the first place,
it is obvious, Soviet assertions to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, that the appeal of Islam is not slowly dying out in the
USSR. According to one study, in fact,
...everything suggests that Islam in the USSR is
undergoing a rebirth among new conditions, and that
this renasence is being aided and guided by the
Moslem hierarchy, which is directing its efforts to
two particular areas: facilitating the practice of
Islam by adapting it to the needs of modern life,
and giving it temporal power by uniting it with
Soviet ideology. 4y
6
It is possible to find evidence of this even in
Soviet sources. An August 19 79 article by the head of the
Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee's Department
of Propaganda and Agitation decried the "tenacity of reli-
gious ceremonies and holidays," while another article des-
cribed the growing practice of "underground Islam" and worship
services held in "home mosques." The writer complained that
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"the prevalence of this form of religiosity .. .makes atheistic
497
upbringing very difficult."
These difficulties are further complicated by the
relation of religion to the nationality problem in the USSR.
Islam is a social bond as well as a religious one. Because
498
of socio-cultural conditions largely rooted m Islam,
the Moslem national groups of the USSR have resisted Soviet
attempts to eliminate national differences through "Russi-
fication." These nationalities tend to marry among them-
selves and cling to their native tongues. And although
recent efforts have been undertaken to make the military an
499instrument of national integration, the Soviet political
and military structure continues to be dominated by Russians,
Another factor is geography, which has placed many
of these national groups astride borders with other countries
The Azeris, for example, are separated by the Soviet-Iranian
border, with approximately 11 million living in Iran, and
4-5 million in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. "It is
obvious," a Kommunist journal editor said, "that we follow
developments in Iran with interest and anxiety."
The second problem faced by the Soviets was that
Iran's new leadership, especially the religious leaders like
Khomeini, had made it clear from the beginning that they
considered Moscow's attitude towards Islam an important fac-
tor in the future of Irano-Soviet relations. In January
1979, Khomeini's spokesman Sadegh Qotzbzadeh told a news
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conference that a Khomeini-inspired government would press
its views among Soviet Moslems. Qotzbzadeh asserted that,
"We intend to propagate the depth and dimensions of our
movement ... We have the same right to propagate our views
as the Soviets have for their ideology."
Khomeini himself stressed the importance of Soviet
domestic policy towards religion. In April 1979, he told
visiting Soviet correspondents, "we expect the USSR to show
greater respect for the religion of the 45 million Muslims
502
of that country and to allow them greater freedom." He
had previously rejected the Soviet Union's claim of support
for liberation movements on the basis that the Soviet Union
denied freedom of religion to the Islamic peoples of the
503
USSR. Just as the Carter Administration's advocacy of
human rights had become an issue in Soviet-American rela-
tions, Iran now seemed determined, with even greater fervor,
to stress Islamic rights in its dealings with Moscow. And
the governments of other Islamic states might follow suit.
Thus, the Kremlin had adequate reason for concern
over the development of a highly nationalistic, religiously-
oriented revolution in Iran. Moscow's leaders fully realized
that heightened religious and national consciousness was
not merely an Iranian phenomenon. The size of the Soviet
Moslem population, its demographic dynamism and its geographic
position along the edge of a world where the Soviet Union is
directly competing with the West; all of these contribute to
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Moscow's uneasiness. The first secretary of the Communist
Party of Turkmenistan betrayed this apprehension when he
bemoaned "the persistence and influence of Islam and denounced
'the centers of foreign lies which are issuing frantic
504propaganda in favor of nationalism and pan-Islamism. . . '
"
Moscow's response to these developments was to
re-emphasize its ongoing campaign of stressing the existence
of religious freedom in the USSR. Additionally , attempts
have been made to further the argument that Marxism and
Islam are not totally incompatable; and, in fact, that the
Soviet Union is the "best friend" of the Islamic countries.
In its broadcasts to these countries. Radio Moscow
has tried to convince its listeners that Moslems in the
Soviet Union are indeed well off. A March 1979 broadcast
to Iran typifies the Soviet approach:
The Soviet constitution stipulates that citizens have
the right to choose any religion or not to follow
any religion. . .Religion is not taught in Soviet
schools, but parents are free to acquaint their
children with any religion. Government officials do
not interfere in the work of purely religious
organizations . 505
A second technique has been to publicize evidence
of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet
government has permitted only 20-2 5 Moslems per year to make
the pilgrimage to Mecca in the past. Radio Moscow and other
media directed at the Islamic nations point out that Soviet
Moslems are able to travel abroad to maintain contact with
their co-religionists. In a January 1979 Persian broadcast.
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one Soviet Moslem cleric, who had just returned from the
Middle East, declared that he was thanked for "the timeless
support that the Soviet Union has given to the wishes of
the Arabs .
"
Visits of foreign Moslems are also widely publi-
cized. The imam of the Mosque of Aden, after a visit to
Central Asia and Kazakhstan, noted that "Soviet mosques are
full of praying people. This clearly and categorically
507proves that the Soviet Government permits freedom of religion."
A September radio broadcast in Arabic related the news of
a Moslem newspaper conference in Tashkent, attended by "men
of religion from the Soviet Union and leading Islamic theo-
logians and correspondents of Islamic papers and magazines
50 8from 12 countries." In November 1979, Iranian clerics
were invited to visit Soviet Transcaucasia by Moslem clergy-
men; the Soviet government also requested permission for
a group of clergy from Caucasia, Moscow, Leningrad and
509Central Asia to visit Iran during the month of Moharram."
Continued efforts along these lines include an Islamic
exhibit in Moscow in January 1980, reported increased expen-
ditures for the restoration of Islamic monuments in Kazakhstan,
and the announcement of an international Islamic conference
510m Tashkent scheduled for September 1980.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the spectacle
of Soviet troops directly engaged in the suppression of an
anti-Marxist, pro-Moslem rebellion complicated Moscow's
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task of convincing the Islamic states that the Soviet Union
was their "best friend." There is no doubt that the religious
aspect of this rebellion and the prospect of the establish-
ment of another "Islamic Republic" was a consideration in the
Kremlin's decision to intervene. The overthrow of a pro-
American Shah in Iran by a religiously-oriented rebellion
was one thing; the overthrow of a Marxist-oriented regime
in Afghanistan, especially by a religiously-oriented move-
ment, was something quite different.
The Kremlin thus made a special effort to portray
their action in Afghanistan as an anti-imperialist move.
Foreign Minister Gromyko asserted:
It is rather difficult for Washington to make the
Muslim world believe in imperialist's good inten-
tions with regard to the Islamic world and to make
Muslim states believe in yarns about the Soviet
Union's ill designs concerning Islam and Muslim
countries. . .Each person who objectively appraises
the developments in the world and policies of
states see that the Soviet Union is a true friend
of the Arabs / a true friend of all Islamic peoples, ^^^
A Pravda article further claimed that "the facts indicate
that it is not the Soviet Union but American imperialism
that, having decided earlier on a course aimed at exacerbating
the international situation, has now taken advantage of the
events in Afghanistan and is moving towards the undermining
of detente and toward confrontation in the context of an
512
arms buildup."
If the position adopted by Iran and other Islamic
countries is any indication, Moscow, despite its exertions.
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faces an uphill struggle to impress the Moslem world of
its healthy attitude towards Islam and of its friendship.
An Iranian cleric, returning from an Islamic conference
in the USSR observed.
What is clearly felt is that the relationship of
Muslims with the Soviet government cannot be isolated
from the relations of the latter with Islamic nations
of the world. 513
4, Iran's Non-Alignment
A potential issue for Moscow's relations with Tehran
is the nature of Iran's future non-alignment. In March 1979,
Iran formally announced that it was withdrawing from CENTO.
Furthermore, the Iranian leadership committed the country
514
to a policy of non-alignment. Prime Minister Bazargan
subsequently announced that Iran would no longer play the
"role of a gendarme" in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean,
and that any projects connected with that role would be
515terminated.
Predictably, the Soviet Union praised these develop-
ments. Isvestiya observed that "the events in Iran have
shaken the military-economic structure which the United
States had been erecting for decades in the Persian Gulf
region." Moscow Radio cited Iran's actions as symbolic
of Iran's becoming a country which was "truly independent"
by virtue of its having "pulled out of the imperialist game,"
while it condemned U.S. policy for attempting "to resurrect
517the same policy of blocs in the Near East and Indian Ocean.
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Although Moscow views the reduction of American
influence and the demise of Iran's military role in the region
as steps in the right direction, the Kremlin may not be
completely satisfied with a truly neutral Iran. If that
is so, the Kremlin leaders may decide to try to pressure
Iranian leaders into joining the Soviet-proposed Asian
Security plan, an attempt that is sure to provoke Iran's
resistance.
Leonid Brezhnev first proposed such a system in 1969,
although it was not until 19 72 that any substantial details
518
concerning the concept came forth. In April 19 72,
Brezhnev asserted that:
Collective security in Asia must, in our view, be
based on such principles as renunciation of the
use of force in relations between states, respect
for sovereignty and the inviolability of borders,
noninterference in internal affairs and the broad
development of economic and other cooperation on
the basis of full equality and mutual advantage. 519
One aspect of the concept which was not fully explained was
that, in such an organization, an attack on one member
would be considered an attack on all, requiring joint action
against the attacker.
The Soviet proposals had three unstated goals:
- the neutralization/isolation of the PRC, which
could be accomplished by inclusion of China in
the scheme, in which case Beijing would be forced
to recognize the political and territorial status-
quo in Asia. It could also be realized by
Qiina ' s exclusion, in which case she would effec-




- the elimination of American military presence in
the Indian Ocean region would be realized by the
adherence of countries like Pakistan and Iran to
the arrangement, and by a Soviet-American agreement
on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. Nego-
tiations between the United States and the USSR
on this subject were begun in 1977, but collapsed
in 1978 admidst the Soviet/Cuban venture in the
Horn of Africa. 52 2
- the reduction of the potential for regional conflicts/
which would result from each member's tacit recog-
nition of the status quo with regard to borders,
etc., and from the mutual security aspects of the
arrangement
.
Moscow, however, was singularly unsuccessful in persuading
countries to endorse the proposal, with the exception of
Outer Mongolia, which approved the concept in 1970,
In 1973, the Soviets attempted to convince the Shah
that Iran should leave CENTO and join an Asian collective
security arrangement. Although the Shah initially displayed
523
some interest in the proposal, nothing further came of it.
The only significant development concerning the
idea in the decade since it was first proposed occurred in
1978, when Afghanistan concluded a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with the USSR which included a mutual commitment
to promote "the creation of an effective security system in




In April 1979, Moscow again called attention to its
belief in the need for an Asian security arrangement. An
editorial in New Times stated, "The USSR views with under-
standing the idea, as advanced by the countries of the region.
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that their homeland should be made a zone of peace... To
realize this idea, a collective quest for constructive
measures that would guarantee security, as well as concerted
525
action by the countries concerned, is needed." And the
Kremlin's voice in Iran, the Tudeh, has included the pro-
posal in its platform.
Whether or not such a proposal, and Iran's overall
attitude towards non-alignment becomes an issue for Soviet-
Iranian relations depends on how seriously Moscow pursues
the subject. The Kremlin's on-going anti-U.S. propaganda
campaign demonstrates Soviet interest in driving a more
permanent wedge between Tehran and Washington, and the
inclusion of the Asian security proposal in the Treaty
with Afghanistan is evidence that the Kremlin has not
abandoned the idea of a collective security arrangement by
which U.S. influence in the region would ultimately be
eliminated and the Soviet Union would become a "manager"
of Indian Ocean and Asian affairs.
5. Energy Matters
A final area of contention between Moscow and Iran's
new leadership has been the re-negotiation of agreements
concluded between the Shah and the Kremlin on the sale of
Iranian natural gas and oil to the Soviet Union.
Iran began exporting natural gas to the Soviet Union
in October 1970, as the result of the economic and technical
527
agreement which was signed in 1966. Between 1970 and 1978,
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Iran sold approximately 70 billion cubic meters of gas to
the USSR, in return for Soviet financial and technical
assistance in construction of a steel mill, pipeline, and
industrial goods. Moscow, in turn, sold gas to its Eastern
bloc partners, as well as to Austria, earning much-needed
528hard currency. Additionally, beginning in 1973, the
Soviets began purchasing about 2 MMT of Iranian oil per
529year.
In December 19 77, the two countries signed a trade
protocol under which Iranian gas or oil would have been
530bartered for Russian-built machine tool parts. This
plan, however, was soon overtaken by the events of 19 78.
As a result of a series of strikes in Iran, the
supply of gas from Iran to Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia ceased at the end of October 1978. Furthermore,
striking workers refused to continue work on the Igat-2
pipeline, which, when completed, would provide gas to West
531Germany and France. The gas stoppage had an immediate
impact in the Soviet republics, which relied on Iranian gas
for approximately 60 percent of their industrial and domestic
(home heating) purposes. Additionally, the Soviets were
unable to meet their commitments to Eastern Europe (a 4
532percent shortage), and lost needed revenues.
One of the first acts of the new government in Iran
in February 1979 was to announce that it was going to review
all prior economic agreements with foreign countries to
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determine which might need to be re-negotiated. The energy
agreements with the USSR did not escape attention. A Radio
Tehran editorial noted "if we are faced with a situation
whereby one takes delivery of Iranian gas at the border, and
then without any effort, sells it there and then at three
times the amount one paid for it, then this is a clearcut
533
case of swindle, even if one is the USSR. " Moscow pro-
tested, noting that "the fact that the price of gas con-
tinues to increase and is now three times what it was at the
beginning, while at the same time the price of Soviet machinery
and industrial goods has remained almost unchanged, proves
that the export of gas to the Soviet Union was profitable for
,,534Iran.
"
Although the export of gas to the USSR resumed in
April 19 79, Iran declared its intention to re-negotiate
the agreement. By the end of April, exports to the USSR
reached approximately 17 million cubic meters per day, and
53520 MCM per day in May. Meanwhile, negotiations were begun
in May on the terms of a new agreement. The Iranian ambassador
to Moscow announced that work was progressing on the Igat-2
pipeline and that a third gas line, which would provide
natural gas to Soviet Turkmenistan, Tadzhikstan, Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan was still being planned. Shortly there-
after, however, negotiations reached a standstill and Iran
announced that it was going to break the contract for the
537
only partially-completed Igat-2 pipeline. It soon became
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apparent that Tehran was prepared to use its exports of
natural gas to the USSR as a lever to persuade Moscow to
meet Iran's price demands. Negotiations continued inter-
mittently, with no real progress. In February 1980, the
Iranian oil minister announced that gas exports to the Soviet
Union, having risen to 27 million cubic meters per day, were
being cut "due to domestic need." On 23 February, it was
announced that Iran had unilaterally raised the price of
538
export gas to the USSR.
In early March a new round of negotiations was begun,
but broke down. Iran thereupon terminated gas and oil
exports to the USSR. The Iranian minister of oil, Ali
Mo'infar claimed that "we can easily forget our income from
gas exports and compensate for the loss by increasing the
price of our crude oil exports by less than 50 cents per
539barrel. "^-^^
In mid-April, a Soviet delegation arrived in Tehran,
and one report noted the possibility that its purpose was
to propose an arrangement with the USSR and Eastern bloc
countries to circumvent application of U.S. economic sanctions
Oil minister Mo'infar later confiinned that a delegation had
arrived to discuss the gas export situation and also stated
that Iran was negotiating increased oil deliveries with
540
several socialist bloc countries. In an interview at
the end of April, Mo'infar claimed to have found "other




while Iran has constantly asserted its ability to
withstand any economic sanctions, it is obvious that what-
ever capacity it has is not without limitations. Iran's
leaders are not likely to bake down too far off their price
demands for gas; one reason is that oil production is
approximately only one-third to one-half of what it was
under the Shah, and higher prices for both gas and oil are
542
necessary to offset some of that difference.
The Soviet Union, meanwhile, is obviously attempting
to take advantage of the state of U.S. -Iranian relations
to further develop Iranian ties with the Eastern bloc. It
should also be noted that Iranian oil and gas agreements
with East Europe could considerably ease Moscow's burden
543in supplying CEMA demands for energy. Under these cir-
cumstances, some compromise on pricing would seem logical,
and would serve the interests of both Tehran and Moscow.
The future course of Soviet-Iranian relations is,
at this point, uncertain. The manner in which the issues
discussed above are resolved will be important to the even-
tual outcome. Compromise may be possible in some areas;
in others, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
neither Iran nor the USSR is likely to abandon its position
regarding Soviet presence there.
It seems likely that how the issues are eventually
resolved is highly dependent on two factors. Much depends on
Iran's own internal political situation in the months to
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come. Iran has been without a strong central government
for over a year; indeed, given the confused state of the
Pahlavi Dynasty's last months, eighteen months is probably
a more accurate figure. The country's past experience under
these circumstances, as was discussed in the first two chap-
ters of this thesis, does not lead to an optomistic forecast
for Iran in its present condition. Indeed, despite all that
has already taken place, the truly critical stage is yet to
come. The passing of the Ayatollah Khomeini from the Iranian
scene - a development which is certain even in his case -
will undoubtedly set off a struggle for power among the
various factions within the country - the secular leaders,
militant religious elements, leftists, Tudeh, etc. Civil
strife is again likely. If the Soviets do indeed intend to
"play the Tudeh card, " such a development would probably
present their best opportunity to do so.
The second factor is whether the Soviets succeed or
fail in their efforts to maintain their puppet Afghan regime
in power. If they are successful, the Kremlin's leaders
may decide to press their advantage and attempt to pressure
Iran, and Pakistan, into cooperating with their regional
policies. Given a Soviet failure in Afghanistan, or even a
protracted involvement requiring a greater investment of
time, resources and manpower, conditions would be much less
favorable for doing so. In either case, Moscow will find
it increasingly difficult to divorce its intervention in
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Afghanistan from its relations with Iran, other regional
countries, the Islamic world and the world-at-large. The
"spill-over" of Soviet actions in Afghanistan into
Iranian-Soviet relations, in the long term, will be
unavoidable, and may be a significant factor in defining





321Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union in the Middle
Ekst/' Current History , October 1979, p. 108.
322Of course, in the case of the Soviet Union, the "divi-
sion" between the government and the media is artificial.
As Ronald Hilton has noted.
The press and scholarship are not viewed in the Soviet
Union as having the verification and analysis of facts
as their primary objective. The market place of ideas
does not exist. The press is an important cog in a
propaganda machine, the aim of which is to promote
the cause of Muscovite communism. .
.
World Affairs Report , Volume 8, No. 4, 1978.
323Kayhan International , September 14, 1978, p. 1.
^^^FBIS
,
11 April 1978, p. F6 . (USSR). Review of 80
issues of FBIS covering the months of January to April 1978
yields fewer than 10 translated Soviet reports concerning
Iran, of which one concerned the Shah's arms purchases (7
February 1978, p. F4); four described Soviet-Iranian talks
concerning the trans-Iranian gas pipeline (13 and 17 April
1978) ; one described joint cooperation on Caspian Sea prob-
lems; and two concerned the protests (11 and 13 April 1978)
.
325Ronald Hilton, ed.. World Affairs Report , Vol. 8,
No. 3, 1978, p. 322. Hilton further noted, "The violent
riots in Iran received vast coverage in the Western press,
but, true to its agreement with the Iranian Government
,
the Soviet press simply published brief notes quoting
Iranian and Western sources, without mentioning the charges
against the Shah or his attacks on Marxists and Moslems."
(emphasis added). Vol. 8, No. 4, 1978, p. 440.
^^^FBIS , 25 May 1978, p. F2.
327
Ibid. Meanwhile, TASS carried the report of the
opening of an Iranian-Soviet chamber of commerce in Tehran.
Op. cit.. World Affairs Report , Vol. 8, No. 3, 1978, p. 323.
328See Robert Moss, "Who's Meddling in Iran," The New
Republic
, December 2, 1978, pp. 15-18, and Ned Temko , "Arms
Aid for Iran's Opposition Admitted by Palestinian Leader,"
225

The Christian Science Monitor ^ 24 January 1979, p. 6. See
also John K. Cooley, "Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf,"
Foreign Affairs , Summer 1979, pp. 1017-1018.
329For a discussion of the opportunity variable in Soviet
foreign policy making, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and
Power in Soviet Foreign Policy , (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co., 1971), pp. 80-83.
330See, for example, FBIS , 22 Feburary 1974, p. Fl
(USSR); New Times , No. 18-19, May 1974, pp. 28-29; FBIS ,
17 May 1974, pp. F12-14.
^^•'FBIS, 30 April 1974, pp. F6-8; 26 June 1974, p. F5;
1 July 1974, p. F4; and New Times , No. 12, March 1975, pp.
7-8.
'^'^^FBIS , 25 June 1973, pp. Dl-2 and 10 August 1973, p. B8
.
Indeed, the most critical and extensive Soviet comments
during the early months of the Iranian crisis were directed
not at the protests, but at the visits of PRC Foreign Minister
Hua and Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to Tehran in July and Septem-
ber 1978. See "Soviets Furious as China Unfolds Its Foreign
Policy," Kayhan International , August 29, 1978, p. 4; also
ibid., August 30-31, September 2-3 1978. See also FBIS , 31
August 1978, p. F5 and 8 September 1978, pp. F6-7, and Peking
Review , No. 36, September 8, 1978, pp. 5-10.
333TASS carried reports of the imposition of the curfew
in Esfahan, protests over housing, and casualties from clashes
with police on 11-13 August. FBIS , 15-17 August 1978. FBIS ,
10 August 19 78, p. Fl. A report of the Abadan theatre fire
was broadcast to Iran in Persian, citing Iranian and foreign
press sources, but refrained from attempting to fix blame.
FBIS , 28 August 1978, p. F2.
"^^"^See FBIS , 28 August, 1978, p. F2 and 11 September 1978,
p. FIO.
335
FBIS, 21 September 1978, p. F7. The Shah responded
on 22 September. Ibid., 22 September 1978, p. F8.
^"^^FBIS, 22 September 1978, p. F9; FBIS, 11 October 1978,
p. FIO.
"^"^"^FBIS, 31 October 1978, pp. F7-8.
226

338One commentary noted, for example, agrarian reform,
women's rights, and the drive against illiteracy and disease
undertaken by the regime, even though it saw them as being
poorly carried out. FBIS , 3 October 1978, 1978, p. A3;
FBIS , 1 November 1978, p. Fll.
Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 3, No. 11, November 15,
1978, p. 2.
^"^^Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 12, December 15, 1978, p. 2.
New Times , No. 48, November 19 78, p. 4.
^'^'FBIS, 20 November 1978, p. F4.
342A 6 December Isvestiya article, noting Washington's
attitude towards providing some assistance for the Shah,
rejoiced, "It wants to (and this includes direct military
intervention) , but at the same time it is wary. Washington
cannot fail to take into account a number of circumstances.
Above all L.I. Brezhnev's reply to the Pravda correspondent's
question has had a due effect." FBIS , 8 December 1978,
pp. Fl-2 . This article was also broadcast to Iran in Persian
FBIS, 14 December 1978, pp. F9-10.
^"^•^
FBIS , 1 November 1978, p. Fl.
344
Ibid.; also The Economist , January 20, 1979, p. 52;
FBIS, 3 January 19 79, p. Fl; 4 January 19 79, p. F4; 5
January 1979, p. F6.
"^"^^FBIS, 27 November 1978, p. A3. See also, FBIS, 30
November 1978, p. F2; 7 December 1978, p. F3; 11 December
1978, p. F9; 13 December 1978, p. F8. See also, "Troubles
in Iran Seen as Anti-U.S. Protest," The Current Digest of
the Soviet Press , Vol. XXX, No. 50, January 10, 19 79, pp.
10- 15. FBIS, 18 December 1978, p. F3.
'^'^^FBIS , 12 December 1978, p. F7.
348
Ibid., p. F6. See also, "US Propaganda Efforts
Condemned," FBIS , 15 December 1978, p. Fl. See also, ibid.,
pp. F3 and 5.
^^^FBIS, 18 December 1978, pp. Fl-3 and 20 December 1978,
p. Fl. See also FBIS , 27 December 1978, p. Fl and New York
Times, 2 January 1979, p. 3.
227

^^^FBIS , 26 December 1978, p. Fl.
351Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 3, No. 12, December 15,
1978, p. 2. A Russian radio program, for example, noted
"cracks" in the Iranian Army. FBIS , 20 December 19 78,
p. F3.
352
The Economist , January 20, 1979, p. 52.
353FBIS , 2 January 1979, p. F2.
FBIS, 3 January 1979, pp. F3-4; 4 January 1979, p. F2;
5 January 1979, p. F7-8; 8 January 1979, p. Fl; 11 January
1979, p. Fl.
355FBIS , 4 January 1979, p. Fl. It was also reported
that Brezhnev personally met with an envoy of Ayatollah
Khomeini in January to discuss the religious leader's future
political course. Kayhan International , February 4, 1979, p. 4
^^^FBIS , 5 January 1979, p. F4.
357
FBIS , 8 January 1979, p. F4. See also, "Oveysi Wants
U.S. to Stage Coup," FBIS , 8 January 19 79, p. F3 and FBIS,
11 January 1979, p. F4; 15 January 1979, p. F5-6.
Soviet World Outlook , Vol, 4, No. 1, January 15, 1979,
p. 3.
^^^Ibid.; FBIS , 9 January 19 79, p. F4; FBIS , 12 January
1979, p. Fl. See also Kayhan International , January 14, 1979,
p. 1.
360
Ibid.; Kayhan International , January 31, 1979, p. 4.
3 61
FBIS , 19 January 1979, p. F6. Moscow praised the
Shah's departure as a "great victory" for the Iranian
people. FBIS , 18 January 1979, p. FIO.
36 2
"Iran: Threat of Military Coup," FBIS , 15 January
1979, pp. Fl-3. Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol.
XXXI, No. 3, February 14, 19 79, pp. 1-3.
'^FBIS , 15 January 1979, p. F4 ; 16 January 1979, p. Fl;




FBIS , 15 January 1979, pp. F1-F7; 18 January 1979,
p. Fl; 23 January 1979, p. F2 and New Times , No. 7, February
1979, p. 7. See also, FBIS , 25 January 1979, p. F3; 26
January 1979, p. F9; 29 January 1979, p. Fl, F3-4 . Current
Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol. XXXI, No. 5, February 28,
1979, p. 19.
^^^FBIS, 6 February 1979, p. F3 and 9 February 1979,
p. F2. New Times , No. 8, February 19 79, pp. 8-9; Soviet
World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 2, February 15, 1979, pp. 2-3.
3 66New Times , No. 9, February 1979, p. 6 and Kayhan
International , 15 January 1979, p. 1.
"^^"^FBIS, 27 February 1979, p. F4; also 7 March 1979,
p. F7. Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty Research , No.
126-79, April 19, 1979, p. 1.
^^^FBIS, 27 February 1979, pp. Fl-5; New Times , No. 8,
February 1979, pp. 8-9; Current Digest of the Soviet Press ,
Vol. XXXI, No. 10, April 4, 1979, p. 18.
^ New Times , No. 35, August 1978, p. 22.
^"^^
FBIS , 22 September 1978, p. F9.
371The broadcast noted the "contradictions between the
relatively rapid, although extremely uneven, economic devel-
opment of the country. It is also caused by the police,
the antipopular political regime and the archaic social
structure." FBIS , 3 October 1978, p. A2
.
^"^^FBIS, 6 November 1978, pp. A5-6.
^^'^FBIS , 7 November 1978, p. F4.
•^^"^
FBIS , 29 November 1978, p. F2. See also FBIS , 30
November 1979, p. F3; December 7, 1978, p. F3.
'^'^^
FBIS , 11 December 1978, p. F8.
376_ . .Ibid.
"^^"^FBIS, 4 January 1979, p. F13.
229

378New Times / No. 3, January 19 79, p. 8. See also
FBIS , 2 January 19 79, p. F16.
379New Times , No. 5, January 1979, p. 6. The Soviets
also began to criticize the Shah directly. FBIS , 31
January 1979, pp. F3-6.
"^^^FBIS, 17 January 19 79, pp. F6-8; 18 January 1979,
pp. F6-10; 30 January 1979, p. Fl.
^^"""FBIS, 23 January 1979, p. F5.
^^^Ibid., p. F6; FBIS , 24 January 1979, p. F3.
FBIS , 26 January 1978, p. F5.
384
"^^^Ibid., pp. F6-7.
•^ New Times , No. 7, February 1979, pp. 6-7; FBIS , 2
February 19 79, p. Fl
.
^^^FBIS , 26 February 1979, p. RIO. FBIS , 27 February
1979, p. F4; New Times , No. 9, February 1979, p. 6.
•^^^FBIS , 9 February 1979, p. F3.
•^^^FBIS , 22 September 1978, p. FIO; Soviet World Outlook ,
Vol. 3, No. 11, November 15, 19 78, p. 2.
38 9
FBIS , 29 November 1978, (Annex), pp. 2-5. For another
explanation by the Tudeh Party Secretary, see FBIS , 7
February 19 79, (Annex), pp. 2-4.
"^^^Ibid.; also Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 3, No. 12,
December 15, 1978, p. 3.
^^^FBIS, 2 January 1979, pp. F12-13.
^^^FBIS, 4 January 1979, p. Fll. New Times , No. 2,
February 1979, p. 9.
^^^FBIS, 24 January 1979, p. F4.
^^^Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 2, February 15,
1979, p. 3. According to one report, Eskandari was replaced
230

because of his opposition to Khomeini. A.G. Noorani, "Soviet
Ambitions in South Asia," International Security ^ Vol. 4,
No. 3, Winter 79/80, p. 53.
Ibid.
396
FBIS , 15 February 1979, p. F9; 8 March 1979, p. F7;
See also 13 March 1979, p. Fll and 15 March 1979, p. FIO;
23 March 1979, p. H4 and 26 March 1979, p. H18.
'^^^FBIS , 26 March 1979, p. H16.
398
A.G. Noorani, "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia,"
International Security , Vol. 4, No. 3, Winter 79/80, p. 49.
"^^^FBIS, February 1, 1979, (Middle East), p. Rl
.
Shahram Chubin, "Repercussions of the Crisis in Iran,"
Survival , Vol. XXI, No. 3, May/June 1979, p. 103. See also,
Robert Moss, "Who is Meddling in Iran," The New Republic
,
December 21, 1978, p. 17; "Leftist Split Among Oil Workers,"
Kayhan International , February 4, 19 79, p. 1.
401
"Iranian Fedayeen Loom as Major Force," JPRS: 073209,
No. 1942, 12 April 1979, pp. 320.
"^^^
FBIS (Iran), 2 April 1979, p. 27. Washington Post ,
2 April 1979, p. 1.
^°^FBIS, 6 April 1978, p. H6.
404
"Tudeh Drive to Join Khomeini Bandwagon," Kayhan
International , February 6, 1979, p. 3.
405 Translations on Near East and North Africa , No. 1909,
(JPRS:72813) , 13 February 1979, p. 16. See also, "Opposition
Leader Comments on Tudeh Party Position," FBIS (Iran), 26
February 1979, p. R28.
"^^^FBIS, 10 April 1979, pp. RlO-11.





409See op. cit.. Moss, "Who is Meddling m Iran,"
p. 17 for an account of the arming and training of leftist
guerrilla groups in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
'^"'^FBIS, 13 April 1979, p. 3 (Annex).
^^^JPRS 74100, 29 August 1979, p. 58.
^-'•^FBIS (USSR), 31 May 1979, pp. H4-5; 25 Junel979, p. H3
.
413Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 9, September 15,
1979, p. 5. FBIS ,<USSRX 29 August 1979, p. HI; FBIS (USSR)
12 September 1979, p. H4 . The ban was subsequently lifted,
but Kianuri acknowledged that "part activity elsewhere is
experiencing difficulties." Kayhan International , October
10, 1979, p. 2. In a February 1980 interview, Kianuri noted
that four copies of the paper were being sent to Khomeini '
s
office in Qom daily, at his request. FBIS , 11 February 198 0,
p. 23 (Supplement).
414 Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 12, December 15,
1979, p. 3. See also FBIS (Iran), 11 February 1980, p. 23;
28 February 1980, p. 24 (Supplement).
416Kayhan International , October 10, 1979, p. 2. Soviet
World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 12, December 15, 1979, p. 3.
'^'•'^FBIS (Iran), 10 April 1979, p. Rll. FBIS (USSR),
5 June 1979, p. H5.
^•^^FBIS (USSR), 5 June 1979, p. H5 . Kayhan International ,
October 10, 1979, p. 2.
419Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 12, December 15,
1979, p. 3.
420Kayhan International , 6 February 1979, p. 3; Soviet
World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 3, March 15, 1979, p. 6; FBIS
(USSR), 12 September 1979, p. H4.
421Kayhan International , 6 February 1979, p. 3.




FBIS (Iran), 13 April 1979, p. 3. (Annex); See also
Alvin J. Cottrell, "American Policy During the Iranian Revo-
lution: The Huyser Mission," International Security Review
,
Vol. IV, No. VI, Winter 1979-1980. Cottrell notes, "...the
Marxists and the Moslem radicals .. .wanted to remove the chief
obstacle to their own political ambitions which they knew
might be thwarted if the integrity of the professional
Iranian military was preserved," p. 439.
"^^^
FBIS (Iran), 10 April 1979, p. R13.
425
Op. cit., Chubin and Zabih, The Foreign Relations of
Iran
, pp. 179-181.
^^^FBIS (USSR), 8 April 1970, pp. A 22-26.
"^^^
FBIS (USSR), September 21, 1972, pp. B4-7.
^^^FBIS (USSR), September 23, 1974, p. F2.
429See Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq; A Study in Iraqi
Politics Since 1968
,
(Washington, D.C.: The Middle East
Institute, 1978), pp. 151-153 and pp. 245-260.
430Kayhan International , 20 January 1979, p. 1. Arab
Report
,
14 February 1979, pp. 4-6. FBIS (Iran), 21 March
1979, p. R7; 22 March 1979, pp. R7-12; 26 March 1979, pp.
Rl-11; Washington Post , 31 May 1979, p. 1.
^•^•'•New York Times , March 4, 1979, p. 3E.
^^^FBIS (USSR), 6 April 1979, p. H7.
"^^^FBIS (USSR), 27 June 1979, p. Hi.
^^'^FBIS (USSR), 6 April 1979, p. H6
.
^^^New Times , No. 19, May 1979; p. 13; FBIS (USSR), 11
May 1979, p. H2.
^"^^FBIS (USSR), 16 May 1979, p. H8.
^'^^FBIS (Iran), 12 July 1979, p. R2; 13 August 1979, p. R3
438Washington Post ^ 24 August 1979, p. 1.
233

439Kayhan International ^ 1 September 1979, pp. 1 and 4.
440Kayhan International / 4 September 1979, p. 1.
441Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 9, September 15,
1979, p. 5; also Kayhan International , 9 September 1979,
p. 1; FBIS (USSR), 10 September 1979, p. HI.
442Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 9, September 15,
1979, p. 5.
443See "Kurdish Operations Against Iraq Continue,"
FBIS (Iran Supplement), 11 February 1980, pp. 23-25.
444Middle East Intelligence Survey , Vol. 8, No. 1, 1-15
April 1980, pp. 2-3.
^^ FBIS (Iran Supplement), 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21 February
1980; 31 March 1980, p. 22. For reports of continuing unrest
see ibid., (South Asia), 4, 8, 11, 14-18, 21, 22 and 29
April 1980.
^^^FBIS (Iraq), 2 April 1980, p. El.
447See, for example, FBIS (Iraq) , 19 and 25 February
1980, 27 March 1980.
^^^FBIS (Iraq), 14 April 1980, p. El; FBIS (Iran Supple-
ment), 31 March 1980, pp. 21-23.
449Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 5, No. 4, April 15, 1980,
pp. 4-5. FBIS (USSR), 9 April 1980, p. H4).
^^°FBIS (Iran), 3 October 1979, p. R15; FBIS (USSR),
27 November 1979, p. H2; 3 December 1979, p. H8; 11





"^^^FBIS (USSR), 20 November 1978, p. Fl.




455Reza Shah, in 1925, attempted to acquire a Soviet
repudiation of both Articles 5 and 6, without success. Op.
cit., Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran
, pp. 234-235,
In March 1959, Iran formally notified the USSR that it
regarded these articles as invalid. In 1974, the Shah
asserted that "This treaty is incompatible with the articles
of the UN Charter." The Statesman , June 26, 1974, p. 6.
Nevertheless, the Soviets have never concurred with this
point of view.
^^^FBIS (USSR), 5 March 1979, pp. F3-4.
457Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 9, September 15,
1979, p. 5.
^^^FBIS (Iran Supplement), 22 January 1980, p. 13. FBIS
(USSR), 28 February 1980, p. H4
.
459Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 5, No. 1, January 15,
19 80, p. 3 and Vol. 5, No. 2, 15 February 19 80, p. 5.
FBIS (Iran Supplement), 3 March 1980, p. 17.
461Mark Heller, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan;
Motivations and Implications (CSS Memorandum No. 2), March
1980, p. 5.
462Franklin Patterson, "Afghanistan," Atlantic Monthly
,
April 1979, p. 6; Kayhan International , May 3, 1978, p. 1.
^^'^Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 3, No. 6, 15 June 1978,
p. 6.
464
Op. cit., Patterson, p. 8; ibid., p. 7.
465Jiri Valenta, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion,"
Baltimore Sun , 19 February 19 79, p. 11.
4 66
Hannah Negaran, "Afghanistan: A Marxist Regime in
a Muslim Society," Current History , Vol. 76, No. 446, April
1979, p. 174.
467_ .^ „ -Op. cit., Valenta.
468




The Washington Post / April 23, 1979, p. 16; New
York Times , August 8, 1979, p. 21.
470
FBIS (USSR), 22 March 1979, p. Dl.
^"^•^
FBIS (Iran), 17 March 1979, p. R2 . FBIS (USSR),
26 March 1979, p. H18; The Christian Science Monitor , 20
March 1979, p. 31; 11 April 1979, p. 5. In July, Kabul
accused Shariat-Madari of financing the revolt. Near East/
North Africa Report No. 2013 , 30 August 1979, pp. 12-13.
^"^^
FBIS (USSR), 23 March 1979, pp. D2-3, D6.
^"^^Ibid., p. D6; FBIS (Iran), 27 April 1979, p. Rl
.
"^ FBIS (Iran), 20 April 1979, p. Rl; see also Radio
Liberty Research 131/79 , April 23, 1979, p. 5.
^^^FBIS (Iran), 27 June 1979, p. R6
.
New York Times , 8 August 1979, p. 4; 14 August 1979,
p. 3; "Afghan Rebels Say Regime Tottering," Christian
Science Monitor , August 29, 1979, p. 6; Kayhan International ,
October 10, 1979, p. 4.
477New York Times , 14 August 1979, p. 3.
478Op. cit., Heller, p. 6.
479
Ibid. As Geoffrey Godsell later noted, "If Mr. Taraki
had wanted to make his government more accpetable to his own
people, the ouster of Mr. Amin from it probably would have
had priority because of the latter 's identification with
indiscriminate killings and the scorched-earth tactics being
used to crush rural resistance." The Christian Science Monitor
,
18 September 1979, p. 3.
Op. cit., Valenta, p. 11; o. cit.. Heller, p. 7.
Ibid.
^^^FBIS (USSR), 28 December 1979, p. D3; 31 December
1979, p. D5; Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol. XXXII,
No . 1 , February 6, 1980, pp. 1-2.
236

483Soviet World Outlook ^ Vol. 5, No. 1/ January 15,
1980, p. 2; FBIS (USSR), 31 December 1979, p. D9.
484Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol- XXXII,
No. 1, February 6, 19 80, pp. 1-2.
"^^^Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 5, No. 2, February 15,
1980, p. 6.
^^^FBIS (Iran Supplement), 31 December 1979, p. 20.
Time , January 14, 1980, p. 12,
"^^ FBIS (Iran Supplement), January 18, 1980, p. 5;
22 January 19 80, pp. 10-11.
FBIS (Iran Supplement), 23 January 1980, p. 6;
Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 5, No. 2, February 15, 1980,
pp. 5-6; Current Digest of Soviet Press , Vol. XXXII, No. 5,
March 5, 1980, p. 5.
^^^FBIS (Iran Supplement) , 11 February 1980, p. 19;
FBIS (USSR), 13 February 1980, p. HI.
"^^^
FBIS (Iran Supplement), 11 February 1980, p. 20.
See also ibid., 22 January 1980, p. 11.
^^"FBIS (Iran Supplement), 25 March 1980, p. 12; Soviet
World Outlook , Vol. 5, No. 4, April 15, 1980, p. 4.
492Helene Carrere d'Encause, Decline of an Empire: The
Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt
,
(New York: Newsweek
Books, 1979), p. 219.
493
Ibid., pp. 231, 246. See also Alexander Benningsen
and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay , Islam and the Soviet Union ,
(New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 138-161.
'^^'^Ibid., p. 3 and 149; Arab Report , 20 June 1979, p. 6;
US News and World Report , May 14, 1979, p. 36. Christian
Science Monitor , 24 April 1980, p. 23. In contrast, Iran,
with a Moslem population of over 30 million has an estimated
80,000 mosques and 180,000 religious clerics of various
categories. Kayhan International , October 21, 1978, p. 4.
495Op. cit., Benningsen, pp. 165-170.
496




"Moslem Rituals Still Strong in Turkemenia, " The
Current Digest of the Soviet Press ^ Vol. XXXI, No. 47,
December 19, 1979, pp. 12-13; ibid.. Vol. XXXII, No. 1,
February 6, 1980, pp. 9-10. See also, Arab Report , 20
June 1979, p. 6.
498Richard Pipes, "Muslims of Central Asia: Trends and
Prospects," Middle East Journal , Spring 1955, p. 152. Arab
Report , 20 June 1979, p. 6.
499
Op. cit., d'Encause, Chapter IV, V and VI; Christian
Science Monitor , 24 April 1980, p. 23; recent evidence which
suggests continued problems among the Nationalities include
Abkhazian demands that their autonomous republic be trans-
ferred from Georgia to the Russian republic and the launching
of a campaign for national solidarity in 19 78, not to mention
the large-scale Jewish emigrations. Soviet World Outlook
,
Vol. 3, No. 7, July 15, 1978, pp. 7-8; ibid.. Vol. 3, No.
10, October 15, 1978, pp. 7-8.
^°°FBIS (USSR), 3 July 1979, p. Hi.
"Khomeini Opposes Intelligence Bases," The Washington
Post , January 18, 19 79, p. A21.
^^^FBIS (Iran), April 20, 1979, p. Rl . Tass and Radio
Moscow omitted this and other embarassing passages in their
coverage of the interview. Radio Liberty Research , No. 131/
79, April 23, 1979, p. 5.
503




FBIS (Middle East), 16 August 1979, p. 3.




FBIS (USSR), 17 May 1979, p. H7.
^^^FBIS (USSR), 14 September 1979, p. CC7. The coun-
tries were Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, Iran,
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, Bulgaria and Japan.
238

509Soviet World Outlook ^ Vol. A, No. 12, December 15,
1979, p. 3. See also, FBIS (USSR), 9 January 1980, p. R4
and 15 February 1980, p. H2
.
510Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 5, No. 2, February 15,
1980, p. 7. See also. The Current Digest of Soviet Press ,
Vol. XXXII, No. 3, February 20, 1980, pp. 7, 24.
511Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 5, No. 2, February 15,
1980, p. 7.
512
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol. XXXII,
No. 5, March 5, 1980, p. 5.
513Kayhan International , October 8, 1979, p. 2.
514 Kayhan International , 11 March 1979, p. 1; 13 March
1979, pp. 1-2; Los Angeles Times , 14 March 1979, p. 20.
^"•^FBIS (Iran), 4 April 1979, p. Rl.
^"'" FBIS (USSR), 20 March 1979, p. A3.
^•''"^
FBIS (USSR), 26 March 1979, pp. CC5-6; also 21 March
1979, p. H-10; 9 May 1979, p. H-1.
518Op. cit., Noorani, "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia,"
pp. 35-38.
519See Current Digest of the Soviet Press , April 19,
1972, pp. 1-9.
520
Op. cit., Noorani, pp. 38-39.
521 Ibid., p. 42; see also Ian Clark, "Soviet Conceptions
of Asian Security: From Balance 'Between' to Balance
'Within'; Pacific Community , January 1976, pp. 172-173.
522For discussion, see Avigdor Haselkorn, "The Expanding
Soviet Collective Security Network," Strategic Review , Vol.
VI, No. 3 (Summer 1978); see also Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 2,
No. 4, April 15, 1977; and New Times , July 1977.
523
Op. cit., Noorani, p. 39.
239

^^^FBIS (USSR), 6 December 1978, p. J12.
^^^New Times , No. 15, April 1979.
^^^FBIS (Iran), 10 April 1979, p. R12.
527For details of the 1966 agreement, see op. cit.,
Rashidi, Iran's Economic Relations with the Soviet Union
1917-1968
, pp. 326-332.
528Arthur J. Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union and Inter-
national Oil Politics (New York: Columbia University-
Press, 1977), pp. 132-134.
529Robert W. Campbell, "Some Issues in Soviet Energy
Policy for the Seventies," Middle East Information Series
,
No. 26-27 (Spring-Summer 1974), p. 99.
530Arab Report and Memo , 26 December 1977, p. 6.
531Arab Report and Memo , Vol. 3, No. 4, January 29,
1979, p. 14.
532
FBIS (USSR) , 25 June 1979, p. H4; Arab Report ,
14 March 19 79, p. 9; Arab Report and Memo , Vol. 3, No. 3,
January 15, 1979, p. 1.
533FBIS (Iran), 26 February 1979, p. R5
.
^•^"^
FBIS (USSR), 9 March 1979, p. F7; Kayhan International ,
19 March 1979, p. 1.
^^^FBIS (Iran), 26 Arpil 1979, p. R14; 31 May 1979,
p. R9.
^^ FBIS (Iran), 10 July 1979, p. R5.
537Christian Science Monitor , 30 July 1979, p. 2;
Current History
, October 1979, p. 109.
FBIS (Iran Supplement), 15 February 1980, p. 75;




FBIS (Iran Supplement), 18 March 1980, p. 9; also,
11, 13, 14 and 17 March 1980.
^"^^
FBIS (Iran Supplement), 18 April 1980, p. II; 21
April 1980, p. 115.
^^•^FBIS (Iran Supplement), 29 April 1980, p. 120.
FBIS (Iran Supplement), 21 April 1980, p. 116.
^^^See Soviet World Outlook , Vol. 4, No. 4, April 16,
1979; p. 4; Vol. 4, No. 8, August 15, 1979, p. 5.
241

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
The thesis offered in Chapter I was divided into three
basic parts. In Chapters II and III, Iran's relations with
both Czarist and Soviet Russia were catalogued to demonstrate
the nature of their historic relationship, a relationship
in which the Russians strove to dominate Iran, often as a
means to achieve other foreign policy ends. The role of
opportunism was shown to be an important ingredient of both
Czarist and Soviet policies toward Iran. Particularly
during times of internal weakness and isolation, Iran has
been susceptible to Russian pressure. Czarist Russia, for
example, exploited Qajar Iran's weaknesses and lack of any
meaningful support in the early half of the 19th Century to
wrest from her territorial and other concessions. Faced with
a more active British role in the last half of the century,
Russia curbed its efforts. Similarly, Moscow sought to
exploit its occupation of northern Iran during the Second
World War by establishing puppet regimes in Iran's northern
provinces, an attempt that failed in the face of US opposi-
tion. A further consequence of the history of Iran's rela-
tions with her northern neighbor is that Iranians have a
healthy distrust of Soviet motivations, despite the "nor-
malized" relations which developed during the 1960 's.
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In Chapter IV, an examination of the decisive events
which propelled the unrest of 1978 into a revolution which would
settle for nothing less than the overthrow of the regime
was undertaken. The primary contention of this chapter was
that, although the nature of the American relationship with
the Shah contributed to the causes of discontent, internal
factors lay at the root of the Iranian revolution. In the
early stages of unrest, the overthrow of the regime was not
an inevitable development; the Shah was, in many ways, his
own worst enemy. The senseless attack on Khomeini in January
1979; the timing of reforms, some half-heartedly undertaken
or poorly executed; the decision not to hold elections until
mid-1979; the rapid change-overs of ministers, some of whom
were sacrificed to "anti-corruption" drives; and the excessive
use of force in suppressing demonstrations; all undermined
the Shah's already shakey credibility and resulted in his
increased isolation, not only from the Iranian people, but
from the very people he chose as his ministers and advisors.
The opposition, which the regime misunderstood and under-
estimated from the very beginning, gained momentum because
of these factors. The "impossible" - the coalition of the
admittedly diverse opposition elements - occurred. Incensed
over the regime's repressive policies, lack of serious
political reform and failing economic conditions and ulti-
mately rallied around a single cause - the removal of the
Shah - these factions united under the one non-regime element
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in Iran which possessed a legitimate claim to authority and
whose record of opposition to secular rule was virtually
unblemished. It was also perhaps the elemnt for which the
Shah had the greatest disdain - the Shi ' ite clergy. Khomeini
the Shah's most unrelenting critic for a decade and a half -
became the symbol of the revolution and of Shi 'ism's politi-
cal role in Iranian life.
Because of the high visibility of the "American connec-
tion" to the Shah - evidenced in historic support for the
regime, billions of dollars of arms purchases and a large
American community in Iran - the United States became a tar-
get of Iranian anger. In retrospect, it is clear that, if
there were any American "sins" with regard to Iran, they were
of "omission" and not "commission." The Nixon Doctrine -
born of America's fear of future Vietnams - was a way of not
becoming directly involved. It found in the person of the
Shah a receptive audience, and during the mid-1970 's, an
apparently capable agent.
The second omission was derived from the first. With
U.S. regional policy interests tied so directly to the Shah,
no American administration could afford to risk a confronta-
tion over other issues. Carter the campaigner could make
Iran's human rights record an issue; as President, his ability
to do so diminished considerably.
The final portion of the thesis, addressed in Chapter V,
concerned the Soviet reaction to the crisis and those factors
which may affect the future of Soviet-Iranian relations.
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There is every indication that Moscow was surprised at the
speed with which the Shah's regime - built on a system of
internal controls, a seemingly pervasive security system
and a well-armed military (a combination with which the
Soviets themselves are no strangers) - could be overthrown.
Of equal surprise in the Kremlin must have been the failure
of the U.S. to undertake substantive measures to assist the
Shah.
The Soviet reaction was a pragmatic one. There was no
direct link between Moscow and the Palestinian-trained
Iranian extremists. Normal political and economic relations
continued with the Shah. Early unrest in Iran went virtually
unmentioned in the Soviet press. Only when it became apparent
that the Shah's troubles were getting worse did they begin
extensive reporting of events in Iran. It was at this point
that Soviet opportunism began to emerge. The anti-imperialist
theme was a comparatively safe one and one that built to a
crescendo by the time the Khomeini/Bazargan regime was in-
stalled. It was a traditional weapon in the Soviet propaganda
arsenal, targeted against the U.S. and designed, in this
case, to indicate sympathy for the opposition point-of-view,
while avoiding direct criticism of the Shah. It should also
have been expected by any policy-maker familiar with Soviet
propaganda techniques and combatted accordingly.
The religious aspect of the revolution was more compli-
cated. It is to be expected that the Soviets will deny any
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concerns over the possibility of "spill-over" of religious
consciousness and re-assertiveness into their own Moslem
republics. To do otherwise would be a de-facto admission
of the transparency of their constitutional guarantees to
freedom of religion and, contrary to their argiiments that
mutual agreement is possible, that there exist not only
fundamental, but irreconcilable differences between Marxism-
Leninism and Islam.
In this regard, however, the Soviets have betrayed them-
selves. The intent to downplay and focus attention on the
other-than-religious aspects of the Iranian revolution are
too obvious to overlook. Their efforts to prevent a "spill-
over" into their Moslem republics has evidently been success-
ful. An Iranian cleric visiting the USSR noted on his return
that "Soviet Muslims had inadequate information about the
Iranian Revolution because the Russian authorities had drawn
far more attention to the revolution's anti-imperialistic
544
aspects rather than its Islamic content."
Moscow's strategy was not totally successful however.
While the Kremlin will vehemently deny that the religious
aspect of opposition to its Afghan puppet regime was a
factor in its decision to invade that country, it is highly
unlikely that the Kremlin's leadership savored the prospect
of the overthrow of that government by a second Islamic
revolt along its southern border. There is, furthermore, no
denying that Moslem rebels in Afghanistan were encouraged
246

by the success of the Islamic revolt in Iran, a fact that
Moscow cannot afford to ignore.
B . CONCLUSIONS
In the final analysis, although it is too early to
definitively state what the future holds for Soviet-Iranian
relations, several observations are possible.
For the time being, Moscow seems to be content to watch
developments in Iran to see if the Islamic Republic proves
to be viable. The Kremlin appears to be somewhat perplexed
by current political developments in Iran and is obviously
preoccupied with Afghanistan. Moscow's continued emphasis
of the "threat of imperialism" may be seen partially as a
device meant to exacerbate tensions and prevent any rapproach-
ment between Tehran and Washington in the meantime, and
partially as a means of deflecting attention from its own
indefensible actions in Afghanistan.
The critical factor is Iran itself. The country currently
finds itself in a critically weakened state , without a strong
central government or military, beset by provincial unrest
and a hostile Iraq (largely of Iran's own making), and un-
solved economic and social problems. Moreover, Iran's inter-
national position is one of increasing political and economic
isolation due to the perpetuation of the hostage crisis.
This is the classic situation in which Soviet opportunism
and exploitation have evidence themselves in Iran in the past
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and which is already apparent in Moscow's attempts to channel
Iran's oil to Eastern Europe.
The May 1980 elections, in which the clerical Islamic
Republican Party won the majority of the seats to the
Parliament was not a development likely to cure Iran's
political paralysis. The IRP is clearly subservient to
Khomeini's wishes and thus the struggle between the secular
and conservative elements for dominance seems sure to con-
tinue. President Bani-sadr has watched his authority gradu-
ally erode over the five months since his election in the
face of opposition by the ultra-conservative clerical ele-
ments led by Ayatollahs Beheshti and Khalkhali. His com-
paratively moderate position on the hostage issue has con-
tributed to this and it is likely that any real executive
power will be vested only in a prime minister nominated by
the Parliament and approved by Ayatollah Khomeini,
It is clear that the political arrangement of the Islamic
government in its present form is not destined to survive
Ayatollah Khomeini, if indeed it lasts that long. From the
very beginning, it has been his vision, and his alone, and
it must be admitted that it is a tribute to his prestige in
the country that he has been able to make it prevail thusfar.
Even other prominent religious figures, Ayatollah Shariat-
madari and Ayatollah Taleghani included, opposed the concept,
preferring a return to the 1906 Constitution, with veto power
546
over all legislation to be vested in the clergy. Shariatmadari
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in particular had backed the secular elements/ and one recent
report stated that, as a result of his opposition to
Khomeini's policies, Shariatmadari "was being kept under
547
very tight control by those close tt» Ayatollah Khomeini."
Given the eventual demise of the Islamic Republic and
the widespread dissatisfaction with its record to date, it
is highly likely that the successor government will be
secular in nature, within a parliamentary framework not un-
like that of the 1906 Constitution. One possibility that
cannot be lightly disregarded is that opposition efforts
currently being undertaken by former Prime Minister Shapur
Bakhtiar from France may result in the establishment of a
nationalist, secular regime. Bakhtiar is said to have the
support of a number of Iranian military officers, both in
exile and still in Iran, as well as certain secular groups,
548possibly including the bazaar. Among other potential
allies might be some of the more moderate clergy, Shariat-
madari included, as well as leftists like the Mujahideen-e-
Khalq members
.
If such a government comes to power in Iran at a future
date, domestic issues will undoubtedly take precedence over
foreign policy matters, with the exception of a still un-
resolved hostage situation. Priority would be placed on
restoring order in the provinces and stimulating the economy.
Of primary importance would be the oil industry, which would
probably require military personnel to prevent continued
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acts of sabotage which have plagued the oil and gas pipe-
549lines m recent months
.
It is also likely that re-structuring of the Army would
take place, although its size would be considerably more
modest than under the Shah. One long-term problem is likely
to be the numbers of weapons which found their way into the
hands of various extremist groups during the revolution;
the military will not go unchallenged. The demise of Khomeini
and his associates would almost certainly remove the main
barrier to a re-normalization of relations with Iraq. Iran
would stress regional cooperation with Iraq and other nations
and oppose foreign intervention in the Gulf area, but the
Shah's tendency towards unilateral action would be avoided.
The ascendency of such a government would not be an
unmitigated disaster from Moscow's point of view. Relations
with Iran under Khomeini are at least as bad, if not worse
than at any time during the Shah's reign. Some improvement
would probably occur. At the same time, assuming a con-
tinued Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Moscow would face
unrelenting criticism of her intervention there. The govern-
ment's stand would be equally insistent on the matter of non-
interference in Iran's affairs, particularly if the Tudeh were
to attempt to insert itself into a governmental change-over
process. Iran would probably seek to maintain a neutralist
status, in which case improved relations with other non-
aligned states would be pursued. An improvement of relations
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with the PRC would undoubtedly evoke the same reaction from
the Kremlin which Chairman Hua ' s 1978 visit to the Shah did.
On the other hand, the Kremlin would probably find reason
for satisfaction in Iran's adoption of a more equidistant
stance between Washington and Moscow.
A second possibility is that the Iranian military will
somehow reassert itself and install a "strongman" by virtue
of a coup d'etat. Such a development, although possible,
seems improbable at this time due to the continued problems
in the areas of discipline and chain-of-command. There are
few military leaders who presently command enough respect
to fill such a role, although there are exceptions, such
as former Navy Commander Rear Admiral Admad Madani , who is
popular among middle class elements and who is known to
favor a secular / orderly and right-wing anti-clerical approach
to politics.
While it is not a likely development, the advent of such
a regime would present Moscow with a situation much like it
faced under the Shah. Iran would be stabilized, and would
probably present a much more assertive foreign policy, with
closer ties to the U.S. and the possible re-introduction of
small-scale American personnel presence to help restore and
maintain some of Iran's deteriorating military equipment.
Such a regime might also undertake a crackdown on leftist,
particularly Tudeh, activity, a policy which would be ex-
tremely frustrating to Moscow after a quarter century of
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sustaining the party-in-exile and seeing it return to active
participation following the Shah's overthrow.
A more likely scenario is a post-Khomeini struggle
between Muslim rightists and Iranian leftist elements which
could quickly plunge Iran into civil war. Both sides have
political and quasi-military organizations; both are pre-
sumably well-armed, having participated in the armed resis-
tance to the Shah during the revolt.
A development of this nature would pose a serious threat
to Iran's ability to maintain its integrity and could occur
in one of two ways; either a religiously-oriented government
crack-down on the leftists, which would certainly not go
uncontested, or a leftist attempt to assert itself in the
wake of Khomeini's passing. The left's stated support for
Khomeini to date is little more than a thinly-disguised
fiction; in the case of the Tudeh, Moscow ordered it.
It is highly unlikely that the left could hope to prevail
in this situation without substantial external support.
Given a choice between the conservative religious elements
and the communists, whether of the Tudeh or another of the
various splinter parties, the majority of Iranians will oppose
the latter. Moscow would be faced with again having to aban-
don the Tudeh to its fate, or rendering critical assistance.
Separatist tendencies, which would be unchecked during a
period of civil strife, could be effectively exploited,





A fourth possibility is that a combination of the first
and third situations will occur; that is, elements of the
left and right will clash after Khomeini's passing, but
that a coalition of secular, moderate religious, and mili-
tary forces, such as that described in the first scenario,
will be able to insert itself into the process, neutralize
both extreme groups, and establish a viable government prior
to the involvement of an outside force. Such a government
would probably be able to obtain broad popular support,
pursue the policies discussed in the first situation, and
incorporate all but the most radical elements of both extremes.
While nobody can predict which of the above scenarios
may develop, one thing is certain. Iran's revolution is as
yet unfinished, and it is fast approaching a critical junc-
ture. The political paralysis and economic stagnation
prevalent in Iran over the past year have worsened, and current
developments do not indicate that the trend is about to be
reversed.
Some years ago, Richard Cottam contrasted his first
two opportunities to view Iran in the following manner. At
the "apex of the Mossadeq era. .. Iran. . .had much verve but
little order." During the period of the late 1950 's, "one
of royal dictatorship. .. this Iran had much order but little
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verve." it remains to be seen whether, in the period
that lies ahead, Iran is destined to forever alternate between
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